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 This thesis examined the cognitive processes by which individuals engage in goal level 
choice and the affective processes that individuals experience during approach and avoidance goal 
striving.  The aim was to develop a set of formal theories that can explain and predict the 
trajectories in goal level choice and affective states as individuals strive towards goals framed as 
desirable or undesirable end-states.  These formal theories provide an explanation of processes at 
multiple levels of analysis, and incorporate constructs from the work motivation, self-regulation, 
emotion, personality, and decision making literatures.  Data from three experimental studies were 
analysed using multi-level techniques and computational modelling in order to test the proposed 
theories.  The findings are reported within three manuscripts that form the body of this thesis. 
 Manuscript 1 investigated goal level choice as a cognitive process involving an interaction 
of decision making, risk preferences, personality, and learning.  A computational model was 
developed in order to describe and predict how individuals make goal level choices over time.  
Drawing from the decision making literature, the model specifies that goal level choice at the 
within-person level can be explained by a dynamic anchoring and adjustment process and a risk 
preference bias.  The model further specifies that between-person variability in risk preferences can 
be partly explained by an interaction of goal framing and trait neuroticism.  An experimental study 
was conducted to evaluate this model.  Participants were randomly allocated to strive towards 
approach or avoidance framed goals as they performed a medium-fidelity Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) simulation task across 10 trials.  At the beginning of each trial, participants chose among 
five goal levels.  The findings of this study indicated that our hypothesized model was able to 
account for the trajectories of goal level choices over time.  Manuscript 1 contributed to the goal 
striving literature by identifying relevant cognitive processes in goal level choice. 
 Manuscripts 2 and 3 investigated the affective processes that emerge as individuals strive 
towards a chosen goal level in approach and avoidance contexts.  Manuscript 2 presented a scale 
validation study for the momentary affect scale (MAS), which was developed in order to measure 
the dynamics of affective experiences during goal striving.  As part of the scale validation, it was 
necessary to address the conceptual question of whether the affect scale should consist of unipolar 
or bipolar items.  Participants performed a medium-fidelity ATC simulation task and were 
repeatedly measured on a set of unipolar and bipolar affect items.  Multi-level confirmatory factor 
analyses were used to evaluate the problem of unipolarity versus bipolarity and to validate the MAS 
against the latent constructs being measured.  The findings of this study provided evidence of 
bipolarity in the structure of affect and indicated that the MAS can be used to measure rapid 
changes in affective states during goal striving. 
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 Manuscript 3 presented a formal model to explain how affective states change during 
approach and avoidance goal striving.  The model specifies that during goal striving, indicators of 
goal progress are associated with affective reactions on the valence dimension, whilst indicators of 
task demand are associated with affective reactions on the arousal dimension.  An empirical study 
was conducted to evaluate this model and identify whether it could account for the trajectories in 
affective states as participants strove towards approach or avoidance framed goals.  Participants 
performed a medium-fidelity ATC simulation task derived from the study in Manuscript 1, but 
modified with longer goal striving episodes and greater variability in workload in order to observe 
greater range and duration of affective experiences.  Affect ratings were collected on the MAS at 
one minute intervals as participants engaged in goal striving across five trials.  The hypothesized 
model and a series of nested alternative models were fitted to the data.  The findings indicated that 
the hypothesized model provided a parsimonious and accurate account of the changes in valence 
and arousal in relation to the indicators of goal progress and task demand, respectively.  Manuscript 
3 contributed to the goal striving literature by providing a formal account of how affective states 
can change over time as individuals engage in approach or avoidance goal striving. 
 The overall contribution of this thesis is to further the theoretical and empirical 
understanding of cognitive and affective processes in goal striving.  The theoretical frameworks 
used in these papers emphasize the role of multi-disciplinary and integrative approaches for 
understanding complex phenomena.  Specifically, the integration of multiple disciplines and 
constructs enable a more precise account of how goal level choice and affective states vary over 
time.  A key methodological advantage of this research is the use of multi-level research designs 
and computational modelling, which are appropriate for testing dynamic constructs and process-
based theories.  In terms of practical implications, the models in these studies offer insight into 
patterns of human behaviour and affective experiences during goal striving, which can be applied in 
the domain of human factors.  
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Modelling Dynamic Affective and Decision Making Processes 
during Approach and Avoidance Goal Striving 
One of the most significant contributions in the history of psychological research is the 
concept of goals.  Goals act as an internal representation of desired or undesired states – depending 
on whether the goal is framed in terms of approach or avoidance – and provide a basis for 
understanding and motivating basic elements of our thoughts and behaviours (Austin & Vancouver, 
1996; Elliot & Friedman, 2007).  A multitude of decision making, work motivation, and self-
regulatory theories draw upon goals as a construct (Carver & Scheier, 1990; DeShon & Gillespie, 
2005; Elliot, 1999; Klein, 1991; Krantz & Kunreuther, 2007; Locke & Latham, 2002; Mento, 
Locke, & Klein, 1992; Roney & O'Connor, 2008).  Public awareness about goals is also increasing: 
goals are becoming prolific in organisational plans, job performance reviews, exercise and health 
programs, and electronic games and apps (Latham, Borgogni, & Petitta, 2008; Locke & Latham, 
2002; Nahrgang et al., 2013; Sullivan & Rothman, 2008).  There is little doubt that setting and 
attaining goals can have long-term consequences on motivation, performance, and wellbeing (Cron, 
Slocum Jr., VandeWalle, & Fu, 2005; Elliot, Sheldon, & Church, 1997; Locke & Latham, 1990). 
Although there is a general understanding about how goals can be prescribed as an 
intervention, much less research has examined the underlying cognitive and affective processes that 
occur during goal striving (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Vancouver & Day, 2005; Vancouver, 
Weinhardt, & Schmidt, 2010).  The goal setting literature indicates that individuals who set 
difficult, specific, and attainable goals will tend to achieve high performance outcomes (Locke & 
Latham, 1990), but this literature does not explain the process by which individuals choose among 
goal level alternatives.  Conceptually, goal level choice is a cognitive process involving elements of 
decision making, risk, and learning – which may be further differentiated by whether the goal is 
framed in terms of approach or avoidance (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Kanfer, 2009; Mento, et al., 
1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  Without an understanding of the dynamics of these processes, 
it is not possible to explain and predict the goal level choices of individuals as they engage in goal 
striving.  Similarly, recent studies have identified that particular affective states can impact on 
behaviours and perceptions that relate to goal striving (Barsade & Gibson, 2007; Louro, Pieters, & 
Zeelenberg, 2007; Seo, Goldfarb, & Barrett, 2010; Seo & Ilies, 2009).  However, the affective 
processes that occur during goal striving remain poorly understood, rendering it difficult to explain 
how affect changes during goal striving (Briner, 1999; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).  The affective 
experiences of striving towards approach versus avoidance goals may also differ, which indicates 
that it is necessary to distinguish the role of goal framing (Carver, 2006; Elliot, et al., 1997).  These 
issues highlight an important theoretical and empirical gap in the literature. 
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The nature of the problem is not a lack of verbalised theory about goal striving as a process.  
Several theories over the past few decades have attempted to describe elements of goal level choice 
and affective experiences during goal striving (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; 
Strickland & Galimba, 2001; Tolli & Schmidt, 2008; Wofford, Goodwin, & Premack, 1992).  
Control theory is perhaps the most well-established framework for examining goal striving (Powers, 
1978; Vancouver, 2008).  It describes an information processing system in which an individual 
strives to monitor and reduce discrepancies between a comparator (desired state) and the current 
state of the environment (current state) (see Figure 1).  This system is a process representation of 
how people make progress towards their goals, and it can be extended to include higher order goals 
or multiple goal contexts (see DeShon, Kozlowski, Schmidt, Milner, & Wiechmann, 2004).  
Control theory has also been used as a framework to describe the relationship between affect and 
perceived discrepancies in rate of progress during goal striving (Carver & Scheier, 1990).   
 
Figure 1.  A simple control theory framework representing discrepancy reduction processes. 
 
The problem, however, is that control theory and the other verbalised theories offer an 
informal account of goal striving processes (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2010; Vancouver, Putka, & 
Scherbaum, 2005).  These theories are useful for generating initial ideas and stimulating theory-
building, but do not offer a precise description of underlying cognitive and affective processes, nor 
address the dynamic and non-linear properties that should be involved (Vancouver, 2008; Wood, 
2005).  For instance, verbal theory may state that individuals experience more pleasant states with 
higher performance, but this statement does not account for the different ways in which 
performance can be perceived, or how pleasant states may decay and return to baseline over time.  
Verbal theories tend to describe processes and relationships at a level of abstraction that makes it 
difficult to generate consistent and verifiable predictions (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2010; Luce, 
1995; Vancouver, 2008). 
There are recent calls for formal theories that can address these limitations of verbal theories 
and advance the understanding of goal striving processes (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2010; 
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computational models, which consist of mathematical statements that are precise, transparent, and 
empirically testable (Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2010).  Given that all parts of a formal theory need to 
be specified in a computational model, they can also improve the consistency and rigor in how 
concepts are developed and operationalized (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2010).  The language of 
computational modelling can also explicitly address the role of dynamic and non-linear properties 
in complex processes (Vancouver, 2008; Vancouver, et al., 2010).  Based on these advantages, I 
propose that a transition from verbal and informal theories to computational and formal theories can 
offer greater insight about the cognitive and affective processes in goal striving. 
This thesis presents a research program that examined three components of the goal striving 
process: 1) the cognitive processes involved in making decisions about goal level across multiple 
goal striving episodes; 2) the affective processes that emerge within goal striving episodes; and, 3) 
the role of the approach-avoidance distinction in goal level choice and affective experiences.  The 
aim was to develop a set of formal theories that can explain and predict the trajectories in goal level 
choice and affective experiences as individuals strive towards approach or avoidance goals.  This 
research program is structured around three manuscripts – one that has been published, and two that 
have been prepared to be submitted for publication.  The manuscripts present the formal models and 
empirical studies that address the aims of this research program.  There are several common themes 
in the methodology and analysis strategy that occur throughout the manuscripts.  I provide a 
description and justification of these themes in the next section, followed by an overview of each 
manuscript. 
Methodology 
In order to examine goal level choices and affective states as they varied over time, several 
decisions had to be made about the methodology of the research program – specifically the research 
design, the experimental task, and the research scope.  A central theme in this research is the use of 
multi-level research designs to examine changes at the within-person, between-person, and 
between-group levels.  At the within-person level, my studies observed how goal level choices and 
affective states varied for each individual as they engaged in a series of goal striving episodes.  At 
the between-person level, my studies accounted for processes that are subject to individual 
differences, such as learning rates and sensitivity to losses.  Goal framing was manipulated at the 
between-group level in order to understand how the approach-avoidance distinction can impact on 
lower level processes (cf. Sullivan & Rothman, 2008; Sullivan, Worth, Baldwin, & Rothman, 
2006).  In this way, my research design is matched to the nature of the phenomena being studied, 
and is capable of observing effects at different levels of variability (Mehta & Neale, 2005; Muthén, 
1994; Vancouver & Day, 2005). 
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 The experimental task used in this research program was a medium-fidelity Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) simulation task (Fothergill, Loft, & Neal, 2009; Loft, Hill, Neal, Humphreys, & 
Yeo, 2004).  This is a complex cognitive and perceptual task in which individuals monitor the flow 
of aircraft across a pre-defined sector (see Figure 2).  The ATC task provides high experimental 
control and flexibility in the use of manipulations, while still being engaging and capable of 
producing meaningful patterns of behaviour and affect over time (Fothergill, et al., 2009).  The task 
can be scripted to present a range of items at regular intervals in order to track various measures 
over time, making it suited to observing dynamic processes during goal striving (see Scandura & 
Williams, 2000).  Although the specifics of the ATC task can be modified to meet the requirements 
of each researcher, it typically consists of participants having to monitor a two-dimensional air 
sector that contains various aircraft routes.  Scripted aircraft move across the sector on these routes, 
and participants need to identify and designate crossing aircraft pairs as either conflict or non-
conflicts based on whether the pair will violate separation standards.  Participants receive training 
and practice on basic ATC and conflict detection concepts before they perform on the task.  At the 
beginning of each trial, the participants are instructed to set a goal level to indicate their target 
performance in identifying aircraft pairs accurately and promptly. 
 
  
Figure 2.  A screenshot of the ATC simulation task with QFA294 and QFA182 in conflict. 
 
 In order to develop a precise understanding of the processes within goal striving, the scope 
of my research program focused on a single goal paradigm.  Individuals were able to choose their 
goal levels across multiple goal striving episodes, but only strove towards a single goal at a time.  
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The concept of striving towards multiple goals is undoubtedly important to address in the goal 
striving literature (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Louro, et al., 2007).  There are many occasions 
where individuals have to manage multiple goals, and additional processes are likely required to 
understand how individuals engage in behaviours such as goal switching or goal abandonment 
(DeShon, et al., 2004; Vancouver, et al., 2010).  Compared to the complexity of multiple goal 
paradigms, however, a single goal paradigm can make it easier to distinguish and precisely examine 
the underlying processes in goal striving.  The findings obtained from single goal paradigms about 
goal striving should also be relevant to multiple goal contexts, except that further research beyond 
the scope of this thesis would need to incorporate the additional sources of information and 
decisions involved with multiple goals. 
 The scope of this research is focused on short episodes of goal striving that last between five 
to 15 minutes for each trial in my studies.  This short time scale made it possible to observe 
proximal and dynamic changes in goal striving processes (Fisher & Noble, 2004; Miner & Glomb, 
2010; Vancouver, Thompson, & Williams, 2001).  In contrast, longitudinal studies that examine 
goal striving over weeks, months, or years can observe long-term trends and capture the effects of 
more distal constructs.  However, what may appear as stable trends in constructs over longer time 
scales may actually contain a series of meaningful fluctuations over shorter intervals (see 
Raudenbush, 2000; Vancouver, et al., 2001; G. Yeo & Neal, 2006).  Momentary changes in 
workload, performance, or affective states are likely to be sufficient to produce changes in 
behaviour during goal striving.  By using a research design with a short time scale in the 
experimental task and measures, this thesis addresses the processes in goal striving that vary over 
the span of seconds or minutes. 
Analysis Strategy 
In line with the methodology outlined above, a combination of multi-level analyses and 
computational modelling were used to examine the aims of my research.  Multi-level analyses have 
gained prominence in organisational psychology research as an appropriate way to understand 
constructs that vary at different levels (see DeShon, et al., 2004; Dyer, Hanges, & Hall, 2005; Koy 
& Yeo, 2008; Miner & Glomb, 2010; Muthén, 1994; Reise, Ventura, Nuechterlein, & Kim, 2005; 
G. B. Yeo & Neal, 2004).  Scholars have found that examining relationships among constructs at 
different levels of analyses has significant implications on the conclusions drawn from the data 
(Gee, Ballard, Yeo, & Neal, 2012; Vancouver, More, & Yoder, 2008; G. Yeo, Loft, Xiao, & 
Kiewitz, 2009; G. Yeo & Neal, 2006).  My research design allowed for observations of goal level 
choice and affective states as they varied at the within-person, between-person, and between-group 
levels.  In order to appropriately distinguish these effects, my analysis strategy consisted of 
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identifying the sources of variance and partitioning them into the appropriate level of analysis (see 
Muthén, 1994). 
The use of computational modelling was also a significant component of my analysis 
strategy.  Computational models provide a language for expressing formal theories (Lewandowsky 
& Farrell, 2010).  These models are developed with mathematical equations that can provide 
specific, testable predictions about dynamic relationships among theoretical constructs (Hulin & 
Ilgen, 2000; Vancouver, 2009).  Computational models are appropriate for examining processes in 
goal striving because they allow researchers to compute variables that, for example, can retain 
memory or update dynamically (Vancouver, et al., 2005).  The use of mathematical equations also 
provides a common language for quantifying the processes among constructs, particularly when 
these constructs are taken from different disciplines.  This research program – particularly 
Manuscripts 1 and 3 –  uses computational models to explain and test processes involved in goal 
level choice and affective experiences during goal striving. 
Overview of Manuscripts in the Thesis 
In this section, I provide an overview of the manuscripts incorporated in this thesis.  I 
summarise how each manuscript addresses the overall aim of examining the cognitive and affective 
processes in goal striving, and the methodology and findings involved.  My first manuscript 
addressed the cognitive processes that enable individuals to make goal level choices across multiple 
approach and avoidance goal striving episodes.  A formal model is presented to describe goal level 
choice as a decision process involving risk.  My second and third manuscripts addressed how 
affective states emerge within approach and avoidance goal striving episodes.  The second 
manuscript focused on validating a measure of affect that can be used during goal striving, and the 
third manuscript presented a formal model that describes how affective states emerge in response to 
indicators of goal progress and task demand during goal striving. 
Manuscript One 
Goal level choice is an important component of goal striving because it defines the end-state 
that an individual will attend to and strive towards.  Goal level choice occurs whenever an 
individual sets a goal, and the goal level may also be revised over time in response to changes in the 
environment or capabilities of the individual (Tolli & Schmidt, 2008).  To improve the 
understanding of how individuals engage in this process, Manuscript 1 examined the cognitive 
processes involved in goal level choice.  Specifically, I considered how goal level choice can be 
described as a process involving constructs from the decision making, risk preference, learning, and 
personality literatures.  The concept of goal level choice has a parallel in the decision making 
literature, because it can be viewed as a decision process in which an individual needs to make a 
trade-off between the value of the desired outcome and the expectancy of success.  Higher goal 
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levels correspond to higher performance expectations, which tend to relate to higher intrinsic or 
extrinsic outcomes when the goal is attained (Locke & Latham, 1990; Mento, et al., 1992).  
However, higher goal levels also diminish the likelihood of goal attainment, particular when there 
are limited resources or time constraints.  Most individuals do not choose a very difficult goal level 
where there is essentially no chance of success, and yet they are also unlikely to choose an easy 
goal level that guarantees success with little sense of achievement.  Instead, there is likely a process 
of maximisation or optimisation where the individual yokes their goal level to their perceived 
performance capability (see March, 1996; March & Shapira, 1992).  The element of risk preference 
emerges when the individual systematically chooses goal levels that deviate from their perceived 
performance capability.  The concept of learning is an additional dynamic factor that can account 
for how goal levels are adjusted as people receive feedback and improve their performance on a 
task over repeated trials (see J. R. Anderson, 1995; Erev & Barron, 2005). 
The decision making literature suggests that it is also necessary to consider how goal 
framing can impact on goal level choice.  The concept of framing is important because the manner 
in which a decision is framed – either in terms of potential gains or losses – can significantly 
influence risk preferences (Barberis, Huang, & Santos, 2001; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Kuhberger, 1998).  I examined whether this phenomenon in the decision making domain would 
extend to the context of goal level choice.  Conceptually, goals can also be distinguished in terms of 
focusing on approach (gain) or avoidance (loss) framed outcomes (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Elliot, 
1999).  An additional factor to consider, however, is that how individuals respond to framing may 
depend on personality (Tett & Burnett, 2003).  Therefore, Manuscript 1 also considered how 
individual differences in trait neuroticism might influence risk preferences, particularly in terms of a 
possible interaction with goal framing (Elliot & Thrash, 2002; Tett & Burnett, 2003).  Trait 
neuroticism has been related to increased risk aversive behaviour (Lommen, Engelhard, & van den 
Hout, 2010; Nicholson, Soane, Fenton-O'Creevy, & Willman, 2005), and people who have high 
trait neuroticism may be particularly sensitive to losses as they engage in avoidance goal striving 
(see Tett & Burnett, 2003). 
To address these questions, an experimental study was conducted with participants making 
goal level choices over multiple trials on an ATC task.  The goal levels represented discrete 
performance standards on the number of correct or incorrect decisions to be made within each trial.  
Each trial lasted for five minutes and the participants received immediate audio-visual feedback on 
whether they made correct or incorrect judgements about aircraft pairs.  Goal framing was 
manipulated at the between-group level with participants being randomly allocated to approach or 
avoidance framed goals, associated with making correct decisions or preventing incorrect decisions, 
respectively.  Participants also provided ratings of their level of trait neuroticism.  A computational 
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model was developed to explain goal level choices over time using an intercept, anchoring and 
adjustment, and risk preference bias parameter.  These parameters were allowed to freely vary 
across individuals to account for individual differences in learning rates and risk preferences. 
The findings from this study revealed that goal level choice can be described as a decision 
process involving risk.  The proposed model was able to predict goal level choices over time and 
across individuals through cognitive processes commonly used in the decision making literature.  
Participants appeared to anchor their goal level choices against feedback about their prior 
performance, and they made partial adjustments as their performance changed over time.  These 
adjustments represented a learning process that varied in its rate across individuals.  The findings 
also indicated that choices were influenced by risk preferences and goal framing, such that 
participants with avoidance framed goals were significantly more risk averse than those with 
approach framed goals.  That is, participants with avoidance framed goals, on average, 
systematically chose goal levels that were below their prior performance level.  Participants with 
approach framed goals, on average, appeared to choose goal levels that were closely matched to 
prior performance.  Finally, the findings indicated that personality can interact with the framing 
context to impact on risk preferences for goals.  Specifically, participants who pursued avoidance 
framed goals made goal level choices that were significantly more risk averse if they had high trait 
neuroticism than compared to those who had low trait neuroticism. 
Overall, this study provides an integrative and multi-level perspective on the cognitive 
processes involved in making goal level choice during approach or avoidance goal striving.  By 
offering a process description, the proposed model offers greater insight and precision about how 
individuals engage in goal level choice than compared to traditional verbal theories.  The proposed 
model can account for the decision making and learning components that predict changes in goal 
level over time, and also addresses the role of goal framing and trait neuroticism in influencing the 
element of risk in these decisions. 
Manuscript Two 
Although Manuscript 1 provides an initial framework for understanding goal level choice 
within goal striving, it was also my aim to investigate the role of affect.  The recent self-regulation 
literature has sought to incorporate affective processes as studies indicate that affect can impact on 
constructs that are relevant to goal striving, such as motivation, self-efficacy, risk preference, and 
goal prioritization (Barsade & Gibson, 2007; Brief & Weiss, 2002; Carver, 2003; Foo, Uy, & 
Baron, 2009; Miner & Glomb, 2010; Seo, Bartunek, & Barrett, 2010).  These findings suggest that 
goal striving processes cannot be fully understood without considering the affective component. 
Manuscript 2 addressed an initial methodological challenge of designing a brief scale that 
can measure momentary changes in affective states (see Hinkin, 1998).  There was also a theoretical 
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issue about whether affect should be conceptualised along unipolar or bipolar dimensions, which 
would impact on the composition of items in the scale (see Barrett & Russell, 1998; Watson & 
Clark, 1997).  The aim of the manuscript was to develop and validate the momentary affect scale 
(MAS), which can be completed quickly by participants as they perform on dynamic tasks and 
engage in goal striving.  The MAS was examined in an experimental study involving a version of 
the ATC task that was designed to be cognitively demanding and likely to produce variation in 
affective states (see Fothergill, et al., 2009).  The participants completed eight trials on the task and 
provided ratings on the two bipolar items that comprised the MAS on each trial, and 16 unipolar 
items from the UWIST Mood Adjective Checklist on every second trial (Matthews, Jones, & 
Chamberlain, 1990).  The responses on these two scales at the within- and between-person levels 
were used to evaluate the unipolarity-bipolarity problem.  The MAS was evaluated by comparing 
the correspondence between the two bipolar items and the latent factor structure of the unipolar 
items. 
 The findings from this study demonstrated evidence of bipolarity in the structure of affect, 
such that the affect ratings made by participants were best described by two bipolar factors rather 
than four unipolar factors.  The responses on the two bipolar items from the MAS were also 
correlated with the latent factor structure of the 16 unipolar items in the expected direction.  This 
indicated that the bipolar items from the MAS are capable of observing responses across the affect 
circumplex in an appropriate manner.  This study contributes to the literature by examining the 
structure of affect from a dynamic perspective and providing new evidence of bipolarity through 
multi-level analyses.  The MAS also makes a practical contribution by providing researchers with a 
tool to measure affective states quickly, while minimizing disruption and response fatigue.  For the 
purpose of my research program, this study validates a measure that can be used to obtain ratings of 
affect within short intervals during goal striving.  The capability to observe brief fluctuations in 
affect is valuable given that the goal striving processes being investigated can change rapidly. 
Manuscript Three 
Manuscript 3 examined the role of affective processes during goal striving.  The aim was to 
develop a formal model that can explain how affective states emerge as individuals strive towards 
approach or avoidance framed goals.  Although there is a growing body of literature on the 
consequences of affect, much less research has been conducted on how it emerges and changes 
during goal striving (Brief & Weiss, 2002; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).  Yet knowing how 
affective states emerge is just as important as knowing its impact on subsequent behaviour – both 
theoretically in terms of understanding affect as a dynamic process, and practically in terms of 
predicting how individuals are likely to feel under different conditions of goal striving.  The 
existing work to date has focused on one of two approaches: either examining a broad range of 
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discrete personal and workplace events that trigger affective experiences (Brief & Weiss, 2002; 
Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), or 
considering how goal-related performance can influence affect (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Cron, et 
al., 2005; Miner & Glomb, 2010).  Manuscript 3 focused on the latter approach in order to explain 
the process by which performance influences affective experiences during goal striving, as well as 
how these experiences can be influenced by the distinction between striving for approach or 
avoidance goals (see Carver & Scheier, 1990; Roney, Higgins, & Shah, 1995). 
The relationship between performance and affect is complicated by the various ways in 
which the former construct can be conceptualised.  There is conflicting evidence about whether 
affect should respond to performance when it is defined as a position discrepancy or velocity 
discrepancy (Brunstein, 1993; Chang, Johnson, & Lord, 2010; Hsee, Abelson, & Salovey, 1991; 
Lawrence, Carver, & Scheier, 2002).  Position discrepancy refers to the difference between an 
individual’s current state and their desired state, while velocity discrepancy refers to the difference 
between an individual’s current rate of progress and their desired or expected rate of progress 
(Carver & Scheier, 1990).  The event of goal attainment is also well-established as an important 
indicator of performance that can influence affective states (Bagozzi, Baumgartner, & Pieters, 1998; 
Smith, Ntoumanis, Duda, & Vansteenkiste, 2011).  Individuals who perform over time also 
experience varying levels of task demand, which can be described as the perceived level of 
attentional, cognitive, and physical effort needed to meet the current workload (Pfaff, 2006).  The 
level of task demand tends to be associated with changes in arousal (Carpenter, Just, Keller, Eddy, 
& Thulborn, 1999; Matthews & Davies, 1998).  However, there is a lack of clarity on whether the 
other constructs should relate to valence, arousal, or other dimensions of affect (see Carver, 2006; 
Carver & Scheier, 1990; Higgins, 1997; Hsee, et al., 1991).  Several theories also indicate that the 
relationship between performance and affect is further shaped by goal framing (Carver & Scheier, 
1998; Elliot, et al., 1997; Higgins et al., 2001; Holman, Totterdell, & Rogelberg, 2005).  Framing 
has been suggested to activate one of two distinct affect systems described as energetic and tense 
arousal, such that the same performance under different framing conditions can produce divergent 
affective responses (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Higgins, 1997; Roney, et al., 1995). 
To address these mixed accounts of affective experiences, Manuscript 3 presented a formal 
model that offers a parsimonious and integrative explanation of affective experiences during goal 
striving.  The model focuses on the two primary dimensions of affect – valence and arousal (Yik, 
Russell, & Barrett, 1999).  Based on a self-regulatory framework presented by Seo, Barrett, and 
Bartunek (2004), the proposed model specifies that valence is a dynamic variable that should 
respond to changes in the indicators of goal progress, which are a combination of position 
discrepancy, velocity discrepancy, and goal attainment state.  Arousal is specified as a dynamic 
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variable that should respond to changes in task demand.  This framework was also used to examine 
whether a more parsimonious explanation could account for the effects of goal framing.  I suggested 
that approach and avoidance goal striving are qualitatively different in terms of how they impact on 
indicators of goal progress.  For instance, approach and avoidance goal striving can be distinguished 
as moving towards desired end-states or preventing movement towards undesired end-states, 
respectively.  Assuming equivalent performance, individuals with approach goals may experience 
an upward trajectory in valence as they gradually move towards the desired state through 
accumulated gains, while those with avoidance goals may experience a downward trajectory in 
valence as they gradually move towards the undesired state through accumulated losses.  It is 
possible that different affective responses under approach and avoidance goal striving can be 
satisfactorily explained with a common set of goal progress indicators that adopt different values, 
rather than inferring the activation of two independent affective systems.  To evaluate this formal 
model, a set of predictions about the trajectories of affective states were generated for 2 x 2 
conditions: whether an individual was striving for approach or avoidance goals, and whether they 
attained or failed to attain their goal.  The predictions of the formal model and a series of nested 
alternative models were compared to empirical data. 
The empirical data was obtained by conducting a study where participants performed a 
medium-fidelity ATC simulation task that was adapted from the study in Manuscript 1.  The task 
was modified to contain longer goal striving episodes and greater variability in workload in order to 
observe greater range and duration of affective experiences.  Participants were randomly allocated 
to pursue either approach or avoidance framed goals.  They made goal level choices and engaged in 
goal striving over five 14 minute trials.  Each trial was scripted so that the flow of aircraft traffic 
contained two peaks and a trough in workload (see Figure 3).  At each minute interval, the task was 
paused and participants provided responses on the MAS (Gee, et al., 2012).  This design captured 
ratings of affective states within individuals at one minute intervals across 70 minutes of goal 
striving.  A set of nested computational models was fitted to the data to examine whether they could 
account for the patterns of affect ratings over time. 
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The findings from this study supported the proposed model, indicating that it had 
significantly better fit to the data than each of the nested alternative models.  The proposed model 
accounted for asymmetrical trajectories in affective states during approach versus avoidance goal 
striving, and also distinguished between trials where participants attained or failed to attain their 
goal.  On trials where individuals attained their goals, those with approach goals demonstrated a 
gradual upward trajectory in valence, while those with avoidance goals maintained a relatively 
stable level of valence.  On trials where individuals failed to attain their goals, those with approach 
goals demonstrated a gradual downward trajectory in valence, while those with avoidance goals had 
a steeper decline that was punctuated by the time interval where goal failure occurred.  Arousal 
reflected a pattern that was similar to the scripted workload cycle.  Our model was able to predict 
and explain these trajectories in valence and arousal with the indicators of goal progress and task 
demand, respectively. 
The key contribution of this paper is the introduction of a formal model that integrates 
multiple goal striving constructs and goal framing to explain affective experiences during goal 
striving.  The model was able to account for dynamic changes in valence and arousal across 
multiple goal striving episodes, and also accounted for divergences in affect trajectories between 
approach and avoidance goal striving.  The existing affect literature has demonstrated that the 
experience of particular affective states can significantly impact on cognition and behaviour 
(Barsade & Gibson, 2007; Brief & Weiss, 2002); this paper contributes towards understanding how 
these affective states can emerge and change during goal striving. 
Overall, the three manuscripts in this thesis addressed the role of cognitive and affective 
processes in goal striving – the decision process of goal level choice at the initiation of goal striving 
and the emergent affective states during goal striving, respectively.  Each manuscript is presented in 
sequence over the next three sections of this thesis.  In the general discussion section of the thesis, I 
present a summary of key findings in relation to the overall process of goal striving, and the 
theoretical, empirical, methodological, and practical contributions of this research program.  The 
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Abstract 
We investigated the role of goal framing and trait neuroticism in goal level choice across multiple 
performance episodes.  Sixty participants were allocated to an approach or avoidance goal framing 
context.  Each participant made goal level choices across 10 trials as they performed a dynamic Air 
Traffic Control simulation task.  We developed a formal computational model to account for the 
goal level choice data at the individual and aggregate levels.  The results of fitted model parameters 
for each individual indicated that participants with avoidance framed goals were more risk averse 
when making goal level choices than those with approach framed goals.  Among those individuals 
with avoidance framed goals, those with high trait neuroticism were significantly more risk averse 
than those with low trait neuroticism.  These findings clarify the role of the approach-avoidance 
distinction and risk preferences in goal level choice, and demonstrate that activated traits can 
moderate the impact of goal framing. 
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A Risk-Based Computational Model of Goal Level Choice 
in Approach and Avoidance Contexts 
 
“The greater danger for most of us lies not in setting our aim too high and falling short; 
but in setting our aim too low, and achieving our mark.” 
‒ Michelangelo Buonarroti 
 
 Goal-directed behavior is an essential aspect of human activity (Diefendorff & Chandler, 
2011).  Goals are internal representations of desired or undesired states that provide direction for 
attention, effort, and performance (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Elliot, 
Sheldon, & Church, 1997).  Many studies demonstrate that people who set difficult, specific, yet 
attainable goals are more likely to achieve higher levels of performance than those who do not 
(Locke & Latham, 1990, 2002).  It is not surprising that goal setting is increasingly prevalent in 
organizational environments (Latham, Borgogni, & Petitta, 2008).  However, the question of how 
people choose goal levels, particularly within dynamic task environments, has received much less 
attention (Ilies & Judge, 2005; Tolli & Schmidt, 2008; Tubbs, Boehne, & Dahl, 1993; Vancouver, 
2008).  Furthermore, the few studies that examine goal level choice have focused on settings in 
which people strive to approach desired outcomes (Bandura & Cervone, 1983; Lee, Locke, & Phan, 
1997; Seo & Ilies, 2009; Wofford, Goodwin, & Premack, 1992).  Less is known about the way that 
people choose among goal level alternatives when they are striving to avoid undesired outcomes 
(Elliot, et al., 1997).  Yet the achievement motivation literature demonstrates that negative 
outcomes are at least as important as positive outcomes in motivating behavior (Atkinson, 1966; 
Taylor, 1991).  Likewise, little is known about the individual differences that might moderate goal 
level choice in such contexts. 
 One way to understand goal level choice is as a decision process involving risk.  To choose 
between a range of goal levels to be achieved within a defined limit of resources or time constraints, 
a person needs to consider the tradeoff between the potential payoffs and the likelihood of goal 
attainment.  Easy goals entail minimal risk, but tend to have relatively low payoffs (Locke & 
Latham, 1990; Mento, Locke, & Klein, 1992).  Difficult goals entail greater risk, but tend to have 
higher payoffs.  These goals and their associated payoffs may refer to desired outcomes (e.g., higher 
payoffs representing larger rewards) in approach contexts, or undesired outcomes (e.g., higher 
payoffs representing smaller penalties) in avoidance contexts.  The amount of risk that a person is 
willing to take relative to the payoffs will inform their goal level choice.  The instrumentality of 
goal attainment may also be an additional factor that can influence choices – though for the scope of 
this paper, we propose to focus on goal level choice under the context of high instrumentality. 
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 Based on the above conception, we should be able to use the long history of research in the 
decision making and motivation literatures to predict the effects of approach and avoidance framing 
on behavior (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Elliot, 2006; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kuhberger, 1998).  
However, the effects that have been observed in these literatures are very different.  On one hand, 
studies in decision making have found that people become more risk seeking when decision 
outcomes are framed in terms of potential losses as compared to potential gains (Camerer, 2000; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  This suggests a preference for more difficult goal levels with 
avoidance framed goals.  On the other hand, research in the approach and avoidance motivation 
literature suggests that framing a goal in terms of avoidance can undermine task motivation and 
performance (Elliot, et al., 1997; Sullivan & Rothman, 2008; Sullivan, Worth, Baldwin, & 
Rothman, 2006), which may correspond to preferences for easier, less risky goal levels.  There is 
also evidence that the pattern of risk preferences observed in static decision making tasks may be 
reversed in dynamic task environments that allow for ambiguity and learning (Erev & Barron, 2005; 
March, 1996).  These views generate different predictions regarding the effect of avoidance framing 
on goal level choice, particularly since we are interested in understanding these choices in a 
dynamic task environment. 
It is also necessary to recognize that people bring pre-existing behavioral tendencies or traits 
to any context.  Social cognitive approaches to personality regard personality traits as learned 
responses to situational cues (e.g., Mischel, 2004; Tett & Burnett, 2003).  According to this view, 
contextual factors cue the expression of personality traits, producing differences in the way that 
people respond in a given situation.  We use trait activation theory (Tett & Burnett, 2003) to 
understand how framing may cue the expression of personality and explain differences in goal level 
choice between individuals.  Specifically, we propose that trait neuroticism will activate when 
undesirable outcomes are made salient (Paulus, Rogalsky, Simmons, Feinstein, & Stein, 2003; Tett 
& Burnett, 2003), and account for differences in risk aversion between individuals. 
 In this paper, we describe a study where people continually choose and revise goal levels 
over multiple performance episodes.  We consider how goal framing contributes to risk preferences, 
and how framing interacts with trait neuroticism, to explain differences in goal level choice across 
individuals.  In order to achieve these aims, we developed a formal computational model of this 
process and fitted it to the goal level choice data.  Specifically, we used the individual level 
parameters derived from fitting each individual to a non-linear, dynamic model to test predictions 
about the effect of goal framing and neuroticism on risk preferences. 
A Formal Model of Goal Level Choice 
 To contribute towards understanding the goal level choice process, we propose a formal 
computational model to represent how people choose and revise goal levels over time.  There is an 
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increasing movement towards using formal (i.e., computational) models to understand self-
regulatory and goal setting phenomena (see Vancouver, Putka, & Scherbaum, 2005; Vancouver, 
Weinhardt, & Schmidt, 2010).  Formal models can offer a more precise description of the 
relationships among constructs and dynamic processes than traditional verbal theories (DeSchon, 
2013; Vancouver et al., 2005).  In this paper, we present a simple computational model in order to 
describe the dynamics of goal level choice over multiple performance episodes, and build on this 
model to account for risk preferences, goal framing, and individual differences in trait neuroticism. 
 To establish the scope and constraints of the model, we propose to focus on predicting goal 
level choice in a performance context, where individuals are setting a goal level that represents their 
target level of performance on a task.  To describe the dynamics of goal level choice over multiple 
performance episodes, we suggest an anchoring and adjustment process in which individuals set 
their goal level based on their expected level of performance, and where they revise their goal 
depending on feedback about the discrepancy between their expectations and actual performance.  
Therefore, the model initially specifies that on a given performance episode or trial (t), an 
individual will choose a goal level (gt) that is anchored to their expected performance for that trial 
(Pt).  Thus: 
 
tt Pg   (1) 
 This initial function is only useful when we further elaborate on how expected performance 
is determined over time.  In our model, the value for expected performance is adjusted as a running 
average over time using a standard delta-learning rule (Widrow & Hoff, 1960), such that with each 
new observation of performance on a completed trial, an individual will update their running 
average by a fraction of the difference between the previous value (Pt-1) and the new observation 
(pt-1).  This fraction is often referred to as the learning rate in models of learning (e.g., Anderson, 
1995), which we represent as a learning weight parameter () that is allowed to freely vary between 
0 and 1.0 at the between-person level in our model.  Thus: 
  111   tttt PpPP    (2) 
where higher values of  represent an individual with a higher rate of learning, such that the 
individual will tend to strongly adjust their level of expected performance in line with the most 
recent observation.  Lower values of  represent an individual with a lower rate of learning, such 
that the individual will tend to remain anchored to their running average and make smaller 
adjustments to their level of expected performance with each new observation.  Within the scope of 
this paper and for parsimony, the model assumes that the learning weight parameter is stable over 
time within individuals.  However, it is necessary to acknowledge that it is possible for the learning 
rate to gradually change over time and across different tasks, and this could be represented by 
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allowing the parameter to freely vary at the within-person level (i.e., t).  So far, we have a simple 
model that represents how individuals can gradually adjust their goal levels over time over multiple 
performance episodes, allowing for the possibility of fluctuations in performance that occur through 
noise or learning.  In the remaining sections, we relate the components of risk preferences, goal 
framing, and trait neuroticism to this model. 
Risk Preferences and Goal Framing 
 Risk preference can be defined as a bias towards choosing alternatives that have a relatively 
high or low probability of success (Atkinson, 1957; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995).  A risk seeking 
preference can be described to occur when individuals choose goal levels that are systematically 
higher than their expected performance, which would result in a lower probability of success.  A 
risk aversive preference occurs when individuals choose goal levels that are systematically lower 
than their expected performance, which would result in a higher probability of success.  Our model 
incorporates risk preferences by specifying that individuals will choose a goal level based on a 
combination of expected performance and a risk preference bias parameter (), which is allowed to 
freely vary at the between-person level.  Thus: 
  tt Pg  (3) 
where positive values of  represent individuals who choose to set goal levels that are higher than 
their expected performance, and negative values represent individuals who choose to set goal levels 
that are lower than their expected performance.  It is worth noting that the anchoring and adjustment 
process will occur dynamically over time, independently of the risk preference bias demonstrated 
by an individual.  This model, therefore, can distinguish between individuals who set high goal 
levels because they have a risk seeking bias versus those who set high goal levels because their 
level of expected performance is higher than what would be their actual performance (and do not 
actually have a risk seeking bias).  The former represents a risk preference, while the latter 
represents a matter of learning and calibration.  The literature indicates that risk preferences can 
also gradually change over the course of dozens of learning trials (see March, 1996).   The scope of 
the current paper, however, focuses more on the dynamics of the anchoring and adjustment process 
at the within-person level, and risk preference is examined at the between-person level to account 
for its variability across individuals and contexts. 
The context may have a particularly significant influence on risk preference.  Research in 
decision making has found that risk preferences can be strongly influenced by how decision 
outcomes are framed (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  When the outcomes of a decision are framed 
in terms of potential gains, studies have found that people typically choose alternatives that are 
relatively risk averse.  When the same outcomes are framed in terms of potential losses, people will 
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typically choose alternatives that are relatively risk seeking.  This pattern of preference reversal 
from decision framing has been demonstrated to be robust across many experimental and field 
studies, conducted across a range of contexts including gambling, health interventions, and stock 
trading (Barberis, Huang, & Santos, 2001; Camerer, 2000; Kuhberger, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981). 
The decision framing effect has been proposed to be due to a cognitive bias in which 
escalating gains and losses are associated with non-linear diminishing value (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979).  People perceive that the uncertain alternative of a large gain is relatively less desirable than 
a likely moderate gain; and they perceive that the uncertain alternative of a large loss is relatively 
less undesirable than a likely moderate loss.  These arguments suggest that when faced with a 
choice among alternative goal levels, people will have a stronger risk seeking preference if the goals 
are framed in terms of negatively valenced outcomes (losses) than if they are framed in terms of 
positively valenced outcomes (gains).  Therefore, we hypothesize that (H1a) goal framing will 
influence risk preferences, such that people in avoidance goal contexts will have higher risk seeking 
preferences than those in approach goal contexts.  This finding would be observed in the model if 
the bias parameter  is estimated to be significantly higher across individuals with avoidance 
framed goals than those with approach framed goals. 
 However, some recent studies in the motivational literature suggest a competing perspective 
on the effects of goal framing on motivation and behavior (Elliot, et al., 1997; Sullivan & Rothman, 
2008; Sullivan, et al., 2006).  These studies measured the effects of goal orientation on the 
motivation and performance of students pursuing academic grades (Elliot, et al., 1997; Sullivan, et 
al., 2006), or compared the eating habits of students who adopted approach or avoidance goals for 
health outcomes (Sullivan & Rothman, 2008).  The studies found that people who reported high 
avoidance goal orientations, or who adopted avoidance health goals, tended to demonstrate lower 
intrinsic motivation and task performance than those who reported high approach goal orientations 
or who adopted approach health goals.  The authors argued that avoidance goals tend to make 
negative outcomes more salient, produce greater anxiety and fear of failure, and result in lower 
intrinsic motivation than approach goals (Elliot, et al., 1997; Sullivan, et al., 2006).  They also 
argued that avoidance goals typically have less well-defined end-states, which provide less 
information about the required behavior for pursuing such goals and contributes to lower 
performance than compared to approach goals (Elliot, et al., 1997; Sullivan & Rothman, 2008). 
 In our study, we directly manipulate goal framing as our participants engage in an ongoing 
performance task.  Although the research by Elliot and colleagues has not explicitly measured goal 
level choice during approach or avoidance goal striving, we expect that the observed negative 
consequences of avoidance goals on motivation are likely to impact on the willingness to adopt 
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challenging and risky goal levels.  Based on the mechanisms proposed by Elliot and colleagues, 
avoidance goal framing should be less motivating than approach goals as individuals choose a goal 
level for an upcoming task, and we argue that this should lead to a preference for easier, less risky 
goal levels (see Dewett, 2007; Hollenbeck, Williams, & Klein, 1989; Krueger Jr. & Dickson, 1994).  
Therefore, we propose a competing hypothesis that (H1b) goal framing will influence risk 
preferences, such that people in avoidance goal contexts will have lower risk seeking preferences 
than those in approach goal contexts.  This finding would be observed in the model if the bias 
parameter  is estimated to be significantly lower across individuals with avoidance framed goals 
than those with approach framed goals. 
Risk Preferences and Neuroticism 
 In additional to contextual framing effects, a long tradition of research has investigated how 
personality constructs relate to risk preferences (Demaree, DeDonno, Burns, & Everhart, 2008; 
Nicholson, Soane, Fenton-O'Creevy, & Willman, 2005; Paunonen & Ashton, 2001).  For example, 
trait extraversion, neuroticism, sensation seeking, and impulsivity have been correlated with 
individual differences in risk preferences (Chauvin, Hermand, & Mullet, 2007; Clarke & Robertson, 
2005; Nicholson, et al., 2005; Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000).  However, the effects of personality 
constructs on risk preferences are often weak and inconsistent (Clarke & Robertson, 2005; 
Dahlbäck, 1990; Nicholson, et al., 2005), and it may actually be inappropriate to assume that 
personality constructs have consistent effects across all contexts.  Modern conceptualizations of 
personality focus on how context can moderate the expression of personality (e.g., Mischel 2004; 
Tett & Burnett, 2003). According to this view, a personality trait is a propensity to demonstrate a 
distinct pattern of behavior in response to contextual demands.  As explained below, there are 
strong grounds to believe that avoidance goal framing may cue the expression of neuroticism. 
 In our current study, we adopt a trait activation theory perspective (Tett & Burnett, 2003) to 
consider the relationship between personality traits and risk preferences within the avoidance 
context.  In particular, Elliot and Thrash (2002) note that individuals differ in their sensitivity and 
reactivity towards negative stimuli.  Of the Big Five personality traits, neuroticism is the trait that is 
most relevant in the context of avoidance motivation (Elliot & Thrash, 2002).  Neuroticism is 
characterized by a heightened perceptual vigilance, sensitivity, and reactivity towards the presence 
of negative stimuli (Elliot & Thrash, 2002; Smillie, Yeo, Furnham, & Jackson, 2006).  Although 
there are some mixed findings, studies generally suggest that neuroticism is positively related to 
risk aversion (Lommen, Engelhard, & van den Hout, 2010; Nicholson, et al., 2005; Paulus, et al., 
2003; Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000).  We anticipate, based on trait activation theory, that the 
pursuit of goals in an avoidance framed context should activate neuroticism and the tendency for 
risk aversive behavior.  Therefore, we hypothesize an interaction such that (H2) an individual’s 
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level of trait neuroticism will relate more positively to risk aversion under avoidance goal framing 
than approach goal framing. 
Method 
Participants 
 Sixty university students (38 women, 22 men; mean age = 21.98) participated in a 2 hour 
experiment for course credit or $20.00 if they were not eligible for course credit.  
Task 
The experimental task was a medium-fidelity Air Traffic Control simulation (Loft, Hill, 
Neal, Humphreys, & Yeo, 2004).  The simulation provides a dynamic and engaging task 
environment that produces realistic performance trajectories while retaining high experimental 
control (Fothergill, Loft, & Neal, 2009).  The task required participants to monitor aircraft that 
moved through controlled airspace and ensure that they did not violate the minimum vertical and 
lateral separation standards of 1000ft and 5 nautical miles, respectively.  To perform this task, 
participants had to detect and classify aircraft as conflict or non-conflict pairs.  Conflict pairs were 
defined as aircraft on the same flight level and crossing flight paths that would pass within 5 
nautical miles at their point of closest approach, thereby violating the minimum vertical and lateral 
separation standards.  Non-conflict pairs were defined as aircraft on the same flight level and 
crossing flight paths that would not violate the minimum lateral separation standard at their point of 
closest approach. 
Participants made classifications by firstly clicking on the flight level information panels of 
any two aircraft, where a confirmation response box would appear with the aircraft call signs, and 
subsequently clicking on either the conflict or non-conflict declaration button in that response box.  
When conflict pairs were classified, one aircraft in the pair would begin to climb 1000ft to ensure 
vertical separation.  As the climb required approximately 4 seconds in the simulation to complete, 
participants had to respond early enough to ensure the aircraft pair had the opportunity to be 
vertically separated prior to a loss of lateral separation.  For non-conflict pairs, participants had to 
classify them before they reached their point of closest approach. 
A single experimental trial on the task took 5 minutes to complete and contained six conflict 
aircraft pairs and four non-conflict aircraft pairs.  Immediate audio and visual feedback on 
performance was provided during the task as participants made classifications on aircraft pairs.  On 
each trial participants could make up to 10 correct or incorrect decisions.  For aircraft that were in 
conflict, a decision was scored as correct if the participant classified the pair as a conflict at least 4 
seconds before minimum separation would be violated.  For aircraft that were not in conflict, a 
decision was scored as correct if the participant classified the pair as a non-conflict before their 
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point of closest approach.  Incorrect decisions occurred when the participant made a 
misclassification or did not classify an aircraft pair in time. 
Goal Framing Manipulation 
As part of the goal framing manipulation, participants in the approach condition had to 
choose a goal of making at least 2, 4, 6, 8, or 10 correct decisions on an upcoming trial.  
Participants in the avoidance condition had to choose a goal of making no more than 8, 6, 4, 2, or 0 
incorrect decisions on an upcoming trial.  To associate these goals with positive and negative 
outcomes, we implemented a scoring system adapted from framing manipulations in decision 
making research (see Boettcher III, 2004; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & 
Lauriola, 2002).  The scoring system ensured that participants could make meaningful risk tradeoffs 
between the payoffs of goal attainment and the likelihood of goal attainment. 
In the approach condition, participants started with zero points.  They were instructed that 
they had the opportunity to gain up to 100 points on each upcoming trial, and that they could set a 
more challenging goal to maximize the number of points they stood to gain.  If the amount of 
correct decisions reached or exceeded the participant’s goal, they received an amount of points 
calculated by multiplying the chosen goal level by 10 (e.g., gain 80 points for attaining a goal level 
of eight correct decisions).  However, the participants received zero points if they failed to attain 
their goal.  Choosing more difficult goal levels could increase the amount of points gained, but 
lowered the likelihood of goal attainment. 
In the avoidance condition, participants started with 1000 points.  They were instructed that 
they had the risk of losing up to 100 points on each upcoming trial, and that they could set a more 
difficult goal to minimize the number of points they stood to lose.  If the number of incorrect 
decisions did not exceed the participant’s goal, the participant lost an amount of points calculated 
by multiplying the chosen goal level by 10 (e.g., lose 20 points for attaining a goal level of two 
incorrect decisions).   However, the participants would lose all 100 points if they failed to maintain 
their goal.  Choosing more difficult goals could decrease the amount of points lost, but also lowered 
the likelihood of goal attainment.  The scoring system was symmetrical between the two conditions, 
and the final cumulative score after 10 trials could range from zero to 1000. 
Measures 
 Goal level choice was measured as five discrete goal level alternatives displayed as a series 
of buttons in a row.  The easiest goal level was located on the left, and the most difficult goal level 
was located on the right.  Each button was labeled with the goal level in terms of performance (e.g., 
“4 correct decisions” or “6 incorrect decisions”) and the potential amount of points gained or lost 
(e.g., “Gain 40 points” or “Lose 60 points”).   
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 Performance was measured as the number of correct decisions made on each trial.  For the 
purpose of comparability, goal levels and performance in the avoidance condition were converted to 
the equivalents of the approach condition for analysis (e.g., a goal level of zero incorrect decisions 
was equivalent to a goal level of 10 correct decisions). 
 Trait neuroticism was measured with 10 items on the stability sub-scale (e.g., “I worry about 
things”) from the International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg et al., 2006).  Participants rated 
how well these statements described them on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (inaccurately) to 
5 (very accurately).  
Procedure 
Each participant was allocated to an individual computer terminal and randomly assigned to 
the approach or avoidance goal framing condition.  Demographics and trait neuroticism were 
administered at the beginning of the study.  The participants viewed a 20-minute audio-visual 
training presentation on relevant air traffic control terminology and simulator instructions.  The task 
began with a 3 minute practice trial, followed by 10 experimental trials.  Each trial had a unique 
pattern of traffic with approximately the same level of difficulty, and the trial presentation order 
was randomized.  Participants were asked to choose their goal level at the beginning of each trial.  
The goal level and a running tally of correct or incorrect decisions in the approach and avoidance 
conditions, respectively, were displayed during each trial.  At the end of each trial, participants 
viewed a feedback screen that displayed their goal level, performance, and score for that trial. 
Analysis 
Because of the dynamics inherent in the protocol and the processes likely involved, we used 
a computational modeling approach to facilitate data analysis (Vancouver, 2009).  Specifically, the 
computational model addressed the notion that past performance influenced expectations regarding 
performance in a non-linear way (i.e., based on an updating function).  These performance 
expectations then, in combination with risk preference, were modeled to affect the chosen goal 
level.  The model had two free parameters: a learning weight () that determined the extent to 
which the difference between the observed previous performance and the previous performance 
expectation changed subsequent expectations; and a risk preference bias weight () that determined 
the extent to which goal level choice deviated from performance expectations.   
These parameters were fitted to each participant’s data using observations of the 
participant’s performance and goal levels across trials.  As there was no prior performance to 
reference on the first trial, the initial goal level of each participant was used for the initial value for 
expected performance (P0).  To identify the best fitting parameters for each individual, we allowed 
the learning rate parameter to vary freely between 0 and 1 at 0.1 intervals, and we allowed the bias 
parameter to vary freely between -3 and +3 at 0.1 intervals.  Using each combination of parameter 
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values in the model, we calculated the predicted goal levels for each individual.  We selected the 
combination of parameters that minimized
1
 the root-mean-square error between the model’s 
predictions and participant goal level data over 10 trials.  The estimates of  derived via this process 
were used to test the hypotheses.  This strategy of analyzing parameter estimates has been used in 
recent modeling research on dynamic decision processes (Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2011).  The 
formula for the computational model is exactly as described in the introduction, except that the 
values for goal levels were additionally constrained to have a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 10 
as per the experimental design. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 includes the means and standard deviations for goal level, performance, cumulative 
score, and trait neuroticism.  An inspection of the distributions revealed that ratings of trait 
neuroticism were normally distributed.  The mean performance level suggested that the Air Traffic 
Control simulation was a challenging task for participants given that it was possible to make up to 
10 correct decisions on each trial. 
 
Table 1 
Means and SD (in parenthesis) of Goal Level, Performance, Cumulative Score, and Trait 
Neuroticism by Goal Framing 
 Goal Level Performance Cumulative Score Trait Neuroticism 
Approach 6.67 (1.53) 6.67 (1.64) 216.73 (98.83) 2.62 (0.68) 
Avoidance 5.95 (1.56) 6.28 (1.49) 188.53 (88.22) 2.74 (0.76) 
Note.  Goal levels, performance (correct decisions), and cumulative score in the avoidance condition were 
converted to the equivalent approach condition values for aggregation. 
 
Computational Model Fit 
Aggregating across participants, the root-mean-square error was 0.83, indicating that on 
average, the predicted goal levels deviated from observed goal levels by 0.83 points.  The squared 
correlation coefficient indicated that the model was able to account for 85% of the total variance in 
goal level.
2
  The aggregate parameter values for the learning and risk preference bias weights were 
.50 and 0.44, respectively, indicating a moderate amount of learning and risk seeking on the task.  
                                                 
1
 This process was able to identify a best-fitting combination of parameters for all participants except one, where their 
goal level data had zero variance across 10 trials and appeared to be insensitive to changes in performance.  They were 
retained in the dataset as the results were not significantly affected by dropping the participant. 
2
 In contrast, a multilevel model that predicted goal level as a function of past performance accounted for only 55% of 
the total variance in goal level, confirming the value of using a computational model to estimate the learning and risk 
preference bias parameters. 
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Note that the model did not estimate goal level choice on the first trial, so the calculation of the 
root-mean-square error and squared correlation coefficient did not include the first trial.  Figure 1 
illustrates the fit of the model by comparing the predicted goal level choices to the participant data 
in the approach and avoidance conditions.  The model captured the trends in the data well across 
both conditions.  There was no significant difference in the aggregate parameter values for the 
learning weight between the approach (M = .53) and avoidance conditions (M = .47), t(58) = 0.94, p 
= .35. 
 
Figure 1.  Mean goal level over 10 trials by goal framing including aggregate model predictions and 
standard errors (Ns = 30). 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 To test our proposed hypotheses, we conducted a hierarchical multiple regression with the 
risk preference bias parameter as the dependent variable (see Table 2).  Goal framing and trait 
neuroticism were entered as main effects at Step 1, and the interaction between goal framing and 
trait neuroticism was entered at Step 2.  All variables were mean-centered.  In support of 
Hypothesis 1b, goal framing had a significant positive relationship with the risk preference bias 
parameter, such that the parameter was lower for individuals in the avoidance condition (M = -0.02, 
SD = 1.56) than in the approach condition (M = 0.90, SD = 1.23).  This indicated that individuals in 
the avoidance framing condition were relatively more risk aversive when choosing goal levels than 
individuals in the approach framing condition. 
The main effect of trait neuroticism was not significant, but consistent with Hypothesis 2, 
the relationship between trait neuroticism and risk preferences was stronger for individuals in the 
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simple slope of trait neuroticism for individuals in the avoidance condition was -0.83 (p = .01), 
indicating that higher levels of trait neuroticism were associated with greater risk aversion in the 
avoidance context.  The unstandardized simple slope of trait neuroticism for individuals in the 
approach condition was 0.19 (p = .62), indicating that trait neuroticism did not significantly predict 
risk preferences in the approach context. 
 
Table 2 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression for Goal Framing and Trait Neuroticism on the Risk 
Preference Bias Parameter 
 B SE B β p 
Step One     
Constant 0.44 0.18   
Goal Framing 0.44 0.18 .30 .02 
Trait Neuroticism -0.38 0.25 -.19 .14 
Step Two     
Constant 0.48 0.18   
Goal Framing 0.44 0.18 .30 .02 
Trait Neuroticism -0.32 0.25 -.16 .20 
Trait Neuroticism x Goal Framing 0.51 0.25 .25 .04 
Note.  R
2
 = .13 for Step One (p = .02): ΔR2 = .06 for Step Two (p = .04). 
 
 
Figure 2.  Interaction plot of goal framing by trait neuroticism on the bias parameter with standard 


















Approach Framing Avoidance Framing
Risk-based Computational Model of Goal Level     29 
 
Discussion 
 Goal level choice represents the level of aspiration and risk that an individual is willing to 
adopt, but relatively minimal research has examined this choice process.  This paper examined the 
role of goal framing, risk preferences, and trait neuroticism in predicting goal level choice over 
multiple performance episodes.  Our study makes several contributions to the motivational and 
decision making literature.  We make an empirical contribution by manipulating goal framing and 
examining the differences in goal level choice over multiple performance episodes.  Despite the 
importance of both positive and negative outcomes in motivating behavior (Atkinson, 1966; Taylor, 
1991), to the best of our knowledge, no prior research has examined how striving for approach and 
avoidance goals differentially impacts on the goal level choice process.  Our study has empirically 
demonstrated a significant effect of goal framing on risk preferences during goal level choice.   
 Importantly, predictions regarding the direction of the goal framing effect differed 
depending on the literature one examined.  According to the decision making literature, framing 
decisions in terms of losses tends to increase risk taking more than framing decisions in terms of 
gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  On the other hand, the motivational literature suggested that 
framing goals in terms of negative outcomes tended to be less motivating than framing goals in 
terms of positive outcomes (Elliot, et al., 1997; Sullivan, et al., 2006).  As such, avoidance goal 
framing could lead to a preference for easier, less risky goal levels (Dewett, 2007; Hollenbeck, et 
al., 1989).  Consistent with the motivational literature, we found that participants in the avoidance 
context demonstrated significantly lower risk seeking than those in the approach context. 
 Our lack of support for the prediction from the decision making literature implies that what 
is normally a robust effect across a range of decision making contexts (Barberis, et al., 2001; 
Camerer, 2000; Kuhberger, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) may not generalize to goal level 
choice (see Levin, et al., 2002).  Indeed, our findings adds to a growing body of studies indicating 
that traditional models of decision making do not translate well to dynamic contexts (Erev & 
Barron, 2005; March, 1996; Johnson & Weber, 2009).  In particular, our study suggests that the 
classic decision framing effect does not necessarily generalize to the context of goal level choice, 
which is situated within a dynamic motivational and goal striving context.  Traditional decision 
making studies tend to use hypothetical and static scenarios, which may not capture the 
motivational element involved in setting and striving towards a goal level.   The context of goal 
level choice – particularly across successive performance episodes – can offer more opportunity for 
motivation, feedback, and learning to alter preferences (March, 1996; Levin, et al., 2002). 
 The results of our study indicate that individual differences can also have an important role 
in predicting the direction of risk preferences within a particular context.  In support of our second 
hypothesis, we found that participants in the avoidance context with higher trait neuroticism tended 
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to demonstrate higher levels of risk aversion; this relationship was not present in the approach 
context.  Consistent with trait activation theory (Tett & Burnett, 2003), we suggest that avoidance 
goal framing activated trait neuroticism and its association with risk aversive behavior (Lommen, et 
al., 2010; Nicholson, et al., 2005).  More generally, our findings support the idea that personality 
traits are more likely to be cued in particular contexts, and that avoidance contexts may be 
particularly relevant for the expression of neuroticism.  By considering the interaction of personality 
traits and contexts, we can account for a larger portion of the variability in risk preferences and goal 
level choices across individuals. 
 Another significant contribution of the present study is the analytic approach we used.  
There is a growing demand for using computational modeling to develop a better understanding of 
self-regulatory and goal setting processes (Vancouver, Putka, & Scherbaum, 2005; Vancouver, 
Weinhardt, & Schmidt, 2010).  Formal computational modeling allows for more precise predictions 
about relationships between constructs as they change over time (DeShon, 2013).  In this study, we 
developed a formal computational model that could explain goal level choices at the individual 
level over 10 successive performance episodes on a medium-fidelity simulation task.  By fitting 
individual level parameters on risk preference and learning rate, our proposed model managed to 
capture both the general trajectories in goal level choice and more distinctive patterns within each 
individual (Vancouver, 2009).  Although evidence of model fit does not necessarily indicate that a 
model is the best explanation of the data, our findings suggest that the computational model 
provided a parsimonious explanation of goal level choice processes over successive performance 
episodes.   
Limitations and Future Research 
 Although the dynamic nature of the paradigm, the use of rigorous experimental methods, 
and incorporation of a computational model for analysis purposes adds to the value of this research, 
there are also some limitations that should be acknowledged.  The scope of this study was focused 
on goal level choice in a single goal paradigm, and therefore the findings may not generalize to 
multiple goal contexts.  The proposed model is intended to describe how individuals engage in goal 
level choice for a single goal over successive performance trials.  In multiple goal contexts, we 
would also need to understand how individuals choose between different goals and goal levels.  
When individuals are faced with multiple goals to achieve, their goal level choice for one goal may 
impact on their capability to strive towards the other goals.  Thus, it may be necessary to have a 
broader framework to understand these processes – such as resource allocation theory or multiple-
goal expectancies (see Schmidt & DeShon, 2007).  The findings from this study, however, may still 
be nested within these broader frameworks and contribute towards understanding the process of 
goal level choice within each goal as individuals engage in goal striving over time.  A similar 
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anchoring and adjustment process may occur in multiple goal contexts, except that an individual 
would have an expected performance for each of the different tasks.  We anticipate that goal 
framing across multiple goals will also be predictive of the relative goal levels among those goals; 
for example, individuals may be more motivated to strive towards approach goals and set 
increasingly high goal levels, while their pursuit of avoidance goals may be more risk averse and 
lag behind in terms of goal level.  In terms of future research, we suggest that the current emphasis 
on goal choice in the multiple goals literature needs to be integrated with studies on goal level 
choice, as both decision processes are needed in multiple goals striving. 
It is also worth noting that participants only engaged in goal striving for the duration of an 
hour in this study.  Our design is useful for investigating proximal effects of goal framing and goal 
level choice processes, but other patterns of results may occur over longer periods of goal striving.  
For example, the studies in the motivational literature that found a negative effect of avoidance 
goals on motivation and performance had measured their constructs at discrete periods over several 
months (Elliot, et al., 1997; Sullivan & Rothman, 2008; Sullivan, et al., 2006).  We suggest that 
future research can manipulate goal framing during longer goal striving episodes so that it is 
possible to examine goal level processes that involve slower feedback loops or cumulative effects.  
Longer periods of goal striving may also impact on the relationship between goal framing and risk 
preference.  For example, individuals might learn to rely more on their actual performance rather 
than the framing, or the effects of avoidance goal framing may gradually lead to disengagement 
from the task (see March, 1996; Sullivan & Rothman, 2008).  Nevertheless, the underlying process 
of anchoring and adjustment observed in the current study will likely generalize to longer periods of 
goal striving, even though other long-term processes may need to be introduced. 
 There is also a limitation in conceptualizing risk preference bias at the between-person level, 
because this did not account for possible changes in risk preferences within individuals over time.  
Some studies have demonstrated that learning in decision making tasks can lead to shifts in risk 
preferences over time (Erev & Barron, 2005; March, 1996), and this may apply to goal level choice 
as well.  In this study, conceptualizing risk preferences as a static construct was valuable for 
examining how it differed across individuals in relation to trait neuroticism and goal framing.  
Given that we also had an explicit learning parameter, the inclusion of learnt risk preferences 
construct would have also significantly increased the complexity of the model fitting and 
interpretation.  The former represents shifts in goal level choice due to perceived changes in 
performance capability, while the latter would represent shifts in goal level choice due to perceived 
changes in the viability of one’s risk preferences.  We propose that further research is needed to 
examine how these different forms of learning can be distinguished in predicting goal level choice. 
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 Finally, the payoff contingencies we used in the present study constrain the generalizability 
of our current findings to contexts with high instrumentality upon goal attainment.  Specifically, we 
tied outcomes to the selected goal level, provided the goal was attained.  We did this to ensure that 
participants took the goal level choice seriously, and to represent a type of payoff contingency.  
However, other contingencies are possible.  For instance, Locke and Latham (1990) recommend 
that rewards be tied to performance, not goals, to avoid the drop in motivation that might occur if 
the individual felt they would not achieve the goal.  Our study also assumed high instrumentality, 
whereas it may significantly vary in other work contexts.  For example, employees who attain their 
goals do not always receive a reward depending on a variety of factors (e.g., availability of 
resources or politics of a workplace).  Our proposed model is best understood as a strategy for 
engaging in goal level choice where payoffs are contingent upon goal attainment.  Although future 
research should examine how instrumentality can be incorporated into the model, we also suggest 
that contexts with variability in instrumentality may depend on a different class of strategies that 
does not fit the proposed model – individuals may need to engage in traditional decision making 
processes of deliberate, effortful calculations of expected utilities to choose a goal level in contexts 
that do not depend primarily on performance and goal attainment. 
Implications for Practice 
 There are several practical implications that derive from our findings.  Goals are 
increasingly prevalent in both organizational settings and personal development (Latham, et al., 
2008; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999), and goal level choice is an important component of goal setting.  
Our study highlights that the goal level choice process can be influenced by framing.  Furthermore, 
the impact of avoidance framing can differ across individuals depending on their level of trait 
neuroticism.  Managers and human resource practitioners can evaluate how decisions and goals are 
framed in their organizations to address the potential impact on goal level choice.  Organizations 
may have an environment that emphasizes undesired outcomes, particularly if it is in a safety 
oriented industry or has recently experienced an economic downturn.  In the former case, having a 
preference for risk aversion may be appropriate for ensuring that employees are striving to perform 
at a safe level of capacity.  In the latter case, encouraging an approach framing may be more 
motivating for employees to enable future business growth (see Elliot, et al., 1997; Sullivan, et al., 
2006).  Through continued research on goal level choice and the impact of approach and avoidance 
framing, people will have more opportunities for improving the management of goal-directed 
behavior at work. 
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Abstract 
Affect is a dynamic construct that varies over time and can significantly influence motivation 
and performance in organisational contexts. This chapter addresses key conceptual and 
methodological challenges that arise when aiming to measure affect as a within-person 
process. The literature has been divided on whether the structure of affect is unipolar or 
bipolar and no research has considered the structure across levels of analysis. Measuring affect 
as a within-person process also requires a brief scale that can be administered with minimal 
disruption. This chapter presents data that provide evidence for bipolarity in the structure of 
affect. We use these data to validate the Momentary Affect Scale, which is a new brief affect 
scale that can be used in within-person research designs and applied settings. 
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Measuring Affect over Time: The Momentary Affect Scale 
Emotions and moods are a fundamental part of work. Every working day can be a source of 
excitement and anxiety (Seo, Barrett, & Bartunek, 2004). Understanding the role of affect at work is 
increasingly important as organisations deal with more competitive markets, complex job roles, and 
uncertain economic conditions. Affect is a dynamic construct that can fluctuate over time and in 
response to changing circumstances (Ashkanasy & Ashton-James, 2005). In turn, how a person 
feels can influence their motivation and performance (Carver & Scheier, 1990). Recognising that 
affect is a dynamic construct, recent studies have examined affective processes at the within-person 
level of analysis (Ilies & Judge, 2005; Louro, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2007). This body of work has 
significant implications for theory and practice because it helps us understand how fluctuations in 
affective states over time can influence self-regulation and performance.  However, there are a 
number of conceptual and methodological challenges associated with the measurement of affect as 
a dynamic variable that are yet to be resolved. 
In this chapter, we introduce a new self-reported affect measure that addresses these 
challenges.  Although there are a range of methods by which affect can be measured, such as 
physiological, neuroimaging, and implicit tasks, we focus on self-report scales because they 
represent the most well-established method of measuring affect (Humrichouse, Chmielewski, 
McDade-Montez, & Watson, 2007).  Self-report scales are useful for measuring the subjective 
experiences of individuals, and this is often appropriate because the experience of affect is largely 
subjective (see Ashkanasy, 2003).  Research has demonstrated that subjective affective experiences 
can tend to predict subsequent behaviours, even when individuals may not fully understand the 
reasons for their affect rating (Schachter & Singer, 1962; Sinclair, Hoffman, Mark, Martin, & 
Pickering, 1994).  Self-report measures of affect are also more viable in applied research because 
they are relatively more cost-effective and efficient to administer and analyse – particularly when 
attempting to observe changes in affective states over time amongst a large sample of respondents. 
Nevertheless, there is a conceptual challenge when studies attempt to observe self-reported 
affect as a dynamic within-person process, because it is necessary to account for the structure of 
affect at the appropriate level of analysis. The academic literature has been divided on whether 
affect is best represented by unipolar or bipolar dimensions (Barrett & Russell, 1998; Watson & 
Clark, 1997). Do people experience varying levels of affective states such as happiness and sadness 
at the same time, as suggested by a unipolar model, or is affect like a pendulum that can only be at 
one place at a time on the spectrum of affective states, as suggested by a bipolar model? 
Furthermore, affective states differ between individuals as well as within individuals over time, and 
can lead to different effects depending on what level of analysis is being considered (Koy & Yeo, 
2008). It is therefore possible that the structure of affect differs across levels of analysis, yet no 
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research to our knowledge has considered this possibility theoretically or empirically. Failure to 
understand these issues can lead to inappropriate measurement of affective states and inaccurate 
conclusions. 
The methodological challenge is to ensure that an affect scale is brief enough to be suitable 
for repeated measures designs in applied performance contexts. Typical affect scales involve many 
items and can take some time to complete. The requirement to complete multi-item scales can be 
distracting and interfere with performance of the person’s primary task, particularly if they are 
administered frequently (Hinkin, 1998; Hui & Triandis, 1985). Yet in certain task contexts where 
emotions can change rapidly, it is important to administer the measure frequently in order to track 
actual changes in affect. A brief affect scale would be more practical for tracking these momentary 
within-person variations in affect. 
 The aim of this chapter is to introduce a brief measure of affect that a) accurately reflects the 
structure of affect at the within-person level of analysis and b) is suitable for longitudinal research. 
We begin by reviewing the literature regarding the structure of affect and offering new insights 
regarding implications for the structure across the within- and between-person levels of analysis. 
We present a repeated measures study designed to examine the multi-level structure of affect and 
use these findings to validate the Momentary Affect Scale (MAS), a brief bipolar scale that is 
suitable for the repeated sampling of affect. 
The Structure of Affect 
Affect refers to feelings that an individual experiences at a given point in time (Barrett, Mesquita, 
Ochsner, & Gross, 2007). The affect circumplex represents states along two orthogonal dimensions 
of valence and arousal (see Figure 1) (Matthews, Jones, & Chamberlain, 1990; Yik, Russell, & 
Barrett, 1999). Valence refers to the experience of pleasure and represents states ranging from 
unpleasant to pleasant. Arousal refers to the experience of energy or activation and represents states 
ranging from activated to deactivated. According to Yik et al. (1999), people experience affective 
states that are a combination of valence and arousal, which together form the secondary dimensions 
of pleasant-activation, unpleasant-activation, pleasant-deactivation, and unpleasant-deactivation 
(see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1.  Primary and secondary (diagonal) dimensions of affect and examples in parenthesis. 
 
There has been disagreement in the literature about whether the secondary dimensions of the 
affect circumplex are best represented as unipolar or bipolar (Barrett & Russell, 1998; Russell & 
Carroll, 1999; Watson & Tellegen, 1999; Yik, et al., 1999). The unipolar conceptualisation suggests 
that pleasant-activated, unpleasant-activated, pleasant-deactivated, and unpleasant-deactivated 
states represent four separate dimensions of affect that exist independently of each other. Each 
dimension is unipolar and ranges from neutral (which lies in the middle of the circumplex) to an 
intense experience of one of the four states. According to this conceptualisation, it is possible for a 
person to experience states such as tension and relaxation, or excitement and boredom at the same 
time.  
The bipolar conceptualisation suggests that affective states located at opposite ends of the 
circumplex such as pleasant-activation and unpleasant-deactivation, or unpleasant-activation and 
pleasant-deactivation, cannot co-exist at the same time. Rather, the secondary dimensions form two 
bipolar continuums ranging from pleasant-activation to unpleasant-deactivation and from 
unpleasant-activation to pleasant-deactivation. This conceptualisation suggests that people can only 
be at one point along the continuum at a time. Experiencing a pleasant-activated state such as 
excitement precludes the experience of an unpleasant-deactivated state such as boredom. 
Determining the structure of affect is important because it has implications for how the 
construct is measured. Assessing the structure of affect requires data from scales designed to 
measure all four unipolar dimensions separately. Most existing scales do not meet this criterion so it 
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is difficult to determine whether they accurately reflect the structure of affect. Two of the most 
commonly used affect scales are the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, 
Clark & Tellegen, 1988) and the UWIST Mood Adjective Checklist (Matthews, et al., 1990). The 
PANAS only represents affect along two of the four unipolar dimensions: Positive Affect, which 
ranges from neutral to pleasant-activation, and Negative Affect, which ranges from neutral to 
unpleasant-activation.
1
 The absence of scales to measure the two deactivated unipolar dimensions 
renders it impossible to use data from this measure to assess the structure of affect. More generally, 
conclusions from studies that have used the PANAS may differ if deactivated states were measured.  
The UWIST represents affect along the two bipolar dimensions of Energetic Arousal, which 
ranges from pleasant-activation to unpleasant-deactivation, and Tense Arousal, which ranges from 
unpleasant-activation to pleasant-deactivation. Though this measure includes items from all four 
quadrants of the circumplex, the scales impose bipolarity on the data by combining unipolar 
dimensions that are hypothesised to be bipolar opposites into a single scale (with items from one 
end of the continuum being reverse scored), making it impossible to observe the relationships 
between them. Thus, the UWIST scales are also unsuitable for drawing conclusions about the 
structure of affect.  
In order to assess the structure of affect, we measure affect using four unipolar scales, 
designed to assess each end of the secondary dimensions. This approach is suitable for testing 
bipolarity because it assesses both activated and deactivated states without imposing a bipolar 
structure on the data (Russell & Carroll, 1999). Instead, we measure the proposed bipolar opposites 
using separate scales and observe the relationships between them. 
Levels of Analysis 
 A further complication involved in developing a scale based on an appropriate 
conceptualisation of affect is accounting for the level of analysis at which we operationalize and 
examine the construct. The focus here is on within-person variation in affect; however, affect also 
varies between individuals. Traditionally, studies have operationalized affect at the between-person 
level, examining how stable differences in affective traits relate to self-regulatory and performance 
outcomes across individuals (Beal, Weiss, Barros, & MacDermid, 2005; Fisher, 2002). More 
recently, there has been growing interest in how momentary fluctuations in affect produce changes 
in these outcomes over time. Most of these within-person studies have adopted measures such as the 
PANAS and UWIST that have traditionally been used for between-person research (e.g. Foo, Uy, & 
Baron, 2009; Ilies, De Pater, & Judge, 2007; Richard & Diefendorff, 2011). This approach assumes 
that the structure of affect is the same at the within- and between-person levels.  
                                                 
1
 Interestingly, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen (1988) conceptualised Positive and Negative Affect as bipolar dimensions, 
but the PANAS operationalizes them as unipolar constructs. 
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To our knowledge, there is no research that has compared the structure of affect across 
levels of analysis. Given that affect is conceptualised as a multi-level construct, its structure may 
actually vary across levels. Indeed, this may explain in part why there has been mixed evidence 
regarding the structure of affect. For example, it is possible that at a given moment, a person’s 
affective state can only lie at a single point on a continuum ranging from tired to excited, yet that 
person’s average levels of tiredness and excitement are independent when aggregated across time. 
This would suggest a bipolar structure at the within-person level and a unipolar structure at the 
between-person level. Alternatively, it is also possible to have a unipolar structure at the within-
person level and a bipolar structure at the between-person level.  
The current research assesses the structure of affect at the within-person level by taking 
repeated observations of affect over time and isolating the within-person from the between-person 
variation. We use these results to validate our new measure. We use a longitudinal achievement task 
where participants pursue goals and have opportunities for success and failure. We argue that this 
type of context is appropriate for examining within-person changes in affect because affect is 
known to be associated with self-regulatory constructs such as effort, goals, and performance 
(Carver, 2003; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Seo et al., 2004). Thus, we expect to see significant within-
person variance in affect over time. 
Scale Length 
 Measuring affect at the within-person level of analysis requires repeated measures to be 
taken over time. Existing measures of affect tend to be long: the PANAS has 20 items and the 
UWIST has 24 items. While these scales are valuable for domain sampling and internal consistency, 
they are not optimal for capturing momentary fluctuations in affect over short periods of time. First, 
the act of filling out lengthy questionnaires is not likely to produce much variation in affective 
experience. Second, because of their length, within-person studies that have used these measures are 
often limited to making a small number of observations with long intervals between them (e.g. Ilies 
& Judge, 2005; Zohar, Tzischinski, & Epstein, 2003). Such methods make it difficult to examine 
real-time affective responses to discrete events. 
 This research addresses these issues by introducing a new measure of affect that assesses the 
two secondary affect dimensions with a single item each and is thus suitable for within-person 
designs. Compared to longer measures, these scales take less time to administer and thus can be 
used more often with shorter intervals between observations. Furthermore, they are less prone to 
response bias due to boredom or fatigue (Hinkin, 1998).  
The Current Research 
 The aim of this research is to develop and validate the MAS, a brief measure of affective 
experience that is suitable for the repeated sampling of affect. The following sections present a 
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study designed to examine the structure of affect across levels of analysis. Using a set of 16 
unipolar items, repeated measures of momentary affect were taken while participants engaged in a 
laboratory task. This enables the comparison of bipolar and unipolar models of affect at both the 
within-person and between-person levels. We then present our newly developed MAS and use the 
results from this study to establish evidence of its validity. We argue that this measure addresses 
conceptual and methodological challenges associated with within-person studies because it is 
validated by research that examines the structure of affect across levels of analysis and is brief 
enough to be used repeatedly over short periods of time. 
Experimental Task and Measures 
The validation study was conducted with 59 participants from the University of Queensland 
local community. The participants had a mean age of 22.27 (SD 4.29) years and received either 
course credit or $20.00 compensation. The participants performed a conflict detection task in an air 
traffic control lab, where a computer program called ATC-Lab simulated a medium-fidelity air 
traffic control environment (Loft, Hill, Neal, Humphreys, & Yeo, 2004). The task required 
participants to actively monitor and manage aircraft as they moved through an air sector (see Figure 
2). This air traffic control simulation is a cognitively demanding performance task that allows us to 
observe meaningful within-person variation in affect and maintain high experimental control 
(Fothergill, Loft, & Neal, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 2.  A screenshot of the air traffic control simulation task. 
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The participants were instructed to ensure that aircraft under their jurisdiction did not come 
into conflict. A conflict is defined as a situation where two aircraft flying at the same flight level 
will violate the minimum separation standard of five nautical miles laterally. Participants could 
resolve a potential conflict by instructing one aircraft to increase its flight level by 1000ft before the 
conflict occurred. 
The participants were initially trained on a ten-minute audio visual presentation about basic 
air traffic control concepts in the simulation. They performed a two-minute practice trial, which had 
four aircraft flying through the sector and one conflict. This was followed by eight five-minute test 
trials. Each test trial contained approximately 25 aircraft flying through the sector and two or three 
conflicts, and the order of presentation was randomised for each participant. During each trial, 
participants received audio and visual feedback on their performance in accepting the aircraft and 
resolving conflicts. The participants provided self-report ratings on a bipolar affect scale after each 
trial, and self-report ratings on a unipolar affect scale after every second trial. The experiment took 
one and a half hours in total. 
Unipolar Affect Scale 
 Four separate unipolar variables were measured with 16 items from Matthews et al.’s (1990) 
UWIST Mood Adjective Checklist to operationalize affect as a unipolar construct (see Appendix 
A). The dimensions of pleasant-activation, unpleasant-deactivation, unpleasant-activation, and 
pleasant-deactivation were measured in terms of High Energetic Arousal, Low Energetic Arousal, 
High Tense Arousal, and Low Tense Arousal, respectively. Each unipolar affect variable was 
assessed using four items (e.g. nervous, tense, anxious, and stressed for High Tense Arousal). 
Participants were instructed to “circle the number that describes the degree to which you felt the 
following during the previous trial”. Each item was rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranked from 1 
(not at all) through 3 (moderately) to 5 (extremely). This response format conforms to what Russell 
and Carroll (1999) describe as “ambiguous”; that is, the bipolar opposites of each unipolar variable 
were not explicitly specified and instead respondents had discretion over defining the anchors (e.g. 
does “not at all” tense mean neutral or calm?). Matthews et al.’s (1990) UWIST Mood Adjective 
Checklist uses labels that are well established from a long history of affect research (Thayer, 1967, 
1978, 1986). 
Momentary Affect Scale 
 The MAS measures two bipolar affect variables of Energetic Arousal and Tense Arousal 
with two items (see Appendix B). The two items were developed from the same 16 items used for 
the unipolar scales described above (and thus also based on Matthews et al.’s (1990) UWIST Mood 
Adjective Checklist). The 16 items were grouped into four sets corresponding to High and Low 
Energetic Arousal, and the High and Low Tense Arousal items, in order to create two single item 
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bipolar scales. The anchors in these bipolar rating scales contain a set of mood adjectives on each 
end. Bipolar Energetic Arousal is rated on an 11-point scale ranging from -5 (very sluggish, tired, 
sleepy, dull) through 0 (neutral) to 5 (very active, energetic, alert, bright). Bipolar Tense Arousal is 
rated on an 11-point scale ranging from -5 (very relaxed, calm, composed, comfortable) through 0 
(neutral) to 5 (very nervous, tense, anxious, stressed). This response format explicitly 
conceptualises Energetic and Tense Arousal as bipolar constructs. This proposed brief affect scale is 
also shorter than most measures of affect so it can be completed by respondents quickly. 
Analysis Strategy 
Factor structure. The first stage of analyses involved evaluating the factor-structure of the 
16 unipolar affect items at the within- and between person levels of analysis. Muthén’s (1994) four-
step procedure was used to guide our approach. The first step is to estimate the proportion of 
systematic between-person level variance for each item in order to decide whether multi-level 
analyses are necessary. This value is referred to as the intraclass coefficient (ICC1). Muthén (1990, 
1994) recommends calculating the ICC1 for each variable assuming random level effects rather 
than fixed level effects
2
. The remaining steps involve: 2) conducting a single-level confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) on the sample pooled within-person covariance matrix; 3) conducting a 
single-level CFA on the sample between-person covariance matrix; and 4) conducting the multi-
level CFA (MLCFA) on the sample pooled within-person and between-person covariance matrices 
simultaneously.  
Muthén (1994) recommends comparing competing models at each step. We compared four 
models (see Figure 3) designed to assess unipolarity versus bipolarity. Model 1 specified four 
factors that represented the four unipolar affect constructs, which were allowed to correlate with 
each other. Model 2 had the same structure, except that only the semantic opposite factors (i.e. High 
and Low Tense Arousal; and High and Low Energetic Arousal) were allowed to correlate. Good fit 
indices for these models and negative correlations between semantic opposite factors would be 
indicative of bipolarity, whereas non-significant correlations between these factors would be 
indicative of unipolarity. 
  
                                                 
2
 Muthén’s ICC is calculated from a ratio of the maximum likelihood estimates of the latent within and between 
variance components, assuming random level effects.  
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      Model 1 with four correlated constructs                Model 2 with correlated bipolar constructs 
 
         
   Model 3 with uncorrelated bipolar constructs              Model 4 with two correlated constructs 
 
Figure 3.  Four models tested in multi-level confirmatory factor analysis. 
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Model 3 specified four factors that represented the four unipolar affect constructs, but 
constrained correlations between semantic opposites to zero. This model represents a unipolar 
structure because it specifies that semantic opposite factors must be uncorrelated. Model 4 specified 
two correlated factors that explicitly represented bipolar Tense Arousal and Energetic Arousal 
constructs. This model imposes a bipolar structure on the data because it specifies that semantic 
opposite factors load onto a single factor. Good fit indices for Model 3 would be strongly indicative 
of unipolarity. Good fit indices for Model 4 would provide support for a two factor model of 
bipolarity and the MAS. 
For all models, correlated error terms were permitted between all items within their 
respective factors
3
, but not between items from different factors. In this case, the items within 
factors were conceptually and semantically similar (e.g. tense and stressed), which would likely 
result in common method effects where participants respond similarly towards these items 
(Crawford & Henry, 2004; Ecklund-Johnson, Miller, & Sweet, 2004). Allowing correlated error 
terms is a common and acceptable method to account for this phenomenon (Crawford & Henry, 
2004; Gerbing & Anderson, 1984). 
Scale validation. The second stage of analyses involved validating the MAS. We 
demonstrate the validity of this measure by examining how the Tense and Energetic Arousal scales 
of the MAS compare to the two latent bipolar constructs of Tense and Energetic Arousal from 
Model 4, and the four latent unipolar constructs of High and Low Tense Arousal and High and Low 
Energetic Arousal generated by the MLCFA. We use the patterns of correlations between the MAS 
scales and the latent affect constructs across levels of analysis to assess the convergent and 
discriminant validity of the MAS. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics and Internal Consistency 
 Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations (SDs), Cronbach’s alpha, and correlations 
for the four unipolar scales, two bipolar scales of the MAS, and the trial variable at the within- and 
between-person levels of analysis. Inspection of the distributions revealed that Low Tense Arousal 
and High Energetic Arousal were approximately normal. High Tense Arousal and Low Energetic 
Arousal had significant positive skew and slightly leptokurtic distributions. However this was to be 
expected, as participants were not expected to experience extreme levels of states such as “anxious” 
or “sluggish” in this experiment. These distributions are not problematic for the analyses because 
CFAs are robust to violations of normality when sample sizes are large (Harrington, 2008). 
 
                                                 
3
 A covariance constraint of zero was imposed on one correlated error term within each factor to reduce model 
complexity. 
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Table 1 
Means, SDs, Cronbach’s Alpha (), and Intercorrelations between Unipolar Factors, Bipolar 
Factors, and the Trial Variable at the Within- and Between-Person Levels of Analysis 
Factor Mean SD  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. High Tense Arousal 1.97 0.89 .85 - -.57** -.09* .16** .58** -.03 
2. Low Tense Arousal 3.28 0.87 .83 -.41** - .44** -.12** .24** -.76** 
3. High Energetic Arousal 3.26 0.84 .87 .20** .10 - -.58** -.33** .73** 
4. Low Energetic Arousal 1.83 0.87 .88 .14* -.13* -.41** - .09* -.59** 
5. MAS Tense Arousal 1.55 2.57 - .44** -.48** -.01 .00 - -.45** 
6. MAS Energetic Arousal 1.95 2.31 - .19** .08 .60** -.37** .01 - 
7. Trial - - - -.56** .23** .29** .06 -.39** -.26** 
Notes: *p < .05. **p < .01; within-person level correlations below diagonal, between-person level correlations above 
the diagonal (note that trial varies only at the within-person level and so is uncorrelated with the variables at the 
between-person level)  
 
The descriptive statistics showed moderate negative correlations between semantic 
opposites at both levels of analysis, though the correlations were stronger at the between-person 
level. This pattern of correlations is indicative of bipolarity (Yik, et al., 1999). Figure 4 presents a 
plot of mean scores for each unipolar factor over the four measured trials. As seen in Figure 4, the 
growth trajectories of semantic opposites mirror each other. During the course of the experiment 
High Tense Arousal decreases whereas Low Tense Arousal increases. Likewise, High Energetic 
Arousal decreases whereas Low Energetic Arousal increases slightly. 
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MLCFA Results 
 The ICC1 values ranged from .44 to .62 (M = .53, SD = .06), indicating that between 44% 
and 62% of the variance in affect ratings was at the between-person level. These results suggest that 
multi-level analysis is appropriate, so we proceeded to steps 2 to 4. The model fit indices for these 
separate within- and between-person levels are included in Appendix D.  Since the results of steps 2 
and 3 were consistent with the results of step 4, we only report the results of the last step which 
involved conducting a MLCFA that incorporates the within-person and between-person covariance 
matrices simultaneously. Four MLCFAs were conducted by specifying models at both the within- 
and between-person levels with no equality constraints specified. Person-mean-centred scores were 
used for the data at the within-person level, whereas person-means were used for the data at the 
between-person level. Table 2 includes the results of these MLCFAs. 
 
Table 2 
Results of MLCFA of the Combined Covariance Matrix with no Equality Constraints 
Measurement Model 2 df p 2/df RMSEA CFI TLI SRMR AIC 
1. Four-factor model (all constructs 
correlated) 
275.55 156 .000 1.77 .05 .93 .90 .06 571.55 
2. Four-factor model (only 
bipolar opposites correlated) 
330.82 164 .000 2.02 .06 .91 .86 .08 610.82 
3. Four-factor model (bipolar 
opposites uncorrelated) 
384.24 160 .000 2.40 .07 .87 .81 .13 672.24 
4. Two-factor model (factors 
correlated) 
381.73 166 .000 2.30 .07 .88 .82 .08 657.73 
4. Model 1 vs. Model 2  55.27 8 .000       
5. Model 1 vs. Model 3 108.69 4 .000       
6. Model 2 vs. Model 3 53.42 4 .000       
Note. N = 236; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis 
Index; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; 2 for the model comparison 
is difference in 2 values.  
 
Model 1 emerged as the best fitting model overall, with most practical fit indices suggesting 
reasonably good fit. The 2 comparisons indicated that Model 1 had significantly better fit than 
Models 2 and 3. While the practical fit indices approached reasonably good fit for Model 2, they did 
not do so for Model 3. Given that Model 4 was not nested with the other three models, the 2 test 
was not suitable for model comparison. Instead, we used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), 
where lower values indicate greater support for a model. The AIC suggested that Model 4 was 
better than Model 3, but worse than Models 1 and 2, a pattern confirmed by the practical fit indices.  
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The finding that the model with two bipolar factors (Model 4) represented the data better 
than the model with semantic opposite correlations constrained to 0 (Model 3) supports the notion 
of bipolarity. However, the models (Models 1 & 2) in which semantic opposites were allowed to 
correlate appeared to be the most valid. Full assessment of Models 1 and 2 requires examination of 
the interfactor correlations between High and Low Energetic Arousal and High and Low Tense 
Arousal in order to determine whether the data suggest a bipolar or unipolar structure of affect. For 
parsimony, we only report the results for Model 1 given that it was the best fitting model.  
 Tables 3 and 4 display the interfactor correlations for Model 1 at the within- and between-
person level of analysis respectively. At the within-person level, the semantic opposite factors from 
Model 1 showed negative correlations, whereas the other factors were uncorrelated, with the 
exception of High TA and High EA which were weakly positively correlated. The negative 
correlations between semantic opposites coupled with the fact that the correlations between other 
factors were weaker, is suggestive of bipolarity at the within-person level. At the between-person 
level, the semantic opposite factors from Model 1 are also negatively correlated, which suggests 
bipolarity at this level as well. Interestingly, the correlation between Low TA and High EA is stronger at 
the between- than at the within-person level, suggesting that there are individual differences in the 
extent to which people experience pleasant affective states. 
 
Table 3 
Interfactor Correlations for Model 1 based on MLCFA at the Within-Person Level 
Construct  Model 1 (Four Correlated Unipolar Factors) 
  High TA Low TA High EA Low EA 
High TA  -    
Low TA  -.60** -   
High EA  .29** .05 -  
Low EA  .15 -.14 -.51** - 
Note. N = 236. * p < .05. ** p < .01. TA = Tense Arousal; EA = Energetic Arousal 
 
Table 4 
Interfactor Correlations for Model 1 based on MLCFA at the Between-Person Level 
Construct  Model 1 (Four Correlated Unipolar Factors) 
  High TA Low TA High EA Low EA 
High TA  -    
Low TA  -.60** -   
High EA  -.20 .70** -  
Low EA  .38** -.25* -.66** - 
Note. N = 236. ** p < .01. TA = Tense Arousal; EA = Energetic Arousal 
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In addition to examining the correlations between semantic opposite factors, we also 
examine the bivariate frequency distributions of scores on these factors at each level of analysis. 
This approach provides more information because it allows one to examine how frequently different 
combinations of factor scores co-occur. Figure 5 displays the frequency of responses for Low and 
High Tense Arousal (left) and Low and High Energetic Arousal (right) at the within-person level. 
The plots show negative relationships between semantic opposite factors with virtually no cases 
where high scores on both Low and High Tense Arousal co-occur, or where high scores on both 




Figure 5.  Bivariate frequency distributions between semantic opposite factors at the within-person 
level. 
 
Figure 6 displays the frequency of responses for Low and High Tense Arousal (left) and 
Low and High Energetic Arousal (right) at the between-person level. These plots provide 
converging evidence that the High Tense Arousal and Low Energetic Arousal distributions are 
positively skewed. Nevertheless, the pattern is still consistent with bipolarity. At the between-
person level, there are more cases where an individual has low levels of both Low and High Tense 
Arousal or both Low and High Energetic Arousal. However, once again there is a low co-
occurrence of cases where an individual has high scores on these factors. 
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Figure 6.  Bivariate frequency distributions between semantic opposite factors at the between-
person level. 
 
In summary, the results of the above analysis are consistent with a bipolar structure of affect 
at both the within- and between-person levels. Model comparison revealed that the model with two 
bipolar factors (Model 4) fit better than the model with four unipolar factors when correlations 
between semantic opposites were constrained to 0 (Model 3). The best fitting model (Model 1) 
specified a four-factor structure where all factors were allowed to correlate. Examination of the 
correlations between semantic opposite factors in this model revealed negative correlations at both 
levels of analysis. Finally, inspection of the bivariate frequency distributions confirmed that there 
were virtually no cases where individuals had high scores on semantic opposite factors at either 
level of analysis.  
Scale Validation 
 The second stage of the analysis aimed to provide evidence of validity for the MAS. To do 
this, we examined the relationship between the MAS and the factor scores of the latent affect 
constructs generated by the MLCFAs. Table 5 presents the within-person correlations between the 
bipolar Tense and Energetic Arousal scales of the MAS and the latent unipolar constructs of High 
Tense Arousal, Low Tense Arousal, High Energetic Arousal, and Low Energetic Arousal generated 
by Model 1. As can be seen, MAS Tense Arousal is correlated with the latent unipolar factors of 
High and Low Tense Arousal in the expected directions. Likewise, MAS Energetic Arousal is 
correlated with the High and Low Energetic Arousal factors. Finally, the MAS scales are 
uncorrelated with each other. Overall, these correlations suggest that the MAS captures within-
person variation in Tense and Energetic Arousal, supporting the scale’s construct validity. It can 
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also be seen from these correlations that the MAS scales are not strongly related to the latent factors 
representing the opposite construct, providing evidence of divergent validity.  
Table 6 presents the between-person correlations between the MAS scales and the latent 
constructs. At the between-person level, MAS Tense and Energetic Arousal are related to their 
respective latent unipolar factors in the expected directions, providing further evidence of construct 
validity. Unlike at the within-person level, the MAS scales are also correlated with each other. 
However, this correlation was not unexpected because the results of Model 1 suggested that factors 




Within-Person Correlations between the MAS and the Latent Unipolar Factor Scores Generated by 
Model 1 
Factor Latent Low 
TA 






1. MAS Tense Arousal 
-.47** .44** -.02 .03 - 
2. MAS Energetic Arousal 
-.01 .24** -.37** .59** .01 
*p < .05. **p < .01 
 
Table 6 
Between-person Correlations between the MAS and the Latent Unipolar Factor Scores Generated 
by Model 1 
Factor Latent Low 
TA 






1. MAS Tense Arousal 
-.75** .59** -.23** .53** - 
2. MAS Energetic Arousal 
.29** -.11 -.49** .55** -.45** 
*p < .05. **p < .01 
 
 The correlations between the MAS Tense and Energetic Arousal scales and the latent 
unipolar constructs demonstrate that the MAS scales are sensitive to changes at both high and low 
levels of Tense and Energetic Arousal. In order to more closely examine the nature of this shared 
variability, Figure 7 displays plots of MAS Energetic (top) and Tense (bottom) Arousal ratings as a 
function of the observed unipolar ratings of Low Energetic Arousal, High Energetic Arousal, Low 
Tense Arousal, and High Tense Arousal at the within-person level. The top graph suggests that 
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MAS Energetic Arousal is negatively skewed, creating large standard errors at the low end of the 
scale. This pattern is consistent with the positive skew in the Low Unipolar Energetic Arousal 
variable identified previously. Nevertheless, there is a clear pattern whereby increases in MAS 
Energetic Arousal are associated with increases in High Unipolar Energetic Arousal and decreases 
in Low Unipolar Tense Arousal. 
 
 
Figure 7.  MAS Tense and Energetic Arousal ratings as a function of the observed unipolar ratings 
of Low Tense Arousal, High Tense Arousal, Low Energetic Arousal, and High Energetic Arousal. 
 
The bottom graph reveals that MAS Tense Arousal is negatively skewed, which is 
consistent with the positive skew in the High Unipolar Tense Arousal variable identified previously. 
Once again, there is a clear pattern whereby increases in MAS Tense Arousal are associated with 
increases in High Unipolar Tense Arousal and decreases in Low Unipolar Tense Arousal. 
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In summary, the evidence supports the validity of the MAS. The correlations between the 
MAS scales and the latent unipolar factors generated in Model 1 demonstrate that the MAS scales 
capture variation at both high and low levels of corresponding unipolar constructs. This is 
confirmed by the plots showing the observed unipolar scores as a function of the MAS scores, 
which demonstrate that changes in the MAS Tense and Energetic Arousal are associated with 
simultaneous changes in their unipolar constructs.  
Discussion 
The present study aimed to address key conceptual and methodological issues in studying 
affect as a within-person process. We examined the multi-level structure of affect and assessed 
whether it was appropriate to conceptualise affect as a bipolar construct, as compared to traditional 
unipolar measures (Barrett & Russell, 1998; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). We also developed 
and validated the Momentary Affect Scale, a new brief scale suitable for measuring affect within 
dynamic performance task contexts. We implemented a repeated measures research design using a 
dynamic Air Traffic Control simulation task, and used multi-level analyses to evaluate the structure 
of affect across the within- and between-person levels (Muthén, 1994). We used Matthews et al.’s 
(1990) UWIST Mood Adjective Checklist to measure the full affect circumplex and simultaneously 
test for unipolar or bipolar response patterns (Russell & Carroll, 1999). 
Conceptual Structure of Affect 
 The results of the study indicated that model fit indices were stronger for models that 
favoured bipolarity over unipolarity. For the model where we allowed opposing unipolar factors to 
freely correlate, High and Low Tense Arousal were significantly negatively correlated, as well as 
High and Low Energetic Arousal. As participants indicated they had higher levels of unpleasant-
activation, they also simultaneously reported lower levels of pleasant-deactivation. Higher levels of 
pleasant-activation corresponded with lower levels of unpleasant-deactivation. This pattern of non-
independence in the opposing factors provides support for bipolarity in the structure of affect at the 
within-person level (Russell & Carroll, 1999). 
When the affect scores were aggregated over time and compared between-people, the data 
still supported the bipolar perspective. On average, participants who had higher overall levels of 
unpleasant-activation tended to have relatively lower levels of pleasant-deactivation. People with 
higher levels of pleasant-activation tended to have lower levels of unpleasant-deactivation. Thus, 
these data suggest that the structure of affect can be conceptualised as bipolar at both the within- 
and between-person levels. 
Overall, the findings of this study suggest that a bipolar model can appropriately describe 
the structure of affect. This is an important conceptual distinction that helps us clarify the nature of 
affective states and how they vary within people over time. The relatively poor fit indices for the 
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explicit unipolar model suggest that it is inappropriate and unnecessary to measure affect through 
four unipolar factors. These results suggest that people do not become simultaneously high on 
unpleasant-activation and pleasant-deactivation, or pleasant-activation and unpleasant-deactivation. 
Instead, it appears that it is viable to develop an affect scale that measures two bipolar factors – 
bipolar Tense Arousal and bipolar Energetic Arousal. Affective states fluctuate between the two 
endpoints on a single continuous dimension for each factor.  
Momentary Affect Scale 
 We proposed the Momentary Affect Scale to address the methodological issue of measuring 
variations in affect at the within-person level. This brief scale is based on the well-validated UWIST 
scale, and uses the same mood labels that are conceptually associated with Energetic Arousal and 
Tense Arousal (Matthews, et al., 1990; Thayer, 1967, 1978, 1986). However, we developed the 
MAS as a two item scale that measures Energetic Arousal and Tense Arousal at a single moment in 
time. Our aim was to establish whether ratings on the brief bipolar affect scale would correspond 
appropriately with ratings on longer, traditional affect scales. 
The results of the study indicated that scores on Tense Arousal and Energetic Arousal in the 
MAS corresponded with the four latent unipolar factors in the expected direction. Bipolar Tense 
Arousal scores correlated with the unipolar High and Low Tense Arousal, whereas bipolar 
Energetic Arousal correlated with the unipolar High and Low Energetic Arousal. This pattern of 
results supported the construct and divergent validity of the MAS, and it was replicated at both the 
within- and between-person levels. The results also indicated that bipolar item ratings on the MAS 
remained sensitive to relative changes in the equivalent unipolar items despite being only two items 
– the range of bipolar ratings provided on the Tense Arousal and Energetic Arousal item matched 
with ratings given in the unipolar items. 
The overall results of this validation study support the use of the MAS for measuring affect 
over time. Ratings on the MAS can give a meaningful indication of state Energetic Arousal and 
Tense Arousal as it varies over time, making it possible to measure the dynamics of affect under 
various task conditions 
Practical Implications 
 This research has several practical implications. In order for researchers and practitioners to 
effectively measure affect in organisations, it is critical to have a valid conceptualisation of the 
construct. The unipolarity vs. bipolarity debate raised the question of how affect varies over time, 
an issue that has implications for how a scale should be designed. The current study has provided 
evidence that Tense and Energetic Arousal are bipolar constructs, suggesting that it is appropriate to 
design a scale that measures affect using two bipolar factors. 
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 Through this research, we also proposed the MAS to address the methodological issues of 
measuring affect at the within-person level. To measure changes in affect over time, it is valuable to 
use a scale that is brief and easy to administer. Measuring affect regularly in repeated measures 
research designs and dynamic performance contexts raises the issue of item response fatigue and 
disruption to task performance (Hui & Triandis, 1985). The MAS was developed to address these 
issues by having only two bipolar items, and this chapter has provided evidence for its validity in 
the current study. The MAS is valuable for researchers who want an efficient way for participants to 
provide ratings on affective states over time. Practitioners in the field may also find the MAS 
particularly suited for organisational settings, where item response fatigue is a common concern 
(Hinkin, 1998; Hui & Triandis, 1985). This scale provides the opportunity to obtain data on 
dynamic changes in affect at relatively minimal cost or effort. 
Limitations 
 One potential limitation of the MAS relates to the range of affective states generated by the 
experimental task. We used an ATC simulation task which was cognitively demanding. However, 
participants in the study had a lower tendency of reporting very low energetic arousal or very high 
tense arousal. This suggests that the simulation task was sufficiently engaging to minimise 
sleepiness or dullness, though perhaps not engaging enough to generate high levels of anxiety or 
stress. Nevertheless, the results of the validation study demonstrate sufficient support for the MAS. 
It is likely difficult to observe the whole range of affective states in a single task context, but future 
validation studies of the MAS could include experimental designs or field studies designed to 
generate more extreme levels of these states. 
 Another limitation of the MAS is that it can only be used to measure subjective affective 
states. The validity of scores on the MAS is dependent on the capacity of the respondent to be 
aware of their affective states over time. This may be difficult for certain population groups or 
studies that cause high cognitive load or fatigue over time. Physiological measures of affect can be 
more objective and reliable under these conditions. However, physiological measures are also 
generally costly and time consuming to set up for each participant, especially in studies that require 
larger samples. In many applied research contexts, the MAS can provide a more viable method of 
measuring affect over time. 
 It is also important to note that the MAS is still a new scale despite being derived from 
previously validated and widely used items of the UWIST Mood Adjective Checklist (Matthews et 
al., 1990).  Although we have validated the MAS by observing its appropriate pattern of 
correlations with the original unipolar factors, we recommend that further research is needed to 
contribute to the validation of this scale (see Isen & Erez, 2006).  In particular, a comparison of the 
self-report responses of participants on the MAS with alternative methods such as physiological or 
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cognitive measures (e.g., implicit tasks) would provide a stronger indication of the validity of the 
proposed scale. 
Finally, there are potential limitations associated with the fact that the MAS comprises 
single-item scales. Single item scales preclude examination of internal consistency. It is also 
difficult to determine whether the scale adequately samples the content domain. Each MAS item is 
anchored with four descriptors at each end (e.g. Energetic Arousal is anchored with “sluggish, tired, 
sleepy, dull” at the low end and “active, alert, energetic, bright” at the high end) rather than just 
one, in order to capture more of the content domain. Consequently, the MAS may lack sensitivity to 
specific components of Tense and Energetic Arousal (e.g. differing levels of alertness vs. 
brightness). Nevertheless, the brevity of this scale is what makes the MAS particularly valuable for 
longitudinal research and applied task environments. The opportunity to measure changes in affect 
over time is not viable if a respondent has to respond regularly to many items – particularly if 
affective states are changing within minutes or seconds. 
Conclusion 
 Researchers and practitioners are increasingly recognising the important role of affect at 
work (Ashkanasy & Ashton-James, 2005; Busemeyer, Dimperio, & Jessup, 2007; Seo, et al., 2004). 
People will respond to leadership styles, performance feedback, and change projects with various 
affective states (Ashkanasy & Ashton-James, 2005; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Ilies, et al., 2007). In 
turn, various affective states can impact upon motivation and performance (Beal, et al., 2005; Ilies 
& Judge, 2005). However, treating affect as a dynamic variable also raises particular conceptual and 
methodological challenges in the form of the unipolar vs. bipolarity debate and designing a scale 
that is viable for repeated measures. The current chapter addressed these issues and proposes the 
Momentary Affect Scale as a valid and practical tool for measuring affect over time. 
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Appendix A 
Items used in Matthews et al.’s (1990) UWIST Mood Adjective Checklist 
                
Circle the number that describes the degree to which you felt the following during 
the previous trial:           
                
      Not at all   Moderately   Extremely 
Nervous   1 2 3 4 5 
Tense     1 2 3 4 5 
Stressed   1 2 3 4 5 
Anxious     1 2 3 4 5 
Relaxed     1 2 3 4 5 
Calm     1 2 3 4 5 
Composed   1 2 3 4 5 
Comfortable   1 2 3 4 5 
Active     1 2 3 4 5 
Bright     1 2 3 4 5 
Energetic   1 2 3 4 5 
Alert     1 2 3 4 5 
Sleepy     1 2 3 4 5 
Sluggish   1 2 3 4 5 
Tired     1 2 3 4 5 
Dull     1 2 3 4 5 
      Not at all   Moderately   Extremely 
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Appendix B 
Momentary Affect Scale 
 
  
Please circle the number that describes how you felt during the previous trial:
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Appendix C 
Sample Total Covariance Matrix 
 
Sample Pooled Within-Person Covariance Matrix 
 
Sample Pooled Between-Person Covariance Matrix 
 
nervous tense stressed anxious relaxed calm composedcomfortableactive bright energeticalert sleepy sluggish tired dull
N 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236
STDDEV 1.05 1.03 1.05 1.03 1.13 1.08 1.03 0.98 1.02 1.08 0.99 1.01 1.04 1.01 1.10 0.94
MEAN 1.82 2.07 1.94 2.03 3.24 3.22 3.29 3.36 3.56 3.08 3.24 3.38 1.81 1.79 2.01 1.70
nervous 1.10 0.66 0.70 0.70 -0.48 -0.43 -0.30 -0.29 0.10 0.02 -0.07 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.12
tense 0.66 1.06 0.76 0.72 -0.55 -0.47 -0.26 -0.37 0.10 -0.03 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.16 0.15
stressed 0.70 0.76 1.10 0.67 -0.60 -0.52 -0.27 -0.39 -0.01 -0.11 -0.03 0.04 0.10 0.16 0.25 0.21
anxious 0.70 0.72 0.67 1.06 -0.47 -0.45 -0.31 -0.32 0.00 -0.09 -0.07 -0.02 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.18
relaxed -0.48 -0.55 -0.60 -0.47 1.27 0.86 0.59 0.67 0.20 0.39 0.23 0.10 -0.11 0.00 -0.17 -0.08
calm -0.43 -0.47 -0.52 -0.45 0.86 1.16 0.65 0.58 0.18 0.30 0.15 0.11 -0.02 0.08 -0.10 -0.06
composed -0.30 -0.26 -0.27 -0.31 0.59 0.65 1.06 0.49 0.20 0.35 0.19 0.36 -0.11 -0.05 -0.08 -0.11
comfortable -0.29 -0.37 -0.39 -0.32 0.67 0.58 0.49 0.95 0.26 0.48 0.31 0.15 -0.15 -0.13 -0.20 -0.17
active 0.10 0.10 -0.01 0.00 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.26 1.03 0.65 0.67 0.54 -0.49 -0.32 -0.43 -0.39
bright 0.02 -0.03 -0.11 -0.09 0.39 0.30 0.35 0.48 0.65 1.16 0.70 0.47 -0.39 -0.26 -0.40 -0.39
energetic -0.07 0.04 -0.03 -0.07 0.23 0.15 0.19 0.31 0.67 0.70 0.98 0.45 -0.41 -0.28 -0.40 -0.38
alert 0.10 0.09 0.04 -0.02 0.10 0.11 0.36 0.15 0.54 0.47 0.45 1.02 -0.47 -0.34 -0.42 -0.39
sleepy 0.03 0.00 0.10 0.07 -0.11 -0.02 -0.11 -0.15 -0.49 -0.39 -0.41 -0.47 1.08 0.60 0.87 0.58
sluggish 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.00 0.08 -0.05 -0.13 -0.32 -0.26 -0.28 -0.34 0.60 1.03 0.56 0.69
tired 0.05 0.16 0.25 0.16 -0.17 -0.10 -0.08 -0.20 -0.43 -0.40 -0.40 -0.42 0.87 0.56 1.22 0.67
dull 0.12 0.15 0.21 0.18 -0.08 -0.06 -0.11 -0.17 -0.39 -0.39 -0.38 -0.39 0.58 0.69 0.67 0.89
nervous tense stressed anxious relaxed calm composedcomfortableactive bright energeticalert sleepy sluggish tired dull
N 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236
STDDEV 1.05 1.03 1.05 1.03 1.13 1.08 1.03 0.98 1.02 1.08 0.99 1.01 1.04 1.01 1.10 0.94
MEAN 1.82 2.07 1.94 2.03 3.24 3.22 3.29 3.36 3.56 3.08 3.24 3.38 1.81 1.79 2.01 1.70
nervous 0.59 0.23 0.26 0.23 -0.20 -0.11 -0.06 -0.08 0.10 0.04 -0.01 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.03
tense 0.23 0.60 0.31 0.32 -0.22 -0.14 -0.04 -0.13 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.11 -0.03 0.10 0.02 0.02
stressed 0.26 0.31 0.60 0.25 -0.23 -0.17 -0.08 -0.11 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.04 0.06
anxious 0.23 0.32 0.25 0.52 -0.11 -0.16 -0.06 -0.07 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.05 -0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05
relaxed -0.20 -0.22 -0.23 -0.11 0.60 0.28 0.17 0.15 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03
calm -0.11 -0.14 -0.17 -0.16 0.28 0.58 0.25 0.15 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.02
composed -0.06 -0.04 -0.08 -0.06 0.17 0.25 0.45 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.11 -0.04 0.01 -0.08 -0.01
comfortable -0.08 -0.13 -0.11 -0.07 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.40 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02
active 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.53 0.17 0.23 0.24 -0.16 -0.05 -0.13 -0.09
bright 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.07 0.17 0.53 0.25 0.23 -0.15 -0.07 -0.11 -0.10
energetic -0.01 0.13 0.10 0.09 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.23 0.25 0.54 0.20 -0.17 -0.04 -0.12 -0.05
alert 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.54 -0.12 -0.05 -0.11 -0.09
sleepy 0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.16 -0.15 -0.17 -0.12 0.42 0.06 0.25 0.08
sluggish 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.04 -0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 0.06 0.40 0.05 0.15
tired 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 -0.13 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11 0.25 0.05 0.53 0.16
dull 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.09 -0.10 -0.05 -0.09 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.38
nervous tense stressed anxious relaxed calm composedcomfortableactive bright energeticalert sleepy sluggish tired dull
N 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59
STDDEV 1.82 2.07 1.94 2.03 3.24 3.22 3.29 3.36 3.36 3.08 3.24 3.38 1.81 1.79 2.01 1.70
MEAN 0.82 0.79 0.81 0.82 0.91 0.86 0.85 0.81 0.80 0.88 0.77 0.79 0.88 0.86 0.91 0.78
nervous 0.67 0.49 0.51 0.53 -0.34 -0.35 -0.26 -0.24 0.03 -0.01 -0.07 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.10
tense 0.49 0.62 0.53 0.48 -0.39 -0.37 -0.23 -0.27 0.05 -0.10 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.14
stressed 0.51 0.53 0.66 0.49 -0.43 -0.39 -0.21 -0.30 -0.04 -0.14 -0.11 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.22 0.16
anxious 0.53 0.48 0.49 0.67 -0.39 -0.33 -0.27 -0.27 -0.05 -0.10 -0.14 -0.05 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.14
relaxed -0.34 -0.39 -0.43 -0.39 0.83 0.66 0.47 0.56 0.20 0.38 0.26 0.10 -0.08 0.06 -0.15 -0.06
calm -0.35 -0.37 -0.39 -0.33 0.66 0.73 0.47 0.47 0.15 0.31 0.18 0.07 -0.03 0.08 -0.07 -0.05
composed -0.26 -0.23 -0.21 -0.27 0.47 0.47 0.73 0.40 0.16 0.30 0.19 0.29 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 -0.11
comfortable -0.24 -0.27 -0.30 -0.27 0.56 0.47 0.40 0.66 0.22 0.43 0.30 0.12 -0.13 -0.09 -0.15 -0.16
active 0.03 0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.64 0.53 0.51 0.37 -0.38 -0.28 -0.33 -0.33
bright -0.01 -0.10 -0.14 -0.10 0.38 0.31 0.30 0.43 0.53 0.77 0.52 0.31 -0.28 -0.21 -0.32 -0.32
energetic -0.07 -0.06 -0.11 -0.14 0.26 0.18 0.19 0.30 0.51 0.52 0.59 0.30 -0.29 -0.26 -0.31 -0.34
alert 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.10 0.07 0.29 0.12 0.37 0.31 0.30 0.62 -0.39 -0.31 -0.34 -0.32
sleepy 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.09 -0.08 -0.03 -0.08 -0.13 -0.38 -0.28 -0.29 -0.39 0.77 0.57 0.69 0.53
sluggish -0.01 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08 -0.06 -0.09 -0.28 -0.21 -0.26 -0.31 0.57 0.74 0.53 0.58
tired 0.04 0.15 0.22 0.13 -0.15 -0.07 -0.02 -0.15 -0.33 -0.32 -0.31 -0.34 0.69 0.53 0.83 0.55
dull 0.10 0.14 0.16 0.14 -0.06 -0.05 -0.11 -0.16 -0.33 -0.32 -0.34 -0.32 0.53 0.58 0.55 0.61




Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Pooled-Within Covariance Matrix 
Measurement Model 2 df p 2/df RMSEA CFI TLI SRMR AIC 
1. Four-factor model (all constructs 
correlated) 
136.10 78 .000 1.75 .06 .94 .90 .06 580.10 
2. Four-factor model (only 
bipolar opposites correlated) 
162.03 82 .000 1.98 .06 .91 .87 .08 598.03 
3. Four-factor model (bipolar 
opposites uncorrelated) 
218.57 80 .000 2.73 .09 .85 .78 .13 658.57 
4. Two-factor model (factors 
correlated) 
161.05 81 .000 1.99 .07 .91 .87 .08 599.05 
4. Model 1 vs. Model 2  25.93 4 .000       
5. Model 1 vs. Model 3 82.47 2 .000       
6. Model 2 vs. Model 3 56.54 2 .000       
Note. N = 236; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis 
Index; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; 2 for the model comparison 
is difference in 2 values.  
 
Table 8 
Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Between-Person Covariance Matrix 
Measurement Model 2 df p 2/df RMSEA CFI TLI SRMR AIC 
1. Four-factor model (all constructs 
correlated) 
138.36 78 .000 1.77 .12 .93 .89 .10 582.36 
2. Four-factor model (only 
bipolar opposites correlated) 
167.48 82 .000 2.04 .13 .90 .85 .15 603.48 
3. Four-factor model (bipolar 
opposites uncorrelated) 
164.53 80 .000 2.06 .14 .90 .85 .26 604.53 
4. Two-factor model (factors 
correlated) 
152.71 81 .000 1.89 .12 .92 .87 .09 590.71 
4. Model 1 vs. Model 2  29.12 4 .000       
5. Model 1 vs. Model 3 26.17 2 .000       
6. Model 2 vs. Model 3 2.95 2 n.s.       
Note. N = 59; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis 
Index; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; 2 for the model comparison 
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Abstract 
The current paper presents a formal model that describes the process that generates affective states 
during approach and avoidance goal striving.  Valence is specified as a dynamic variable that 
responds to a combination of goal progress indicators including position discrepancy, velocity 
discrepancy, and goal attainment.  Arousal is specified as a dynamic variable that responds to task 
demand.  Goal framing is proposed to influence the values and weightings of these indicators, 
which produces divergent affective trajectories during approach and avoidance goal striving.  Our 
hypothesized model and a series of nested alternative models are evaluated by fitting them to 
empirical data.  These data were collected through an experimental study in which 60 participants 
performed a medium-fidelity Air Traffic Control simulation task.  Participants were randomly 
allocated to an approach or avoidance goal framing condition, and their affective states were 
measured at regular intervals across five goal striving episodes.  The results indicated that our 
hypothesized model could describe and predict four distinct trajectories of affective states as 
distinguished by the goal framing condition and by trials where individuals attained or failed to 
attain their goals.  The contributions of each indicator on valence and arousal differed across 
approach and avoidance goal framing.  We discuss the theoretical, methodological, and practical 
implications of our formal model. 
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A Formal Model of Affective States during Approach and Avoidance Goal Striving 
 
“Emotion is the chief source of all becoming-conscious.  There can be no transforming 
of darkness to light and of apathy into movement without emotion.” 
        ‒ Carl Jung 
 
As people strive towards their goals, they will invariably experience a range of affective 
states such as excitement, anxiety, sadness, or pleasure.  Complex trajectories of affect can emerge 
over time depending on whether individuals are striving to approach desired outcomes or to avoid 
undesired outcomes (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Elliot, 1999; Gray, 1982).  The culminating event of 
goal attainment or failure can also precipitate an abrupt shift in the person’s affective state 
(Bagozzi, Baumgartner, & Pieters, 1998; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997).  Three decades ago, 
such a description of how affective experiences emerge would have been considered extraneous or 
supplementary at best in goal striving research (Briner, 1999; Munchinsky, 2000).  Fortunately, this 
perspective has begun to change in response to growing evidence that affective experiences can 
systematically influence how people think and behave (Ashkanasy & Humphrey, 2011; Barsade & 
Gibson, 2007; Brief & Weiss, 2002; Foo, Uy, & Baron, 2009; Forgas & George, 2001; George & 
Brief, 1992).  Several motivational and self-regulatory studies have since examined how affect can 
impact on goal striving (Beal, Weiss, Barros, & MacDermid, 2005; Ilies & Judge, 2005; Seo, 
Barrett, & Bartunek, 2004; Seo & Ilies, 2009).  However, the state of knowledge remains limited 
when it comes to describing the processes that generate affective states in either approach or 
avoidance goal striving, as well as the dynamics of affective reactions over time (Briner, 1999; 
Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). 
 There are a number of theories that have attempted to describe the process that generates 
affective states during goal striving, but these theories differ in the mechanisms that are considered 
to be responsible.  Carver and Scheier’s (1990) control theory proposes that affective reactions are 
generated by the perceived discrepancy between the current and expected rate of progress towards a 
goal (i.e., velocity discrepancy).  Carver (2003) further extended this theory by proposing that one 
of two affective dimensions – energetic arousal or tense arousal – are activated depending on 
whether the velocity discrepancy occurred during approach or avoidance goal striving.  Depending 
on the sign and magnitude of the velocity discrepancy, individuals experience feelings ranging from 
elation to sadness in gain contexts, and feelings ranging from calmness to anxiety in loss contexts.  
In contrast, regulatory focus theory proposes that affective reactions are generated by the perceived 
discrepancy between an individual’s current position and the goal (i.e., position discrepancy: 
Brockner & Higgins, 2001; Higgins, 1997).  Depending on the sign and magnitude of the position 
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discrepancy, individuals should experience feelings ranging from cheerfulness to dejection in gain 
contexts, and feelings ranging from quiescence to agitation in loss contexts.  These affect labels in 
the two contexts are conceptually similar to the dimensions of energetic and tense arousal, 
respectively.  The distinction, however, is whether these affective reactions are derived from 
information about position versus velocity discrepancies during goal striving.  
Although both theories provide some insights about the process that generates affective 
reactions, it is important to recognize that they are informal theories.  The verbalized accounts of 
affect do not offer a precise description of the underlying processes and their dynamic properties – 
such as the role of memory and decay over time (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2010; Vancouver, Putka, 
& Scherbaum, 2005; Wood, 2005).  The theories are also limited in scope by only considering 
either discrepancies in velocity or position during goal striving, instead of accounting for multiple 
constructs that might simultaneously influence affective states over time, or discrete events such as 
the effect of goal attainment or failure during goal striving (see Bagozzi, et al., 1998; Hsee, 
Abelson, & Salovey, 1991).  Furthermore, the empirical studies applying these theories have used 
inconsistent definitions of affect, position, and velocity, and have tended to generate conflicting 
support for both theories (see Chang, Johnson, & Lord, 2010; Hsee & Abelson, 1991; Lawrence, 
Carver, & Scheier, 2002). 
To address these limitations, we need to move towards a formal theory of affect.  Formal 
theories represent a transition towards mature science by requiring precise specification of 
processes in the form of computational (i.e., mathematical) models (Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2010; 
Vancouver, 2008).  As computational models require all parts of a theory to be specified, they have 
an advantage of improving the consistency in how theories are operationalized and tested in 
empirical studies (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2010).  Formal theories are also especially appropriate 
for examining dynamic properties and complex relationships across multiple constructs 
(Vancouver, 2008; Vancouver, Weinhardt, & Schmidt, 2010).  For instance, affect can be 
mathematically expressed as a within-person construct that retains its level over time until there is 
an external disturbance, and the effect of these disturbances can be calculated to diminish over time 
(see Bower, 1992).  Based on these advantages, we propose that moving towards a formal theory of 
affective reactions will offer a significant theoretical and empirical contribution to the goal striving 
literature. 
 The aim of this paper is to develop and test a formal model of the process that generates 
affective states during approach and avoidance goal striving.  An important distinction in our model 
is that we focus on the role of core affective experiences – valence and arousal – as individuals 
engage in goal striving (see Seo, et al., 2004; Yik, Russell, & Barrett, 1999).  We propose that 
valence is responsive to indicators of goal progress, such that information that contributes towards 
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the expectancy of goal attainment or non-attainment will influence the degree of pleasure or 
displeasure that a person feels; whereas arousal is responsive to indicators of task demand, such that 
information about the level of task demand (e.g., required cognitive effort) will influence the degree 
of activation or deactivation that a person feels (see Seo, et al., 2004).  Our model assumes that 
valence and arousal are dynamic variables that retain their level over time.  Changes in valence are 
produced by changes in information about position discrepancy (the discrepancy between an 
individual’s current state and goal state), velocity discrepancy (the discrepancy between an 
individual’s current rate of progress and the expected rate of progress), and goal attainment.  
Changes in arousal are produced by changes in the level of task demands.  As explained below, this 
proposed model offers a parsimonious way of accounting for the effects of approach and avoidance 
framing without postulating the existence of separate motivational systems.  Our model proposes 
that the same overall process occurs across approach and avoidance goal striving, but that framing 
can impact on the value and weighting of the indicators to produce different affective states. 
In order to evaluate our model, we conducted an experimental study in which participants 
provide instantaneous ratings of affect while striving towards approach or avoidance goals on a 
medium-fidelity Air Traffic Control simulation task (Fothergill, Loft, & Neal, 2009).  The 
experimental setting made it possible to manipulate goal framing and observe changes in affect over 
time in a controlled environment.  We evaluate our formal model by assessing whether it can 
account for the observed affective trajectories as individuals either succeed or fail in striving 
towards approach or avoidance goals.  In the following sections, we begin with a review of the 
conceptualization and operationalization of affect, followed by our formal model, and then we 
present the predicted trajectories of affect across the different goal framing and goal attainment 
conditions. 
Conceptualization and Operationalization of Affect 
 Affect is used to describe the feelings that an individual experiences at any given point in 
time (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007).  These feelings are most commonly represented 
on a circumplex with two primary dimensions, namely, valence and arousal (see Figure 1) 
(Matthews, Jones, & Chamberlain, 1990; Yik, et al., 1999).  Valence refers to the experience of 
pleasure that ranges from pleasant to unpleasant states, while arousal refers to the experience of 
energization that ranges from activated to deactivated states.  The two primary dimensions represent 
the range of core affective experiences that could occur during goal striving. 
Some scholars focus on the secondary dimensions of affect that represent a blend of valence 
and arousal (Yik, et al., 1999).  These secondary dimensions are commonly labeled as positive and 
negative affect, though some researchers describe these same dimensions as energetic and tense 
arousal, respectively (see Brockner & Higgins, 2001; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Matthews, et al., 
Formal Model of Affective States     76 
 
1990; Thayer, 1989).  Positive affect, or energetic arousal, is a bipolar dimension that describes a 
set of feelings that range from pleasant-activation to unpleasant-deactivation.  Negative affect, or 
tense arousal, is a bipolar dimension that describes a set of feelings that range from unpleasant-
activation to pleasant-deactivation. 
 
Figure 1.  Primary and secondary (diagonal) dimensions of affect. 
 
 The affect structure has been operationalized in several different ways.  Some affect studies 
have focused on ratings of satisfaction, pleasure, or positive-negative mood that load primarily on to 
the valence dimension (see Fisher & Noble, 2004; Hsee & Abelson, 1991; Idson, Liberman, & 
Higgins, 2000; Lawrence, et al., 2002; Miner & Glomb, 2010).  The most common affect measure 
is the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), which measures the activated ends of the 
secondary dimensions (pleasant activation and unpleasant activation: Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988).  However, the items in the PANAS have also been criticized for not representing the full 
affect circumplex, but rather only the activated quadrants (unpleasant-activation and pleasant-
activation) (Gee, Ballard, Yeo, & Neal, 2012; Russell & Carroll, 1999).  In our study, we aim to 
represent the full structure of affect by measuring changes across the range of valence and arousal.  
We operationally measure affect in terms of hedonic tone, energetic arousal, and tense arousal.  
Hedonic tone is an expression of the valence dimension that is independent of arousal (Matthews, et 
al., 1990).  Typical hedonic tone scales focus on capturing the sense of pleasure-displeasure at a 
relatively neutral level of arousal.  In contrast, the subjective experience of arousal only occurs in 
combination with some level of valence (Thayer, 1989).  Therefore, we use energetic and tense 
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arousal to measure changes in arousal, because those constructs are sensitive to changes in both 
pleasure-displeasure and activation-deactivation (Matthews, et al., 1990).  These constructs in 
combination allow us to appropriately distinguish how the primary dimensions of affect vary over 
time in relation to the set of goal striving constructs, as compared to studies that focus only on 
satisfaction, valence, or the secondary dimensions exclusively (Briner, 1999). 
A Formal Model of Affective States during Goal Striving 
Valence 
 Our formal model regards goal striving as a process that contributes to the satisfaction or 
frustration of higher order needs such as affiliation, agency, and esteem (Brunstein, 1993; DeShon 
& Gillespie, 2005; Diener & Fujita, 1995).  To achieve these higher order needs, individuals strive 
towards task level goals that can manifest in various forms.  Approach framed goals represent 
desired outcomes that can contribute towards the attainment of higher order needs, while avoidance 
framed goals represented undesired outcomes that can threaten the attainment of higher order needs 
(Elliot, 1999; Elliot & Friedman, 2007).  The role of pleasant states during goal striving is to 
motivate behaviors that enable progress towards desired outcomes and away from undesired 
outcomes, while unpleasant states serve to punish behaviors that enable progress towards undesired 
outcomes and away from desired outcomes (see Bower, 1992; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Lazarus, 
1991; Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  Our model proposes that indicators of progress towards approach 
or avoidance goals produce these affective reactions on the valence dimension. 
 We define valence as a hypothetical construct that is measured through subjective ratings of 
hedonic tone (  ) provided by an individual at discrete points in time during a goal striving episode.  
The subscript t denotes the time at which the rating is made.  We assume that hedonic tone is a 
dynamic variable that has an initial intercept value (  ).  The intercept is treated as a free 
parameter, allowing for individual differences in the initial level of hedonic tone during a goal 
striving episode.  As a dynamic variable, hedonic tone retains its level from the previous point in 
time (    ) until some event produces a change (   ), upon which there is an opponent process 
that brings the level back to baseline over time (Bower, 1992).  Examples of an opponent process 
can be seen in people who win the lottery or engage in high risk activities, where extreme levels of 
valence are experienced for a limited period of time before returning to a level prior to the event.  
We incorporate the opponent process with an exponential decay function that is weighted by a free 
parameter (  ) constrained between 0 and 1, which allows for the strength of the opponent process 
to vary across individuals.  An exponential decay parameter weight of .50 would indicate that a 
sudden increment in hedonic tone would diminish by 50% at each time point until it reaches the 
baseline (see Figure 2).  The general equation for hedonic tone is represented as follows: 
                            1) 
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Figure 2.  Example of an opponent process on changes in hedonic tone over time. 
 
 Position discrepancy.  As individuals make progress towards their goal, one indicator of 
progress that they can attend to is the discrepancy between their current state and their goal state 
(see Chang, et al., 2010; Hsee, et al., 1991).  Formally, the position discrepancy (  ) at a given point 
in time represents the difference between the current state of the system that an individual is trying 
to control (  ) and their goal level (  ), where the subscript n denotes the goal striving episode in 
which the goal level is set (        ).  A position discrepancy value that is negative indicates 
that the individual is currently below their goal, while a positive value indicates that they have 
exceeded their goal.  The change in hedonic tone that is produced by changes in position 
discrepancy is, therefore, represented as follows: 
                 2) 
where    is a free parameter representing the individual’s sensitivity to changes in position 
discrepancy.  We hypothesize that    should be positive when striving for approach goals because 
individuals should experience more pleasant states as they move closer to a desired outcome (H1), 
and    should be negative when striving for avoidance goals because individuals should experience 
more unpleasant states as they move closer to an undesired outcome (H2). 
 A range of studies have provided empirical support for a relationship between position 
discrepancy and valence.  A classic study by Emmons (1986) investigated ratings of affect as 
university students reported on their progress towards several personal goals over three weeks.  At 
four random intervals on each day, participants provided ratings on two unipolar measures of 
pleasure and displeasure, and indicated their goal progress to date in three different ways: by rating 
how successful they were in their goal striving, their satisfaction with the amount of progress they 
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the outcome to occur.  The author found that the combined indicators of goal progress were 
positively related to ratings of pleasure, and not significantly related to ratings of displeasure.  A 
similar study by Brunstein (1993) examined the subjective wellbeing of university students who 
pursued several personal goals over a 14 week period.  The subjective wellbeing scale contained 
two self-rated items that measured life satisfaction and eight adapted items that measured elated 
moods (e.g., “joyful”, “pleased”) and depressed moods (e.g. “sad”, “anxious”).  The results of the 
study indicated that progress towards personal goals was positively related to subjective wellbeing. 
 In addition to the research on personal goals of university students, some empirical studies 
have also been conducted in the work domain.  Wiese and Freund (2005) sampled employees with a 
variety of occupations and instructed them to generate a list of personal work-related goals and rate 
their affective experiences over the previous year using the PANAS.  Three years later, the 
participants provided ratings on the amount of progress they had made towards achieving these 
goals and their affective experiences over the previous year.  The authors generally found that the 
employees who had moved closer towards their goals had reported higher positive affect and lower 
negative affect over the previous year.  Similarly, Miner and Glomb (2010) investigated the affect 
and performance of call center employees over three weeks.  Affect was measured with self-rated 
hedonic tone items (e.g., “happy”, “sad”) that loaded on the valence dimension, and performance 
was objectively measured as customer call length.  Although this study did not explicitly 
incorporate goal striving, the findings indicated that employees reported more positive hedonic tone 
when their customer call length was shorter (higher performance).  Despite some considerable 
variability in the types of affect measures used, the overall evidence indicates that information 
about position discrepancy can produce affective reactions on the valence dimension. 
 Velocity discrepancy.  An alternative indicator of progress towards a goal is the discrepancy 
between an expected rate of progress and the actual rate of progress at a given moment in time 
(Carver & Scheier, 1990).  The expected rate of progress is determined by either an imposed time 
constraint or an individual’s preferences for how much time they want to allocate towards a goal.  
Formally, the velocity discrepancy (  ) at a given point in time is the difference between the current 
rate of progress and the required rate of progress in order to achieve the goal within the remaining 
time available ( ).  The current rate of progress is the change in position over one unit time interval 
(       ).  The required rate of progress is a function of the difference between the goal level and 
the prior state of the system relative to the remaining time available, constrained so that it cannot 
adopt values below zero that would occur after goal attainment (   (
         
 
  )).  The velocity 
discrepancy is, therefore, represented as follows: 
                (
         
 
  )  3) 
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One problem is that the raw values of velocity discrepancy can quickly move towards 
infinity as individuals reach a point where it is impossible to attain their goal in the available 
amount of time (i.e., the denominator approaches zero).  Conceptually, the velocity discrepancy 
values in these contexts should represent an expectancy of goal attainment that is zero.  To make the 
velocity discrepancy values easier to interpret, the equation is scaled between values of 0 and 1 with 
a logistic function, F(x) = 1 / [1 + exp(-x)].  A re-scaled velocity discrepancy value that is less than 
0.50 indicates that an individual is currently making slower than expected rate of progress towards 
the goal, while a value that is greater than 0.50 indicates that they are making faster than expected 
rate of progress towards the goal.  This function is further subtracted by 0.50, such that hedonic tone 
will not change when individuals are performing at an expected rate of progress (i.e., re-scaled 
velocity discrepancy = 0.50).  The change in hedonic tone that is produced by changes in this re-
scaled velocity discrepancy is represented as follows: 
      (
 
[       ]
)      4) 
where    is a free parameter representing the individual’s sensitivity to velocity discrepancy, and   
controls the steepness of the function.  Higher values of   make the velocity discrepancy values 
more step-like, and lower values make the velocity discrepancy values more linear (see Figure 3).  
We hypothesize that    should be positive when striving for approach goals because individuals 
should experience more pleasant states when making faster than expected progress towards a 
desired outcome (H3).  For individuals striving for avoidance goals, we hypothesize that    should 
be negative because individuals should experience more unpleasant states when making faster than 
expected progress towards an undesired outcome (H4). 
 
Figure 3.  The effect of different values of   on the re-scaled velocity discrepancy values where an 
individual performs at a velocity below the expected velocity, such that the velocity discrepancy is 
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 There are some empirical studies that have examined the effects of velocity on affect.  Hsee 
and Abelson (1991) conducted two studies containing hypothetical scenarios of academic ranking 
or salary that described different patterns of position and velocity.  Unlike the definition of velocity 
discrepancy from Carver and Scheier (1990), the concept of velocity used here did not incorporate 
any discrepancy against a reference state velocity.  In the first study, participants were presented 
with pairs of text-based scenarios and they were instructed to choose the more satisfying alternative.  
The results revealed that all participants preferred a scenario with higher position rather than lower 
position.  A majority of participants also indicated it would be more satisfying in a scenario with 
higher velocity than lower velocity.  Interestingly, the response pattern indicated that velocity was 
more important than position, as more participants preferred a scenario with low position and high 
velocity than a scenario with high position and low velocity.  The authors obtained similar findings 
in their second study, where participants viewed graphs of performance that varied in height and 
rate of change on the screen.  Most notably, the findings revealed no evidence of an interaction 
between position and velocity, suggesting that each contributed independently to self-reported 
satisfaction. 
 A subsequent study by Hsee, Abelson, and Salovey (1991) considered how the relative 
weighting between position and velocity may differ under particular task contexts.  They similarly 
used text-based hypothetical scenarios that described academic grades or salary with differing levels 
of position and velocity over time.  Participants provided ratings of their satisfaction among several 
alternative scenarios.  The task context was manipulated in three ways: (1) making the difference in 
position or velocity more salient, (2) associating performance to intrinsic or extrinsic motivators, 
and (3) describing grades and salary as contingent or not contingent on performance.  The authors 
found that position and velocity both contributed to ratings of satisfaction.  Participants 
demonstrated more sensitivity to velocity in their satisfaction ratings when the task condition made 
velocity more salient, associated performance with intrinsic motivators, and made outcomes 
contingent on performance.  This study demonstrated that the relative weighting of position and 
velocity could change depending on the task context. 
 These findings from Hsee and colleagues suggest that both position and velocity can 
influence affective reactions.  However, there are a number of limitations associated with this body 
of work.  For example, the studies focused on comparing relative satisfaction between two or more 
alternatives, rather than measuring affective states as people engage in goal striving.  Furthermore, 
the scenarios are hypothetical and present overt comparisons of specific levels of position and 
velocity, which can accentuate their impact on affective responses.  The use of velocity instead of 
velocity discrepancy is also not consistent with prior theory.  Although such discrepancies may not 
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have been conceptually important in the case of hypothetical scenarios, it may have a more 
significant role in tasks with deadlines and volitional control of rate of progress by individuals. 
 A more recent set of studies has examined velocity as participants perform tasks over time.  
Lawrence, Carver, and Scheier (2002) used a foreign word recognition task in which participants 
received false feedback on their performance on each trial.  The feedback was manipulated to 
describe a trajectory of performance that started high and decreased over successive trials, started 
low and increased over successive trials, or remained consistently average over all trials.  The 
performance feedback converged over time so that every participant had the same number of correct 
responses on the final trial.  The participants provided ratings of their mood on the valence 
dimension at the beginning and end of the experiment.  The authors found that change in mood at 
the end of the experiment was predicted by velocity.  Despite having the same final position, the 
participants who experienced positive velocity in performance had reported more positive mood, 
and those who experimented negative velocity in performance had reported more negative mood.  
These findings demonstrated that participants’ mood was responsive to differences in velocity even 
when they performed in a more naturalistic task context.  However, the authors did not compare the 
relative contribution of position and velocity on affective responses. 
 Chang, Johnson, and Lord (2010) provided an important extension on this literature by 
considering velocity discrepancy.  In their first study, the authors did not specifically look at goal 
striving, but examined the discrepancies between desired and perceived job characteristics such as 
hourly pay rate and learning opportunities.  Undergraduate university students completed a 
questionnaire by rating their desired and perceived position, and their desired and perceived 
velocity, on a set of job characteristics.  They rated their feelings of satisfaction in relation to each 
job characteristic on a scale that ranged from “delighted” to “terrible”.  The results indicated that 
perceived position and velocity were both positively related to satisfaction on three factors of job 
characteristics.  At the same time, the desired position and velocity were both negatively related to 
satisfaction.  The authors interpreted this pattern of findings as evidence of support for the position 
and velocity discrepancy frameworks.  In their second study, university students performed an 
implicit grammar task and were assigned a position and desired velocity goal, such that they had to 
reach a particular proportion of correct trials (position) within six blocks of trials (desired velocity).  
The participants received false performance feedback that indicated a high or low negative 
discrepancy in proportion correct, and a high or low negative discrepancy in rate of improvement 
per block.  After completing the task, participants provided ratings of task satisfaction that was 
calculated as an average of 10 semantic differential items (e.g., ranging from “boring” to 
“interesting”).  The results indicated that smaller position and velocity discrepancies were 
associated with higher ratings of task satisfaction.  The authors also found a significant interaction 
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between position and velocity discrepancies, such that position only predicted task satisfaction 
when the velocity was low (c.f. Hsee & Abelson, 1991).  Overall, these findings indicate that both 
position discrepancies and velocity discrepancies can influence ratings of satisfaction during goal 
striving. 
Goal attainment.  Throughout the process of goal striving, individuals can eventually reach 
a point where they experience the event of goal attainment or failure.  Feedback about goal 
attainment may be determined explicitly if the goal state is specific and measurable, or it may 
depend on the perceptions of the individual or others if the goal state is loosely defined.  In either 
case, the attainment of a desired or undesired state contributes to the satisfaction or frustration of 
personal needs, and thus generates affective states of pleasure or displeasure.  Although a position 
discrepancy value can also represent the point at which an individual’s performance has matched 
their goal state, we propose that goal attainment is a distinct event that impacts on affect more than 
a single unit change in position discrepancy.  Formally, goal attainment (  ) at a given point in time 
is calculated to have a value of 0 when the current state of the system is below the goal level 
(    ), and a value of 1 when the current state of the system is equal or above the goal level 
(    ).  The change in hedonic tone that is produced by changes in goal attainment is represented 
as follows: 
                5) 
where    is a free parameter representing the individual’s sensitivity to changes in goal attainment.  
We hypothesize that    should be positive when striving for approach goals because individuals 
should experience more pleasant states when they have reached the desired outcome (H5).  For 
individuals striving for avoidance goals, we hypothesize that    should be negative because they 
should experience more unpleasant states when they have reached the undesired outcome (H6).  On 
successful trials, people with approach goals should experience a change in goal attainment state, 
while those with avoidance goals should not experience a change in state because they do not reach 
the undesired outcome.  On unsuccessful trials, the reverse pattern should be observed. 
The relationship between goal attainment and affect is well-established in the literature, with 
consistent evidence demonstrating that individuals experience an increase in valence when they 
attain their goals (Bagozzi, et al., 1998; Harris, Daniels, & Briner, 2003; Higgins, et al., 1997; 
Smith, Ntoumanis, Duda, & Vansteenkiste, 2011). However, the research to date that has addressed 
either position discrepancy or velocity discrepancy does not incorporate the event of goal 
attainment (or non-attainment) as an explicit predictor of affect (see Hsee & Abelson, 1991; 
Lawrence, et al., 2002; Wiese & Freund, 2005).  Therefore, it is unclear how goal attainment 
influences affect relative to the other goal striving constructs.  Our formal model explicitly 
considers how position discrepancy, velocity discrepancy, and goal attainment together contribute 
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towards affective reactions on the valence dimension.  The complete function that accounts for 
change in hedonic tone is, therefore, represented as follows: 
                  (
 
[       ]
)                  6) 
Arousal 
Our formal model also accounts for changes in the level of arousal as individuals engage in 
goal striving over time.  The literature indicates that at least two dimensions – energetic arousal and 
tense arousal – are necessary for measuring the subjective experience of arousal (Matthews, et al., 
1990; Thayer, 1989).  For this reason, we define arousal as a hypothetical construct that is measured 
through subjective ratings of energetic arousal (   ) and tense arousal (   ) provided by an 
individual at discrete points in time during a goal striving episode.  As with hedonic tone, energetic 
and tense arousal are dynamic variables with initial intercept values (       ) that are treated as 
free parameters to allow for individual differences in the initial level of energetic and tense arousal.  
Being dynamic variables, energetic and tense arousal retain their level from the previous point in 
time (           ) until some event produces a change (         ).  To account for the 
depletion of arousal in response to the application of effort, we incorporate a linear depletion 
function that is weighted by a free parameter (  ), which allows for the rate of depletion to vary 
across individuals (see Matthews & Desmond, 2002).  A depletion parameter weight of       
would indicate that energetic and tense arousal diminishes by      at each time point.  The general 
equations for energetic and tense arousal are, therefore, represented as follows: 
                   7) 
                   8) 
Given that both energetic and tense arousal have a valenced component, we assume that 
hedonic tone is one of the factors that causes changes in these variables: 
                  9) 
                  10) 
where    and    are free parameters controlling the extent to which ratings of energetic and tense 
arousal are sensitive to changes in hedonic tone.  Given that increments in energetic and tense 
arousal are typically associated with more positively and negatively valenced states, respectively, it 
is expected that    should be positive and    should be negative. 
 Task demand.  During goal striving, the allocation of resources in response to the current 
level of task demand should lead to an increase in the subjective experience of arousal.  Resource 
allocation is a general term that encompasses physiological and cognitive activity, such as 
generating motor movements and using working memory, respectively (Pfaff, 2006).  Task demand 
is an indicator of the amount of resource allocation that is required at any given moment to satisfy 
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the conditions of performance, such as an expected rate of behavioral output (Hockey, 1997; 
Kahneman, 1973).  According to cognitive-energetic theories, an individual’s level of arousal 
changes dynamically in response to the current level of task demand in order to ensure that 
sufficient resources are made available (Bradley & Lang, 2007; Hockey, 1997; Humphreys & 
Revelle, 1984).  Activities that have higher demand for information processing or behavior will lead 
to more activated states, which correspond with increased resource allocation.  Activities that have 
minimal demands will lead to more deactivated states and minimal resource allocation. 
 Formally, task demand (  ) at a given point in time, for the context of our study, represents 
the concurrent number of pending decisions that an individual has to respond to.  Higher values of 
task demand indicate that an individual has increasing numbers of unresolved decisions that require 
a response.  The change in energetic and tense arousal that is produced by changes in task demand 
is, therefore, represented as follows: 
                 11) 
                 12) 
where    and    are free parameters that represent the individual’s sensitivity to changes in the 
level of task demand.  We hypothesize that    and    should be positive in both conditions because 
individuals should experience higher arousal as the number of pending decisions increases (H7). 
 There are several empirical studies that support the relationship between task demands and 
affective experiences on the arousal dimension.  Wright and Brehm (1984) conducted a study where 
participants were instructed to exert varying levels of physical effort on a task to avoid an 
unpleasant stimulus from activating.  Before the trial would supposedly begin, however, the 
participants were instructed to respond to a set of mood adjectives that generally corresponded to 
energetic and tense arousal.  The findings indicated that both forms of arousal were significantly 
higher for participants who anticipated a highly demanding task than for those who anticipated a 
less demanding task.  A similar pattern of findings was observed by Gellatly and Meyer (1992), 
who examined the effect of task demands on physiological arousal as participants performed a letter 
search task.  The participants were instructed to reach a goal level that either could be attained at a 
relaxed pace (low demand) or vigorous pace (high demand).  Physiological arousal was measured 
with average heart rate obtained from each participant during the task as compared to a baseline.  
The authors found that the average heart rate increased significantly more from baseline when 
participants experienced high task demand compared to low task demand.  More recently, a study 
by Carpenter and colleagues (1999) examined the relationship between physiological arousal and 
cognitive demands in a mental rotation task.  Participants had to determine if pairs of figures were 
identical or different, and these figures were rotated with incrementing angular disparity to raise the 
level of cognitive demand.  Arousal was measured via fMRI scans of neuronal activity in the 
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parietal and temporal regions of the brain.  Their findings revealed a linear correspondence between 
the angular disparity and levels of neuronal activation.  Overall, evidence indicates that both 
subjective ratings and physiological indicators of arousal are related to task demand. 
Model Predictions 
To test our formal model, we initially establish a set of predictions of the trajectories of 
hedonic tone, energetic arousal, and tense arousal across 2 x 2 conditions: as individuals engage in 
approach or avoidance goal striving, and as individuals successfully attain or fail to attain their goal.  
To generate these predictions, we firstly set constraints on each free parameter in our model based 
on how we have conceptualized approach and avoidance goal striving in the earlier sections (as 
summarized in Table 1). 
 
Table 1 




Hedonic Tone   
   Initial level of hedonic tone unconstrained unconstrained 
   Strength of exponential decay ≥0, ≤1 ≥0, ≤1 
   Sensitivity to change in position discrepancy ≥0 ≤0 
   Sensitivity to change in velocity discrepancy ≥0 ≤0 
  Steepness of velocity discrepancy function unconstrained unconstrained 
   Sensitivity to change in goal attainment ≥0 ≤0 
Energetic Arousal   
    Initial level of energetic arousal unconstrained unconstrained 
   Strength of depletion <0 <0 
   Sensitivity to change in hedonic tone ≥0 ≥0 
   Sensitivity to change in task demand ≥0 ≥0 
Tense Arousal   
    Initial level of tense arousal unconstrained unconstrained 
   Strength of depletion <0 <0 
   Sensitivity to change in hedonic tone ≤0 ≤0 
   Sensitivity to change in task demand ≥0 ≥0 
 
We ran an unfitted model using a conservative set of parameter values that assumed each 
construct has the same relative weighting within approach or avoidance goal striving, and we 
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simulated performance that would either lead to goal attainment or failure.
1
  Figure 4 demonstrates 
the predictions of the model for one individual’s affective ratings across the four conditions.  The 
different trajectories of affect across the conditions indicate that our model can describe relatively 
complex patterns of affective experiences.  In the next section, we describe the experimental study 
that we conducted in order to evaluate the predictions of our model when it is fitted against 
empirical data. 
 
Figure 4.  Predicted affect trajectories of the model for one individual during approach or avoidance 
goal striving, and successful or unsuccessful trials in attaining the goal.  A single vertical line 




 Sixty participants from the University of Queensland community (28 men, 32 women) 
volunteered to take part in the three-hour experiment for course credit or $30.00 if they were not 
eligible for course credit.  The mean age of the participants was 21.25 years (SD = 4.30). 
                                                 
1
 The initial unfitted model assumed equal parameter weights of 0.33 for k1, k2, and k3 in the approach condition, and -
0.33 in the avoidance condition.  In both conditions, the value of r = 1,     = 0.33, and     = -0.10.  The parameter 
weights for k4 and k5 were set to 0.10 and -0.10, respectively.  The parameter weights for k6 and k7 were set to 0.20.  
Initial level of hedonic tone, energetic arousal, and tense arousal were set to zero.  Performance was simulated to 
increase at a stable rate that would surpass the goal in successful approach and unsuccessful avoidance trials, and not 
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Task 
 The experimental task was a medium-fidelity Air Traffic Control simulation that provided a 
dynamic and challenging performance environment, while retaining high experimental control 
(Fothergill, et al., 2009; Loft, Hill, Neal, Humphreys, & Yeo, 2004).  Participants were required to 
monitor aircraft that moved through controlled airspace and ensure that they did not violate the 
minimum vertical and lateral separation standards of 1000ft and 5 nautical miles, respectively.  All 
aircraft moved across standard flight paths, but target pairs had the same flight level and crossing 
routes.  To perform this task, participants had to detect and classify target pairs as conflicts or non-
conflicts.  Conflict pairs were defined as aircraft on the same flight level that would pass within 5 
nautical miles at their point of closest approach, thereby violating the separations standards.  Non-
conflict pairs were defined as aircraft on the same flight level that would not pass within 5 nautical 
miles at their point of closest approach. 
 Participants made classifications by firstly clicking on the flight level information panels of 
any two aircraft, where a confirmation response box would appear with the aircraft call signs, and 
subsequently clicking on either the conflict or non-conflict declaration button in that response box.  
When a conflict pair was correctly classified, one aircraft in the pair would begin to climb 1000ft to 
ensure vertical separation.  As the climb required approximately four seconds in the simulation to 
complete, participants had to respond early enough to ensure the aircraft pair had an opportunity to 
reach vertical separation prior to a loss of lateral separation.  For non-conflict pairs, participants had 
to classify them before they reached their point of closest approach. 
 A single experimental trial on the task took 14 minutes to complete and contained 12 
conflict aircraft pairs and 8 non-conflict aircraft pairs.  Participants could make up to 20 correct or 
incorrect decisions on each trial.  The duration of the trials was determined to ensure that variability 
in affect could be observed, and the number of pending decisions was determined in pilot testing to 
ensure sufficient variability in task demand over time.  These pending decisions generate demand 
by requiring a combination of vigilance, spatial calculations, and motor behavior to be resolved 
(Fothergill, et al., 2009; Loft, et al., 2004; Warm, Dember, & Hancock, 1996).  Aircraft were 
scripted to enter controlled airspace over the course of a trial.  The script generated a pattern of 
traffic that peaked at approximately 2 and 10 minutes into the trial in the form of a bimodal 
distribution, which represented two instances where task demand was high due to the number of 
concurrent decisions to be made.  For aircraft that were in conflict, a decision was scored as correct 
if the participant classified the target pair as a conflict at least 4 seconds before minimum separation 
would be violated.  For aircraft that were not in conflict, a decision was scored as correct if the 
participant classified the target pair as a non-conflict before their point of closest approach.  
Formal Model of Affective States     89 
 
Incorrect decisions occurred when the participant made a misclassification or did not detect and 
classify a target aircraft pair in time. 
Goal Framing Manipulation 
Participants were randomly allocated to an approach or avoidance goal framing condition.  
On each upcoming trial, participants in the approach condition were instructed to choose a goal 
level of making at least 4, 8, 12, 16, or 20 correct decisions, while participants in the avoidance 
condition were instructed to choose a goal level of making no more than 16, 12, 8, 4, or 0 incorrect 
decisions.  These goal levels were designated to be symmetrical and identical between the two 
conditions, except being framed in terms of approach or avoidance.  Participants could choose a 
different goal level at the beginning of each trial.  During a trial, participants could view their 
current goal and a tally of their cumulative correct decisions (in the approach condition) or incorrect 
decisions (in the avoidance condition). 
 To strengthen the ecological validity of these goals, a scoring system was used to associate 
goal attainment and failure with positive and negative outcomes.  We designed the scoring system 
in line with traditional conceptualizations of approach and avoidance goals (see Boettcher III, 2004; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002).  In the approach 
condition, participants started with zero points and had the opportunity to gain up to 200 points on 
each trial.  They could set more challenging goals to maximize the number of points they stood to 
gain.  If the amount of correct decisions reached or exceeded the participant’s goal, they received a 
number of points calculated by multiplying the chosen goal level by 10 (e.g., gain 120 points for 
attaining a goal level of 12 correct decisions).  However, the participant would receive zero points if 
they failed to attain the goal.  Therefore, participants in the approach condition were striving to 
reach a desired outcome by managing the presence and absence of positive outcomes. 
 In the avoidance condition, participants started with 1000 points and had the threat of losing 
up to 200 points on each trial.  They could set more challenging goals to minimize the number of 
points they stood to lose.  If the number of incorrect decisions did not exceed the participant’s goal, 
the participant lost a number of points calculated by multiplying the chosen goal level by 10 (e.g., 
lose 40 points for attaining a goal level of 4 incorrect decisions).  However, the participant would 
lose 200 points if they failed to maintain their goal.  Therefore, participants in the avoidance 
condition were striving to maintain a distance from an undesired outcome by managing the presence 
and absence of negative outcomes.  Within the boundaries of the approach and avoidance 
distinction, this scoring system was also designed to be symmetrical between the two conditions.   
This scoring system is used to support the goal framing distinction and represents a form of 
contingent reward and punishment for how individuals perform during goal striving. 
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Measures 
 Goal level choice was measured as five discrete goal level alternatives displayed as a series 
of buttons in a row from easiest to most difficult.  Each button was labeled with the goal level in 
relation to the performance required (e.g., “8 correct decisions” or “12 incorrect decisions”) and the 
potential amount of points that would be gained or lost upon goal attainment (e.g., “Gain 80 points” 
or “Lose 120 points”). 
 Raw performance values were captured by the ATCLab software, which included each 
decision input and response times from the participants.  This information could be tracked in 
relation to the actual aircraft flight paths and time of minimum separation to calculate the 
performance and task demand constructs in our computational model.  These calculations, as 
described in the earlier proposed computational model section, were implemented in the MATLAB 
software package. 
 Affect was measured with three items that corresponded with hedonic tone, energetic 
arousal, and tense arousal to represent the full affect circumplex.  The hedonic tone item is derived 
from the UWIST mood adjective checklist (Matthews, et al., 1990) to measure changes that occur 
on the valence dimension.  The energetic and tense arousal items are taken from the momentary 
affect scale (Gee, et al., 2012) to measure changes that occur on the two secondary dimensions 
ranging from pleasant-activation to unpleasant-deactivation, and unpleasant-activation to pleasant-
deactivation, respectively.  These secondary dimensions provide a more nuanced measure of the 
arousal dimension (Matthews, et al., 1990; Thayer, 1989).  For each item, participants were asked to 
respond to “How are you feeling now?” on an 11-point bipolar rating scale.  The scale for hedonic 
tone ranged from -5 (very sad, low spirited, depressed, dissatisfied) to 5 (very happy, satisfied, 
contented, pleased).  The scale for energetic arousal ranged from -5 (very sluggish, tired, sleepy, 
dull) to 5 (very active, energetic, alert, bright).  The scale for tense arousal ranged from -5 (very 
relaxed, calm, composed, comfortable) to 5 (very nervous, tense, anxious, stressed). 
Procedure 
 Each participant was randomly assigned to a goal framing condition and allocated to an 
individual computer terminal.  Demographics were administered at the beginning of the study, 
followed by a 20-minute audio-visual training presentation on relevant air traffic control 
terminology and simulator instructions.  The participants had an opportunity to clarify any issues 
with the experimenter, and they completed an initial 3 minute practice trial that involved three 
aircraft pairs.  When the participants had confirmed that they understood the task, they proceeded to 
complete five 14-minute trials. 
Each trial had a unique pattern of aircraft traffic with approximately the same pattern of task 
demand over time.  The order of trials was randomized across all participants.  The within-trial 
Formal Model of Affective States     91 
 
affect measures were administered at every minute interval, where the task would be paused and the 
three affect items would appear on the screen.  Although feedback from pilot testing indicated that a 
few participants found this distracting, most participants did not indicate a problem with responding 
to the items within the few seconds of pausing.  At the end of each trial, participants viewed a 
summary feedback screen that displayed their goal level, number of correct or incorrect decisions, 
and score received for that trial. 
Results 
We begin this section by presenting a descriptive summary of the overall fit between the 
model predictions and the empirical data across the 2 x 2 conditions, where individuals in the 
approach or avoidance condition either attained or failed to attain their goal.  We also provide a 
summary of the descriptive statistics for the performance and affect data.  In the remaining section, 
we present the results for each component of the computational model in relation to hedonic tone, 
energetic arousal, and tense arousal, and compare our model against a series of nested alternative 
models. 
Descriptive Summary 
Figure 5 presents the average fitted values of the hypothesized model for hedonic tone, 
energetic arousal, and tense arousal during either approach or avoidance goal striving, and in trials 
where individuals attained or failed to attain their goal.  These fitted values of the model closely 
align with the observed affect ratings across the 2 x 2 conditions, indicating that the model can 
account for distinct, complex trajectories of affective experiences during goal striving.  The 
observed affect trajectories reveal interesting asymmetries in affective states over time:  hedonic 
tone tended to increase steadily on trials where participants attained an approach goal, but it 
remained relatively flat on trials where participants attained an avoidance goal.  Hedonic tone 
decreased in a similar pattern when participants failed to attain their goal in both approach and 
avoidance goal striving, though the rate of decline appeared steeper at the average time point in 
which participants failed to meet their avoidance goal.  Energetic and tense arousal tended to 
decline steadily during approach goal striving, and there was a sharper decline from the average 
time point in which participants attained their approach goal.  For participants who attained an 
avoidance goal, energetic arousal remained relatively stable and tense arousal declined steadily over 
time.  For participants who failed to attain an avoidance goal, the reverse pattern occurred: energetic 
arousal declined over time, while tense arousal demonstrated a pattern that mapped closely to the 
pattern of task demand.  The parameters of our proposed model were able to account for these 
asymmetries in affective experiences over time. 
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Figure 5.  Average fitted (lines) and observed (dots) affective states for successful and unsuccessful 
trials in approach and avoidance conditions with standard errors.  A single vertical line represents 
the average time point at which the goal attainment state changed. 
 
Table 2 provides a summary of the performance and affect data for the approach and 
avoidance conditions.  The goal level and score relate to correct decisions in the approach 
condition, and incorrect decisions in the avoidance condition.  Hedonic tone was correlated with 
both energetic and tense arousal, but more strongly with energetic arousal.  Cumulative score was 
more highly correlated with hedonic tone, and less highly correlated with tense and energetic 
arousal in the avoidance condition than in the approach.  In both conditions, cumulative score 
increased while energetic and tense arousal decreased over time.   
 
n = 116 n = 113 
n = 34 n = 37 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations between Affect, Goal Level, and Performance Variables 
across Approach and Avoidance Conditions 
Approach 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Hedonic Tone 0.56 2.25 -     
2. Energetic Arousal 0.27 2.44 0.63** -    
3. Tense Arousal -0.07 2.70 -0.18** 0.17** -   
4. Cumulative Score 8.48 4.52 0.13** -0.28** -0.29** -  
5. Goal Level 12.21 3.97 0.02 -0.06** -0.16** 0.35** - 
6. Time - - 0.06** -0.09* -0.16** 0.80** 0.00 
Avoidance 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Hedonic Tone 0.58 1.97 -     
2. Energetic Arousal 0.36 2.15 0.59** -    
3. Tense Arousal -0.12 2.27 -0.26** 0.03 -   
4. Cumulative Score 4.03 3.14 -0.31** -0.20** 0.12** -  
5. Goal Level 8.43 2.90 -0.20** -0.26** 0.12** 0.38** - 
6. Time - - -0.02 -0.07** -0.08** 0.56** 0.00 
 
Modeling Hedonic Tone 
 Analysis strategy.  We tested the component of the model that predicts hedonic tone by 
comparing a series of nested alternatives that allowed us to evaluate the competing accounts of the 
process by which hedonic tone changes over time during goal striving.  Five alternative models 
were created (see Table 3).  Model 1 represented the null model, which assumed hedonic tone is 
stable over time.  Model 1 had a single free parameter: initial hedonic tone.  The values of all other 
parameters were fixed to zero.  Model 2 assumed hedonic tone changes as a function of position 
discrepancy and also incorporates the opponent process; two additional parameters were required to 
account for these processes.  Model 3 was identical to Model 2 except that it assumed hedonic tone 
changes as a function of velocity discrepancy, rather than position discrepancy.  Model 4 assumed 
that hedonic tone changes as a function of both position and velocity discrepancies.  Model 5, which 
represented the hypothesized model, assumed that hedonic tone changes as a function of position 
discrepancies, velocity discrepancies, and goal attainment. 
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Table 3 

















1. Initial HT free 0 0 0 0 
2. Initial HT, Opponent Process, 
Position Discrepancy  
free free free 0 0 
3. Initial HT, Opponent Process, 
Velocity Discrepancy 
free free free free 0 
4. Initial HT, Opponent Process, 
Position Discrepancy, Velocity 
Discrepancy 
free free free free 0 
5. Initial HT, Opponent Process, 
Position Discrepancy, Velocity 
Discrepancy, Goal Attainment 
free free free free free 
 
All models were run and fitted to the data using MATLAB.  The best-fitting parameters for 
each model were estimated separately for each individual by finding the parameter values that 
minimized the root mean squared deviation (RMSD) between the model predictions and the self-
reported hedonic tone.  These parameters were identified using the simplex minimization algorithm 
(Nelder & Mead, 1965).  We ran each model multiple times with different starting points to ensure 
the best parameter estimates were obtained.  We also used the extra-sums-of-squares test to evaluate 
significant differences in fit between the hypothesized model and the alternatives.  A significant 
result can be interpreted as evidence in favor of the more complex model (i.e. the model with more 
free parameters).  Given that Models 1-4 were more constrained versions of the hypothesized 
model, Model 5 must necessarily provide the best fit.  However, in order for the hypothesized 
model to be supported, the improvement in fit provided by Model 5 must be worth the increased 
complexity. 
Results.  Table 4 presents the RSMD and R
2
 statistics for each model that was fitted to the 
data separately for the approach and avoidance conditions.  The hypothesized model explains 69% 
of the variance in observed hedonic tone in the approach condition and 75% of the variance in the 
avoidance condition.  The extra-sums-of-squares test revealed that Model 5 fits significantly better 
than Models 1-4 in both conditions, providing evidence in favor of our hypothesized model.  Given 
this result, we henceforth limit our interpretation to the hypothesized model. 
 
 















1. Initial HT 1 1.73 .41 1.33 .55 
2. Initial HT, Opponent Process, Position 
Discrepancy  
3 1.55 .53 1.12 .68 
3. Initial HT, Opponent Process, Velocity 
Discrepancy 
3 1.40 .62 1.10 .69 
4. Initial HT, Opponent Process, Position 
Discrepancy, Velocity Discrepancy 
4 1.31 .66 1.02 .73 
5. Initial HT, Opponent Process, Position 
Discrepancy, Velocity Discrepancy, Goal 
Attainment 
5 1.26 .69 0.99 .75 
 
Figure 6 presents the observed and fitted values of hedonic tone (based on Model 5) across 
approach and avoidance conditions for successful trials – where an approach goal was achieved or 
an avoidance goal was not failed – and unsuccessful trials – where an approach goal was not 
achieved or an avoidance goal was failed.  As can be seen, the pattern of hedonic tone differed 
depending on goal framing and goal attainment.  Levels of hedonic tone increased near the end of 
successful approach trials, but remained stable throughout successful avoidance trials.  Hedonic 
tone declined during unsuccessful trials regardless of frame condition.  While this decline was 
linear in the approach condition, the trajectory in the avoidance condition was flat until the goal was 
failed, at which point hedonic tone decreased substantially.  The fitted values of the hypothesized 
model matched these patterns very closely. 
We next examine the model parameter values in order to determine how each component of 
the model – initial hedonic tone, position discrepancy, velocity discrepancy, and goal attainment – 
influence the process by which hedonic tone changes over time when striving for approach and 
avoidance goals.  A set of t-tests were used to identify whether each parameter value differed 
significantly from zero.  Table 5 displays the average parameter values for the approach and 
avoidance conditions.  As can be seen, the initial hedonic tone parameter was greater in the 
avoidance condition than in the approach condition, suggesting that the baseline level of hedonic 
tone was higher in the former.  Contrary to hypothesis H1, the position discrepancy weight did not 
significantly differ from zero in the approach condition, suggesting that, on average, hedonic tone 
did not change in response to moving closer to an approach goal.  However, in support of 
hypothesis H2, the position discrepancy weight is negative in the avoidance condition, suggesting 
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that hedonic tone decreases as an individual moves closer towards an avoidance goal.  In support of 
hypothesis H3, the velocity discrepancy weight parameter is positive in the approach condition, 
suggesting that hedonic tone increases when one’s velocity exceeds that required to reach an 
approach goal.  Contrary to hypothesis H4, the velocity discrepancy weight did not significantly 
differ from zero in the avoidance condition, suggesting that hedonic tone does not change in 
response to discrepancies in rate of progress towards an avoidance goal.  Hypotheses H5 and H6 
were also not supported, as the goal attainment weight parameter was not significantly different 
from zero in both conditions, suggesting that hedonic tone did not change when people reached a 
desired or undesired outcome.  Given the significant improvement in model fit with goal attainment 
as a parameter, however, we suspect that goal attainment may have an effect in the expected 
direction, but only for a proportion of the participants. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Average fitted and observed hedonic tone for successful and unsuccessful trials in 
approach and avoidance conditions with standard errors. 
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Table 5 
Average Parameter Values in Approach and Avoidance Conditions for Hedonic Tone Model 
Parameter 
Approach Avoidance 
Estimate SE p Estimate SE p 
Initial HT 0.34 0.24 .087 0.94 0.30 .002 
Opponent Process Weight .46 0.28 .051 .29 0.34 .198 
Position Discrepancy Weight -0.16 0.18 .082 -0.24 0.13 .044 
Velocity Discrepancy Weight 11.51 3.71 .002 1.26 2.97 .337 
Velocity Steepness 60.93 24.92 .010 102.28 27.32 <.001 
Goal Attainment Weight 0.22 0.23 .173 -4.39 3.85 .132 
 
Modelling Energetic and Tense Arousal 
 Analysis strategy.  We tested the component of the model that predicts energetic arousal in a 
similar manner to the component that predicts hedonic tone.  Three nested alternative models were 
created for each dimension of arousal (see Table 6).  Model 1 represented the null model, which 
assumed that energetic and tense arousal have an initial level and only declined over time at a stable 
rate due to depletion of arousal.  Model 1 had two free parameters: either initial energetic arousal or 
initial tense arousal, and the strength of the depletion rate.  Model 2 is presented as a preliminary 
step to the hypothesized model by including the hedonic tone function and an additional free 
parameter.  As the focus of our modelling was to identify whether task demand can explain changes 
in energetic and tense arousal after accounting for the role of hedonic tone, we used the observed 
hedonic tone data in the model fitting.  Model 3 represented the hypothesized model, which 
assumes that energetic and tense arousal change as a function of hedonic tone and task demand.  
Model 3 required one additional free parameter to account for task demand.  These models were 
fitted and compared in the same manner as the hedonic tone models.  For our hypothesized model to 
be supported, Models 1 and 2 should not provide a significantly better fit than Model 3. 
 
Table 6 
Summary of Hypothesized and Alternative Models for Predicting Energetic and Tense Arousal 
 Parameter  









1. Initial EA/TA, Depletion free free 0 0  
2. Initial EA/TA, Depletion, Hedonic Tone free free 0 0  
3. Initial EA/TA, Depletion, Hedonic 
Tone, Task Demand 
free free free free  
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Results.  Table 7 presents the RSMD and R
2
 statistics for the three energetic arousal models 
and the three tense arousal models that were fitted to the data separately for the approach and 
avoidance conditions.  The hypothesized model (Model 3) explains 74% of the variance in observed 
energetic arousal in the approach condition and 75% of the variance in observed energetic arousal 
in the avoidance condition.  The hypothesized model also explains 76% of the variance in observed 
tense arousal in the approach condition and 71% of the variance in observed tense arousal in the 
avoidance condition.  As expected, the increase in variance explained was relatively large with 
Model 2, which we interpret as being due to the important role of observed hedonic tone data in 
energetic and tense arousal ratings.  Although the increase in R
2
 was relatively small with the 
hypothesized model, the extra-sums-of-squares tests indicated that Model 3 explains significantly 





 for the Energetic and Tense Arousal Models Aggregated across Participants for the 





















2. Initial EA, Depletion, Hedonic Tone 3 1.29 .72 1.10 .74 
3. Initial EA, Depletion, Hedonic Tone, Task 
Demand 
4 1.25 .74 1.07 .75 
Tense Arousal 











2. Initial TA, Depletion, Hedonic Tone 3 1.36 .75 1.25 .70 
3. Initial TA, Depletion, Hedonic Tone, Task 
Demand 
4 1.32 .76 1.21 .71 
 
 Based on Model 3, Figures 7 and 8 present the observed and fitted values of energetic and 
tense arousal respectively across approach and avoidance conditions for successful and 
unsuccessful trials.  The trajectories of energetic and tense arousal were similar, which is consistent 
with the expectation that both variables map onto a latent arousal construct.  Both energetic and 
tense arousal showed a sharp decrease at the end of successful approach trials where the goal was 
attained.  This decrease was much weaker at the end of avoidance trials.  Both energetic and tense 
arousal decreased steadily over time for unsuccessful trials, regardless of whether the goal was 
approach or avoidance.  A large proportion of the variance is accounted for by shifts in hedonic tone 
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over time, but some of the variability is also explained by levels of task demand.  As can be seen in 
the figure, the fitted values of the hypothesized model matched these patterns very closely. 
 
Figure 7.  Average fitted and observed energetic arousal for successful and unsuccessful trials in 
approach and avoidance conditions with standard errors.  
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Figure 8.  Average fitted and observed tense arousal for successful and unsuccessful trials in 
approach and avoidance conditions with standard errors. 
 
Table 8 displays the average parameter values in the approach and avoidance conditions for 
the hypothesized energetic and tense arousal models.  A set of t-tests were used to identify whether 
each parameter value differed significantly from zero.  The initial levels of energetic and tense 
arousal did not differ significantly from zero in both conditions.  The parameter weights for 
depletion were negative in both conditions, indicating that energetic and tense arousal declined over 
time.  As expected, the hedonic tone weight parameter was positive and significant in the energetic 
arousal model for the approach condition, and trended in the expected direction for the avoidance 
condition.  This indicated that hedonic tone tended to be positively related to energetic arousal 
ratings.  Contrary to expectations, the hedonic tone weight parameter was not significantly different 
from zero in the tense arousal model for both approach and avoidance conditions, indicating that 
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hedonic tone was not related to tense arousal ratings.  Finally, the task demand weight parameter 
was positive for both the energetic and tense arousal models in the approach condition, and positive 
for the tense arousal model in the avoidance condition.  The task demand parameter also trended in 
the positive direction for the energetic arousal model in the avoidance condition.  Consistent with 
hypothesis H7, these results generally indicated that task demand tends to increase both energetic 
and tense arousal ratings. 
 
Table 8 




Estimate SE p Estimate SE p 
Energetic Arousal       
Initial EA 0.13 0.25 .306 0.23 0.29 .214 
Depletion Weight -0.04 0.01 <.001 -0.03 0.01 .005 
Hedonic Tone Weight 0.49 0.14 <.001 1.59 0.14 .079 
Task Demand Weight 0.13 0.03 <.001 0.04 0.03 .085 
Tense Arousal       
Initial TA 0.30 0.34 .190 -0.02 0.26 .464 
Depletion Weight -0.06 0.01 <.001 -0.03 0.01 <.001 
Hedonic Tone Weight -0.14 0.11 .115 1.16 1.12 .115 
Task Demand Weight 0.12 0.03 <.001 0.11 0.03 <.001 
 
Discussion 
 This paper presented a formal, computational model of affective states during approach and 
avoidance goal striving.  We aimed to develop an integrative and dynamic account of how affective 
reactions emerge as individuals experience changes in a set of goal striving constructs, which act as 
indicators of goal progress or task demand.  Our formal model states that pleasant-unpleasant states 
relate to indicators of goal progress, and activated-deactivated states relate to indicators of task 
demand.  The predictions of this model were compared against empirical data across 2 x 2 
conditions of goal framing and goal attainment in our study, and a series of nested alternative 
models were also evaluated.  As discussed below, these findings offer several key insights about the 
experience of affective states during approach and avoidance goal striving. 
Accounting for Valence 
The first component of our formal model specified that individuals’ valence would 
dynamically respond to changes in position discrepancies, velocity discrepancies, and goal 
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attainment.  The results supported our model, indicating it could explain the pattern of hedonic tone 
ratings significantly better than compared to the other nested models, even when accounting for the 
increased number of parameters.  Our model was able to account for the hedonic tone trajectories 
across the goal framing conditions and trials where individuals attained their goal or not.  Consistent 
with our predictions, the model indicated that participants with approach goals experienced an 
increase in hedonic tone when they had positive velocity discrepancies (i.e., moving towards their 
goal faster than required).  Participants with avoidance goals experienced a decrease in hedonic tone 
when their position discrepancy declined (i.e., reducing distance from undesired state).  Contrary to 
expectations, hedonic tone did not significantly change in response to position discrepancy among 
participants with approach goals, or in response to velocity discrepancies among participants with 
avoidance goals.  This pattern of findings suggest that velocity discrepancy has more impact on 
valence during approach goal striving, whereas position discrepancy has more impact on valence 
during avoidance goal striving.  The results also indicated that the average weight of goal 
attainment did not significantly differ from zero, even though the inclusion of the construct 
contributed to explaining changes in hedonic tone.  We interpret this finding as evidence that goal 
attainment can impact on valence for some individuals, and that the average effect is obscured from 
the variability of the goal attainment weight.  One possible explanation is that participants could 
vary in their level of goal commitment and task engagement, particularly in the absence of extrinsic 
rewards for goal attainment.  The key implication of these findings is that no single indicator is 
sufficient to explain the dynamics of valenced states; rather, as proposed in our framework, 
individuals can react affectively to a combination of goal progress indicators (see Chang, et al., 
2010; Hsee & Abelson, 1991). 
The complex pattern of findings is also further clarified when we distinguish between trials 
where participants attained or failed to attain their goals.  On trials where goal attainment occurs, 
the model indicates that individuals with approach goals will tend to experience a gradual upward 
trend in hedonic tone due to having a positive velocity discrepancy, which is further bolstered when 
they transition to a state of goal attainment.  In contrast, individuals with avoidance goals will tend 
to experience a relatively flat trajectory in hedonic tone, as they generally have limited movement in 
position and velocity discrepancies in order to attain their goal.  On trials where goal failure occurs, 
the model indicates that individuals with approach goals will tend to experience a steady downward 
trend in hedonic tone due to the combined effects of having a negative velocity discrepancy and the 
fact that they never reach their goal.  Individuals with avoidance goals will experience a similar 
downward trend that is accompanied by a steeper decline when they transition to a state of goal 
failure.  These findings are largely consistent with our predictions and demonstrate that our model is 
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able to account for complex asymmetries in hedonic tone over time as individuals engage in 
approach and avoidance goal striving. 
It is interesting that the weightings of each indicator were not equal across the goal framing 
conditions, which is a question that has not been addressed in the affect or goal striving literature.  
Individuals appeared to be most sensitive to velocity discrepancy in approach contexts, which 
explained most of the change in hedonic tone during goal striving, respectively.  In avoidance 
contexts, individuals appeared most sensitive to position discrepancies and goal attainment, which 
distinguished the relatively flat trajectory in hedonic tone during successful trials and the steep 
decline during unsuccessful trials.  Although these findings require further investigation as to why 
they differ across goal frames, it bears some consistency with theory suggesting that approach 
contexts promote a generative and opportunity seeking orientation, whereas avoidance contexts 
promote a defensive and error monitoring orientation (Elliot & Friedman, 2007; Higgins, 1997; 
Roney, Higgins, & Shah, 1995).  Individuals may be relatively eager to achieve an approach goal 
quickly and attend to their rate of progress, whereas avoidance goals may emphasize the importance 
of maintaining a distance from failure.  These findings also reiterate the importance of including 
multiple indicators of goal progress and distinguishing between approach and avoidance framing, so 
that it is possible to examine the divergences in how affective states emerge. 
Accounting for Arousal 
 The second component of our hypothesized model specified that individuals’ energetic and 
tense arousal would respond dynamically to the level of task demand.  The results supported our 
model, indicating that it could explain the pattern of energetic and tense arousal ratings significantly 
better than the nested alternative models.  The data tended to indicate that both energetic and tense 
arousal ratings increased with the level of task demand as individuals engaged in goal striving, and 
this effect was maintained across goal framing conditions.  These findings are consistent with 
cognitive-energetic theories, which suggest that individuals experience higher arousal in order to 
prepare sufficient resources to meet ongoing demand (Bradley & Lang, 2007; Hockey, 1997; 
Humphreys & Revelle, 1984).  As described by our model, however, there is also a depletion 
process that leads to a decline in energetic and tense arousal as individuals perform over time. 
 We note that a large proportion of energetic and tense arousal was explained by hedonic 
tone ratings, especially when compared to task demand.  We propose that further work is needed to 
examine alternative goal striving constructs that might account for the variance in energetic and 
tense arousal.  Our task demand construct related to cognitive effort primarily in terms of vigilance 
and spatial calculations, but other studies have examined demands relating to physical effort or 
working memory (see Carpenter, et al., 1999; Gellatly & Meyer, 1992; Wright & Brehm, 1984).  
Other constructs to consider are goal revision or abandonment during goal striving, which could 
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further moderate the relationship between task demand and arousal over time (see Austin & 
Vancouver, 1996; Schmidt & Dolis, 2009; Tolli & Schmidt, 2008).  Although our conceptualization 
of task demand was sufficient to contribute to the prediction of arousal, we suggest that this 
component of the model can be extended upon. 
Theoretical, Methodological, and Practical Contributions 
 This paper makes several theoretical, methodological, and practical contributions in relation 
to affect and goal striving.  The key theoretical contribution of this paper is the development of our 
formal model of affective states during approach and avoidance goal striving.  The model provides 
an integrative framework for examining the relationships between multiple goal striving constructs 
and affective states along the primary dimensions.  In contrast, the existing literature on how 
affective states emerge during goal striving is limited, and the studies that have been conducted tend 
to have a narrow focus on how affect is defined and what constructs can influence affective states 
(Briner, 1999; Chang, et al., 2010; Hsee & Abelson, 1991; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).  Our model 
challenges this perspective by attempting to relate valence to multiple indicators of goal progress 
and arousal to indicators of resource allocation.  Based on this model, we were able to observe a 
more complex structure of affective experiences during goal striving, and we found that individuals’ 
affective states can be responsive to a combination of goal striving constructs.  Individuals do not 
just attend to the distance remaining from their goal, but also their current rate of progress and the 
level of task demand during goal striving.  They also react independently to the event of goal 
attainment or failure.  Future studies that engage in theory development and modelling of affective 
experiences can draw on this framework in order to extend the scope of the constructs being 
investigated. 
Our formal model also addresses the theoretical distinction between approach and avoidance 
goal striving.  Although there are conflicting perspectives on how goal framing can impact on the 
relationship between affect and goal striving (Carver & Scheier, 1990, 1998; Elliot & Friedman, 
2007; Higgins, 1997; Roney, et al., 1995), we presented an alternative set of predictions based on 
our model.  The data supported our alternative framework, demonstrating that our model was able 
to account for distinct trajectories in affective states during approach and avoidance goal striving.  
According to our model, the divergence in affective states can be explained by the different values 
and weightings of position discrepancy, velocity discrepancy, and goal attainment when goals are 
operationalized as approach versus avoidance.  We found that it was sufficient to focus on the 
primary dimensions of affect, and did not observe evidence that energetic and tense arousal relate 
specifically to approach and avoidance striving, respectively (see Carver & Scheier, 1998).  Thus, 
our model provides a parsimonious and integrated account of how goal framing can lead to 
variation in affective states during goal striving.  More broadly, the findings of our study also re-
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state the importance of incorporating goal framing into affect and goal striving research (see Elliot 
& Friedman, 2007; Elliot, Sheldon, & Church, 1997). 
 The methodological contribution of this paper is observed in the combination of 
computational modelling and a multi-level experimental research design.  A central theme in this 
paper is the transitioning from abstract and verbalized informal theories to specific and 
mathematical formal theories.  As demonstrated in our paper, computational modelling provides a 
language to specify precise relationships among constructs while still being derived from theory 
(Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2010; Vancouver, et al., 2005).  Our formal model required all 
components of our framework to be specified so that it can be simulated against empirical data; 
these equations are transparent and can be easily replicated under different contexts, as compared to 
informal theories that can be operationalized inconsistently (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2010).  
Another advantage of computational modelling was the capability to mathematically account for 
dynamic and non-linear processes in our formal model.  Although these dynamics in affect are often 
recognized in verbal theory, these constructs are at risk of being treated as static constructs in 
traditional correlational analyses (Vancouver, 2008; Vancouver, et al., 2005).  This paper represents 
an initial step for transitioning ideas and concepts in the affect literature into formal theories. 
The choice of our research design was also instrumental for observing the dynamics of 
affective states during goal striving.  Our study is novel in that we obtained ratings of affect at a 
momentary level of analysis during goal striving, which made it possible to observe proximal 
changes in affect as individuals experienced fluctuations in performance and task demand.  The 
experimental setting made it possible to obtain these ratings of affect in a controlled and minimally 
disruptive environment.  The findings from our study demonstrated that the trajectories in affect can 
be highly responsive to changes in the environment.  Our research design made it possible for our 
model to account for these affective states within-individuals over time, while also comparing 
between-individuals and between goal framing conditions.  We propose that the affect literature can 
benefit from further research at these levels of analysis in order to fully address the dynamics of 
affective experiences (see Muthén, 1994; Raudenbush, 2000; Yeo & Neal, 2004). 
 The findings in this paper also raise some practical implications for the work context.  
Although our study used an experimental setting and an air traffic control simulation task, the 
underlying processes involved in affective experiences and goal striving should be relevant across 
other contexts (Anderson, Lindsay, & Bushman, 1999; Locke, 1986).  Firstly, the association 
between pleasant-unpleasant states with a combination of goal progress indicators has implications 
for the design of feedback in work contexts.  Typical sources of feedback at work tend to be 
oriented towards the distance between accumulated performance and a goal (i.e., position 
discrepancies), such as whether an employee has met monthly sales targets or whether the company 
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has reached the annual strategic goals.  Position discrepancies are intuitive and easy to calculate, but 
our model suggests that feedback about rate of progress (i.e., velocity discrepancies) should also be 
considered.  On one hand, implementing positive feedback about velocity discrepancies can be a 
source of improved morale, particularly if individuals perceive a large position discrepancy from 
their goal.  On the other hand, the presence of difficult deadlines or unexpected project delays may 
lead to perceptions of negative velocity discrepancies, which in turn may impact negatively on the 
affective state of employees.  To address the role of affect in the workplace, each of these indicators 
of goal progress should to be considered carefully. 
 Secondly, our study also highlights that goal framing can lead to different affective 
experiences over time.  Individuals who fail to attain their goals tend to experience a decline in 
hedonic tone with both types of goals, yet our model indicates that the decline can be steeper with 
avoidance goals.  In work contexts where the likelihood of failure is high, it may be advisable to 
minimize framing of goals in terms of avoidance.  For individuals who attained their goals, our 
model indicates that those with approach goals experience a gradual increase in hedonic tone, 
particularly if they are making faster than expected progress towards their goal.  In contrast, those 
with avoidance goals maintain a relatively stable and positive level of hedonic tone regardless of 
feedback as long as the goal is attainable.  Therefore, there appears to be more discretion about how 
goals are framed in work contexts where goal attainment is likely, and other non-affective outcomes 
from goal framing may take precedence (see Barberis, Huang, & Santos, 2001; March & Shapira, 
1992; Sullivan & Rothman, 2008).  An interesting note is that several studies in the motivation 
literature have indicated that avoidance goals are more detrimental to motivation and performance 
than approach goals (Elliot, et al., 1997; Sullivan & Rothman, 2008; Sullivan, Worth, Baldwin, & 
Rothman, 2006).  Our findings are partly consistent with that perspective, but we provide further 
clarification about when avoidance goals can be detrimental in relation to affective experiences. 
 Thirdly, we observed an association between task demand and ratings of energetic and tense 
arousal.  When taking into account the valenced component of energetic and tense arousal, our 
model suggests that individuals will experience enthusiastic and excited affective states if they 
encounter high task demand in combination with good progress towards goals.  This pattern of 
performance and affective experience closely relates to the concept of engagement (Warr, 1990).  
However, it is also possible for individuals to experience anxious and stressed affective states if 
they encounter high task demand in combination with poor progress towards goals.  This pattern 
would closely resemble the concept of strain (Payne & Fletcher, 1983).  The concepts of 
engagement and strain are important in the work context, and our model suggests that a 
combination of goal progress and task demand indicators can contribute towards predicting the 
experience of these states. 
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Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 There are several limitations in our study that impact on the generalizability of our findings 
and indicate directions for future research.  Firstly, the use of single item ratings of affect assumed 
that participants can attend to their affective state.  This type of measure would likely increase the 
amount of unattributed variability in the data, particularly given that some participants may be 
unfamiliar with being asked about their affective states across short time intervals.  We found that 
some participants did not exhibit much variability in their affect ratings, and it may be partially 
attributed to unfamiliarity with reporting affective experiences on an ongoing basis.  For the 
purposes of our study, we believe this was an issue of feasibility and practicality.  Our affect 
measures have been validated in prior research (see Gee, et al., 2012; Matthews, et al., 1990), and 
the pattern of responses tends to suggest that a large proportion of participants were providing 
meaningful patterns of data.  Self-report items make it possible to capture responses across larger 
samples at minimal expense.  Nevertheless, we suggest that it would be valuable to extend our 
findings by considering alternative measures of affect that are less dependent on participants being 
capable of self-reporting their affective states. 
 Secondly, our formal model does not explicitly address the role of individual differences in 
affective experiences.  The free parameters of our model were fitted at the within-individual level, 
such that it captured individual differences in initial levels of hedonic tone, energetic arousal, and 
tense arousal, as well as the weightings of the goal progress and task demand indicators.  The scope 
of this paper, however, did not allow us to address the individual level factors that may explain the 
variability in these parameters.  Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that our findings do not 
necessarily generalize across individuals, such that not all individuals may respond to goal framing 
or the goal striving constructs in the predicted manner.  We propose that the question of individual 
differences is an important avenue for future research for the affect literature, and also an 
opportunity to further extend and test the formal model we have presented.  We suggest that 
extraversion, neuroticism, and trait affectivity are likely to be significant individual difference 
constructs that impact on affective experiences during goal striving (see Elliot & Thrash, 2002; 
Smillie, Yeo, Furnham, & Jackson, 2006; Tett & Burnett, 2003; Yeo, Frederiks, Kiewitz, & Neal, 
2013). 
 Thirdly, we recognize that our study examined goal striving in a single goal paradigm.  Goal 
striving in real world contexts often involves prioritizing among multiple goals, and individuals 
would have to manage information from indicators across each salient goal (see DeShon, 
Kozlowski, Schmidt, Milner, & Wiechmann, 2004; Louro, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2007; Schmidt & 
Dolis, 2009; Schmidt, Dolis, & Tolli, 2009).  These indicators may have interactive properties that 
are not described in our current model – such as when individuals observe that they are performing 
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poorly across a range of goals, or the additional demands in attending to multiple goals.  Our formal 
model of affective states currently does not generalize to contexts where individuals are striving 
towards multiple goals, and further research would be needed to extend this work.  Nevertheless, we 
propose that our model will be valuable for future research as an underlying framework for 
investigating how affective states emerge during multiple goal striving. 
 Finally, there are several areas in which the model can be further developed to contribute 
towards a more integrative framework of affective processes.  The proposed model provides a 
framework for understanding how affective states can emerge during goal striving, but these 
affective states can influence subsequent cognitions and behaviors in turn (see Ashkanasy & 
Humphrey, 2011; Barsade & Gibson, 2007; Foo, Uy, & Baron, 2009).  Future research is needed to 
formally integrate the inputs and outputs of affective processes so that it is possible to close the 
feedback loop and incorporate affect as a dynamic self-regulatory process in goal striving.  We 
suggest that more research is also needed to investigate other types of inputs that can influence 
affective states.  This study focused on the influence of performance feedback in relation to goal 
striving, but some studies in the affect literature have attempted to categorize and predict the effect 
of discrete events on affective states (see Bono, Glomb, Shen, Kim, & Koch, 2013; Kahneman, et 
al., 2004).  Even as individuals engage in goal striving over time, they can experience specific 
events (e.g., missed out on a lunch break or had a positive interaction with colleagues) during 
striving that may impact on their affective state.  It would be valuable to explore how discrete 
effects can be formally modelled and integrated with continuous performance feedback to predict 
affective experiences across more complex task environments. 
Concluding Remarks 
Goal striving is a basic and regular component of human behavior, and people experience a 
myriad of emotions as they make progress towards their goals.  In the work context, these goals 
may manifest as monthly sales budgets, number of units sold, project deadlines, or safety incident 
rates.  Some of these goals are framed in terms of approach, while others are framed in terms of 
avoidance.  As we increase our understanding of how affective states emerge over time in the 
workplace, we can improve our prediction of its consequences on behaviors and perceptions.  The 
long term application is to increase opportunities to develop interventions to the goal striving 
process in order to improve work motivation, well-being, and performance.  The formal model 
presented in this paper contributes to these aims by providing a precise and testable framework of 
how affective states can emerge in response to indicators of goal progress and task demand.  In turn, 
this framework provides directions for future research and further theory development for 
understanding affective experiences during goal striving. 
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Appendix A 
Functions used in the Formal Model of Affective States 
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Glossary of Terms 
t = Current time interval in trial T = Time intervals remaining in trial    = Exponential decay weight 
Ht = Hedonic tone St = Current state (performance)    = Linear depletion function 
Pt = Position discrepancy Gn = Goal level k1-7 = Free parameter weight 
Vt = Velocity discrepancy Xt = Goal attainment r = steepness of re-scaled function 























General Discussion     118 
 
Summary of Key Findings  
This thesis aimed to contribute to the understanding of cognitive and affective processes 
involved in goal striving, addressing a theoretical and empirical gap in the literature (Austin & 
Vancouver, 1996; Vancouver & Day, 2005).  Specifically, I chose to examine three components of 
goal striving within the scope of this research program: how individuals establish and adjust their 
goal level over time, how affective states emerge as individuals perform towards their goals, and 
how goal framing can influence the trajectories of goal level and affect during goal striving.  Using 
a series of formal computational models, this research program provides an account of goal level 
choices and affective states reported by individuals over multiple goal striving episodes.  As I will 
describe below, the findings from each manuscript contributes to the overall understanding of goal 
striving processes in several ways. 
Manuscript 1 provides an explanation of the process by which the goal level is established 
and revised at the beginning of a goal striving episode.  The study demonstrated that goal level 
choice can be modelled as a decision process involving risk.  The computational model fitted to the 
empirical data offered a precise description of the goal level choice process: individuals made goal 
level choices that were anchored against their prior performance, and they learnt by making 
adjustments to their goal level as their performance diverged from their previous goal level.  The 
choice process was also influenced by individual differences in risk preference, which accounted for 
individuals who chose goal levels that systematically differed from their prior performance over 
time.  Variability in risk preferences was partly accounted for by goal framing and trait neuroticism.  
Individuals were more risk aversive when they had avoidance framed goals compared to approach 
framed goals, and this effect was magnified for individuals who reported high trait neuroticism.  
These latter findings highlight the multi-faceted and multi-level nature of goal striving, and 
demonstrate that goal framing can impact on striving behaviour through changes in risk preference.  
Manuscript 1 informs a key cognitive component of the goal striving process and offers a more 
precise model of goal level choice than existing verbal theory.  We know that difficult and 
attainable goals lead to better performance than very easy or difficult goals – this research identifies 
how and why individuals choose among these goal level alternatives as a decision process. 
Manuscripts 2 and 3 examined how affective processes can be measured and described 
during goal striving – in particular, how affective states emerge and change as individuals perform 
towards either approach or avoidance goals.  Manuscript 2 addressed the initial conceptual and 
measurement problem with treating affect as a dynamic construct (Watson & Clark, 1997; Yik, et 
al., 1999).  Using a longitudinal research design and multi-level analyses, the manuscript provided 
support for a bipolar conceptualisation of affect and the application of the MAS.  These findings 
improve the understanding of how individuals report their experiences of affect over time, and 
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indicates that bipolar items can be used instead of unipolar items.  The advantage, as seen in the 
MAS, is the capability to use fewer items to measure changes in affective states.  The brevity of the 
scale is particularly suited to repeated measures research designs because it is easy to administer, 
reduces disruption from task performance, and minimizes response fatigue.  For my research 
program, the MAS provided a tool for examining affect dynamically within goal striving. 
Manuscript 3 provides a description of how affective states emerge during approach and 
avoidance goal striving.  The paper presented a formal model that associates valence with indicators 
of goal progress, and arousal with indicators of task demand during goal striving.  This framework 
makes it possible to distinguish affective experiences along the primary dimensions, and allows for 
a set of diverse goal striving constructs to be categorised into these dimensions.  This formal model 
offers a more precise description of the role of affect during goal striving than compared to existing 
verbal theory (Brief & Weiss, 2002; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).  This model demonstrated that it 
is capable of accounting for different trajectories of affect as individuals either engage in approach 
or avoidance goal striving, and as they either attain or fail to attain their goal.  Overall, Manuscript 
3 informs how affect can be incorporated as a dynamic process within goal striving.  It contributes 
to an understanding of how affective states are likely to emerge and change over time depending on 
the individual’s progress and task demands during goal striving, and highlights that these affective 
states also depend on whether approach or avoidance goal striving is occurring. 
In summary, the findings from this research program have elaborated on key components of 
the goal striving process.  My research has described the cognitive mechanisms in goal level choice, 
the affective experiences as individuals perform towards goals, and the divergences that occur due 
to approach versus avoidance goal striving.  The methodology and frameworks used in this research 
program can also guide future studies that examine dynamic processes in goal striving.  In the 
remaining section, I discuss the theoretical, methodological, and practical contributions of my 
research, and also consider the limitations and directions for future research. 
Contributions to the Literature 
 This thesis makes a theoretical contribution to the goal striving literature firstly by providing 
a multi-disciplinary and integrative approach.  By incorporating relevant concepts and empirical 
findings from other disciplines, this research was able to explain the goal level choice process 
beyond existing verbal theory (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Vancouver, 2008).  Concepts such as 
anchoring and adjustment, the delta learning rule, and risk preferences from the decision making 
and learning literature helped explain the goal level choice process.  The personality literature and 
trait activation theory offered an explanation of how individuals can differ in their risk preferences, 
depending on their sensitivity to losses and how a goal is framed (see Tett & Burnett, 2003).  
Taking this integrative approach allowed for a more elaborative description of the goal level choice 
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process.  Likewise, the integration of the various goal striving constructs with the two primary 
dimensions of affect made it possible to explain the trajectories in affective states over time with 
greater specificity.  Performance was not just defined as a one dimensional construct – it was 
defined in terms of position discrepancy, velocity discrepancy, and goal attainment based on the 
various ideas presented in the affect literature.  Affect was not just measured in terms of a general 
satisfaction construct, but actually distinguished in terms of valence and arousal.  This multi-
disciplinary and integrative approach is an answer to concerns about the lack of integration of 
theories that are directly relevant to goal striving (Mento, et al., 1992; Richard & Diefendorff, 2011; 
Seo, et al., 2004; Steel & König, 2006; Wood, 2005), and it addresses the call for more precise 
descriptions of goal striving processes (see Vancouver & Day, 2005; Wood, 2005). 
A second theoretical contribution is the inclusion of goal framing in my studies.  The 
conceptual distinction between approach and avoidance is important in the decision making, 
motivation, and personality literatures, yet minimal work has investigated its role in goal striving 
(Carver & Scheier, 1990; Elliot, et al., 1997; Roney, et al., 1995; Seo, Goldfarb, et al., 2010).  My 
research program presented formal models that acknowledge the role of goal framing in goal level 
choice and affective experiences.  My empirical findings on goal framing in relation to risk 
preferences are consistent with ideas expressed in the motivation literature (see Elliot, et al., 1997; 
Sullivan, et al., 2006), yet somewhat inconsistent with findings in the decision making literature 
(see Kuhberger, 1998).  These findings highlight the importance of distinguishing approach and 
avoidance goal striving, yet also indicates a continual need to evaluate whether decision making 
theories about framing are generalizable to the context of goal striving (see Erev & Barron, 2005). 
 My research program also makes several methodological contributions to the goal striving 
literature, firstly through the use of multi-level research designs.  These research designs are 
becoming increasingly common in the organisational psychology literature in recognition of their 
value over static and cross-sectional research designs (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; DeShon, et al., 
2004; Dyer, et al., 2005; Muthén, 1994; G. B. Yeo & Neal, 2004).  However, there are still 
considerable challenges to understanding and interpreting multi-level constructs given the level of 
complexity in using appropriate research designs and analyses (Dyer, et al., 2005; Muthén, 1994).  
The studies presented in this thesis have demonstrated how goal striving processes can be examined 
in terms of within-person dynamics, between-person differences, and between-group manipulations 
of goal framing.  The time scale in which goal striving was examined is also important, as seen by 
the distinct trajectories of goal levels and affect that were observed within minutes of goal striving.  
Using designs with repeated measures that occur on a daily or monthly basis would have obscured 
such findings in this research.  The experimental tasks and methodology used here can be adapted 
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to examine a broad range of cognitive, behavioural, and affective processes (Loft, Sanderson, Neal, 
& Mooij, 2007; G. Yeo, et al., 2009; G. Yeo & Neal, 2006). 
The other methodological contribution was the use of multi-level factor analyses and 
computational modelling in my studies (Muthén, 1994; Vancouver, et al., 2005).  These types of 
analytic approaches are increasingly recognised in the motivation and self-regulation literature as a 
way to understand and describe dynamic processes (DeShon, 2013; Dyer, et al., 2005; Vancouver, 
et al., 2010; G. B. Yeo & Neal, 2004).  This thesis demonstrated how multi-level analyses can be 
used to examine the structure of affect based on ratings provided by individuals over time.  The 
advantages of computational modelling was also demonstrated throughout my research – it provides 
a language for specifying more precise and dynamic relationships among constructs that is 
conducive to both theory building and empirical testing (Vancouver, et al., 2005; Vancouver, et al., 
2010).  Computational models represent an opportunity to transition from verbal theories – which 
tend to convey general and abstracted principles – to formal theories that can precisely define and 
generate predictions of processes over time. 
 Finally, this thesis has some practical implications for the domain of human factors and 
human performance modelling.  The role of human performance models is to predict human 
behaviour within defined systems and task environments, typically for the purpose of supporting 
system design and evaluation, risk management, and training programs (Loft, et al., 2007; Pew, 
2008).  However, one of the existing limitations of these models is that they tend to ignore the 
motivational and affective processes required for effective self-regulation of behaviour (Byrne & 
Pew, 2009).  The integration of psychological theories can improve the effectiveness of human 
performance models in task environments that involve complex processes – such as with air traffic 
controllers or hospital surgical teams.  For example, workload modelling is a classic application of 
human performance models, yet computational models of workload ignore the element of goal level 
choice or affective reactions despite their relevance in influencing workload over time (see Loft, et 
al., 2007; Neal et al., 2013).  This thesis informs existing human performance models by providing 
insight into the goal level choice process and affective experiences during goal striving and task 
performance.  The computational models presented in this thesis can be adapted in workload 
models to account for how individuals make decisions about the level of performance they will 
commit to, and how different types of feedback (e.g., about relative position versus rate of progress) 
can influence levels of anxiety or tiredness.  In this way, my research can contribute towards more 
sophisticated modelling of human behaviour to address current human factors problems. 
Limitations 
 Although this research program contributes to the goal striving literature in several ways, I 
also acknowledge some limitations that set boundaries on the conclusions that can be drawn from 
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my findings.  As stated within the research scope, the present work focused on a single goal 
paradigm rather than multiple goals.  Although my findings explain processes involved in pursuing 
a single goal, it does not account for multi-goal processes such as dual goal expectancies, goal 
abandonment, or goal switching (DeShon, et al., 2004; Louro, et al., 2007; Vancouver, et al., 2010).  
My findings on the experience of affect during goal striving also assume that individuals are 
attending to information for their current goal.  In a multiple goal context, it is unclear how the 
information across the other goals would influence an individual’s current affective state, such as 
whether such information is fully integrated, or partially weighted depending on each goal’s 
salience.  As such, the proposed models of goal level choice and affect are represented in a 
relatively simplified environment.  Given the significant level of complexity and scope in multiple 
goal paradigms, however, this research program makes an incremental contribution by focusing on 
describing striving processes towards a single goal. 
 Participants were also assigned to strive towards a performance goal rather than having an 
opportunity to set their own goals (see Brunstein, 1993; Wiese & Freund, 2005).  Participants were 
able to choose and adjust their goal level, but the direction and purpose of the goal was fixed by the 
study.  On the one hand, there is evidence that self-set and assigned goals can produce relatively 
similar outcomes (Latham & Marshall, 1982; Locke & Latham, 2002), and most real-world work 
environments will involve assigned goals for employees.  On the other hand, individuals who set 
their own goals may demonstrate preferences for qualitatively different types of goals, such as 
learning goals or normative comparison goals (Brett & VandeWalle, 1999; Cron, et al., 2005; Fan, 
Meng, Billings, Litchfield, & Kaplan, 2008; Phillips & Gully, 1997; Sullivan, et al., 2006).  The 
findings from this research apply to assigned performance goals, and further research would be 
needed to assess whether the findings can generalise to other goal types.   
 Another limitation to consider is the length of the goal striving episodes, which involved 
five to 15 minute trials across sessions that were no longer than three hours.  Although this time 
scale makes it possibe to observe meaningful, proximal goal striving processes (see Raudenbush, 
2000; Vancouver, et al., 2001; G. Yeo & Neal, 2006), my findings do not account for possible 
longer term changes in performance, goal levels, and affective states (e.g., moods).  For instance, 
goal framing may lead to long term changes in performance or affective states that cannot be 
observed in my studies; it is also possible that the observed patterns of data may stabilise over time 
through learning and adaptation (March, 1996).  The studies in this research program were able to 
reveal meaningful changes in goal striving processes within a short time interval, but these findings 
should not be assumed to generalise to long term trends. 
 Finally, it is necessary to acknowledge that this research program collected data in a 
laboratory setting involving university students, as compared to a field setting with employees in 
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organisations.  There are a multitude of environmental, selection, and covariate factors in field 
settings that my research does not account for, which suggest that further research is needed to test 
for generalisability in applied settings (see Ashford & Northcraft, 2003; Kanfer, 2009; Lindenberg 
& Steg, 2007).  However, the underlying goal striving processes being studied should not be unique 
to the choice of setting and population, and the participants in my studies performed a medium-
fidelity ATC simulation task that is established to be challenging and engaging (Fothergill, et al., 
2009; Loft, et al., 2004).  There is also consistent evidence indicating that laboratory-based studies 
can have as much external validity as field studies when appropriate research designs and 
manipulations are used (C. A. Anderson & Bushman, 1997; C. A. Anderson, Lindsay, & Bushman, 
1999; Bower, 1992; Locke, 1986; Stone-Romero, 2004).  In actuality, laboratory research provide 
the necessary level of control to develop and test psychological theories, particularly when complex 
and dynamic processes are involved. 
Directions for Future Research 
 Based on the findings established in this thesis, I propose that there are several directions for 
future research on goal striving processes.  There is a general need for a more complete and 
integrative theory that can describe both cognitive and affective processes at all stages of goal 
striving (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Brief & Weiss, 2002; Vancouver & Day, 2005).  However, 
such integrative works require a more precise understanding of each component of goal striving.  In 
the case of goal level choice, further research is needed to understand how decisions are made about 
goal levels when there are multiple goals to pursue.  There is a question of how individuals intend 
to allocate resources across multiple goals at the intial stage of goal level choice, and there are 
likely dynamic and interactive processes over time as individuals revise their goal levels based on 
feedback about performance across multiple goals.  Such research would contribute towards 
explaining how people strategically revise their goal levels over time when there are multiple 
opportunities, threats, or competing demands.  At a different level of analysis, it would also be 
interesting to examine ‘pre-emptive’ changes in goal level choice within a goal striving episode, 
rather than only between goal striving episodes.  There is a question of what within-person factors 
can predict goal level revision during goal striving, and also what between-person factors might 
influence how frequently individuals are willing to revise their goal level over time. 
 For the research on affective experiences during goal striving, I suggest that the proposed 
formal model should be integrated with existing literature on the consequences of affect on 
behaviour.  By examining how affective experiences emerge and how it leads to subsequent 
changes in behaviour over time, such research will contribute towards understanding affect as a 
dynamic control loop (see Vancouver, 2008).  I also propose that research is needed on how the 
indicators of goal progress and task demand constructs can be integrated with studies that have 
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focused on discrete events (Bono, Glomb, Shen, Kim, & Koch, 2013; Kahneman, et al., 2004).  
Although both types of research are valid approaches for predicting affective states, such studies 
have largely remained separated from each other.  In a workplace environment, employees typically 
have to attend to information about their performance through sources such as self-monitoring, 
performance reviews, key performance indicator reports, and informal feedback.  Yet they may also 
experience an encounter with a friendly colleague, an irate customer, or unexpected illness.  My 
research contributes towards understanding the indicators of goal progress and task demand in 
relation to task performance, but further research is needed to examine how discrete events can be 
integrated as well. 
 Finally, there are several directions for improving understanding about the role of goal 
framing.  My initial findings demonstrated an interaction between trait neuroticism and goal 
framing in predicting risk preferences, yet there are also other personality constructs and goal 
striving processes that might be influenced by goal framing (see Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & 
Lauriola, 2002; Roney, et al., 1995).  It would also be valuable to improve the understanding of how 
personality constructs may influence preferences for goal framing in turn, given that individuals can 
engage in self-selection of preferred environments (see Sullivan, et al., 2006).  Further review work 
is also needed to evaluate the relevance and overlap in the various approach-avoidance distinctions 
as presented in trait-based theories (see Elliot, 1999; Gray, 1982; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997; 
Jackson, 2009; Wallace, Johnson, & Frazier, 2009). 
Concluding Remarks 
 Goals are a central construct in many psychological theories and are an essential component 
of human motivation and behaviour, yet many questions remain about the underlying processes 
involved.  This thesis has provided a series of theoretical, methodological, and practical 
contributions by describing the processes involved in goal level choice, affective experiences, and 
goal framing as individuals engage in goal striving over time.  Through the use of multi-level 
research designs and computational modelling, my research provides insights into the dynamics of 
these constructs.  Several directions for future research have been suggested to further the 
understanding of these goal striving processes.  The necessity and impact of such research will 
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